

Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies - Rand Corporation, 2008 - 2008 - Walt L. Perry, John Gordon, IV, John Gordon - 9780833044563 - 57 pages

The dominance of intelligence. The analytic questions. Intelligence analysis. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that U.S. forces need more-effective techniques and procedures to conduct counterinsurgency. This monograph examines the nature of the contemporary insurgent threat and provides insights on using operational analysis techniques to support intelligence operations in counterinsurgencies. The authors examine the stages of an insurgency and discuss the kinds of intelligence that are needed at each stage. A number of techniques--pattern discernment and predictive analysis, for example--appear to show promise of being useful to intelligence analysis. Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation Rochlin, Gene I., and Chris C. Demchak Lessons of the Gulf War: Ascendant Technology and Declining Capability. Walter L Perry. John Gordon. Perry, Walter L. and John Gordon IV. 2008. Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgency. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation Rochlin, Gene I., and Chris C. Demchak. 1991. Lessons of the Gulf War: Ascendant Technology and Declining Capability. This book will serve as the primary resource for economists and students who want to learn about this important branch of economic theory. View. Show abstract. counterinsurgents collect operational reporting as they perform their daily functions--what is frequently termed "passive" collection--HUMINT requires "active" collectors who are specially trained to conduct military source operations and interrogations.6 Yet counterinsurgency doctrine is impoverished with respect to the role of HUMINT. See also, Walter L. Perry and John Gordon IV, Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008): 15. 13 Kilcullen, "Chapter 11: Intelligence," in Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges, ed. Thomas Rid and Thomas Keane (New York: Routledge, 2010):155. Chapter V intelligence support to counterinsurgency. Purposes of Joint Intelligence in a Counterinsurgency. Intelligence-Operations Dynamic and Intelligence Architecture. Principles of Intelligence Operations in Counterinsurgency. Intelligence Disciplines. All-Source Intelligence. Factors Effecting Intelligence Collaboration. Chapter VI supporting operations for counterinsurgency. Section a. information operations. General. Employing Information Operations Capabilities. Planning Information Operations in Counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency (COIN) is comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its core grievances. The United States Army spent decades conducting what was, essentially, a counterinsurgency in the American West during the period after the Civil War; the British Army was faced with multiple insurgencies during the period of Empire in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; and as the colonial era came to an end in the post World War II period, the Western militaries especially. Today, the problem of combating insurgencies continues to loom large for the armed forces of several western nations. Yet despite this, the preference of most Western militaries has been to focus on conventional combat operations against the armed forces of another nation state. This is reflected in the spending patterns of the NATO nations today.