Reconnecting Theory and Practice in Pluralistic Contexts: Issues and Aristotelian Considerations

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to contribute, from a research practitioner perspective, to the theory–practice gap debate in organization studies, focusing on pluralistic contexts such as project organizing. The current debate is introduced, then the features of the two main philosophical traditions (i.e., modernism and postmodernism) are critically summarized. Then, propositions to reconnect theory and practice according to the Aristotelian pre-modern ethical and practical philosophy are discussed. Some key implications in the following areas are outlined: roles played by practitioners and scholars; emancipatory praxeological style of reasoning; closing the “phronetic gap”; and the development of “good practice,” ethics, and politics.

KEYWORDS:
Aristotle; practice; theory; modern; post-modern; project organizing
INTRODUCTION

The overall purpose of this article is to contribute, from a research practitioner perspective, to the theory–practice gap debate in organization studies, especially in pluralistic contexts such as project organizing and temporary–based organizations. Pluralism is defined here as “constituted by three complementary characteristics of divergent and/or multiple objectives (e.g., stakeholders perspectives [Turner & Zolin, 2012]), diffuse power (e.g., project governance [Ahola et al., 2014]), and knowledge-based work processes (e.g., knowledge management and learning processes [Linder & Wald, 2010; Midler & Lundin, 1998])” (Denis et al., 2007, p. 182, [added by the authors]). Project management is considered mainly as an action (organizing as problem-solving) and goal-oriented discipline. “Because action takes place over time, and because the future is unknowable, action [and its consequences] is inherently uncertain” (Aristotle, 1926a, 1.3, [added by the authors]). This uncertainty is the cause of pluralistic project contexts. However, project management still relies on a strong engineering and modernist influence emphasizing predictability and certainty. Contrasting this view, as attested by many books, papers, articles, conferences, and seminars… and by everyday experience, we observe an increasing tension between demands for relevant, evidenced-based universal tools and solutions versus the need to accommodate ambiguity and context and the improbability of resolving the ambition of performance as the dependent variable (March & Sutton, 1997). As expressed by Keynes "...there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know." (Keynes, 1937, pp. 113–114) Consequently, rather than taking a perspective rooted in philosophy of science (e.g., modern and/or postmodern traditions), we focus on what practitioners do in organizing rather than what organizing theories and practices are. We introduce the state of the debate between theory and practice, part of the recurrent question of demonstrating that social
sciences and organization studies are sciences that matter, in other words, make an acknowledgeable impact on society. We outline the current debate between what we name in a reductive way, modern and postmodern traditions (Miller, 2009), and the prevalent dichotomous thinking (theory vs. practice) to better move beyond it, anchoring our contribution in the Aristotelian ethical and practical philosophy (Duska, 1993; Eikeland & Nicolini, 2011). Some main features of the two main philosophical traditions (modernism, postmodernism) in organization studies are briefly and critically summarized, before some key aspects of the Aristotelian pre-modern practical and ethical philosophy are presented. We contend that going back to the pre-modern philosophies (i.e., Aristotle in this article) offers a relevant and fruitful support to deliberate on the past and present to create the future (Söderlund & Gerald, 2012). In relation to uncertainty and deliberation, Aristotle noted, “But we only deliberate about things which seem to admit of issuing in two ways; as for those things which cannot in the past, present, or future be otherwise, no one deliberates about them, if he supposes that they are such; for nothing would be gained by it.” (Aristotle, 1926b, 1357a) Therefore, this work may be seen as part of the recent renewed interest in phronesis and phronic social science (e.g., Clegg, Flyvbjerg, & Haugaard, 2014; Shotter & Tsoukas, 2014; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997). We discuss and conclude with some major implications of the suggested shift to an Aristotelian emancipatory style of reasoning for reconciling theory and practice.

**Science that Matters and the Theory—Practice Gap**

The problem of science that matters (i.e., makes an impact on society), and its relation to the theory–practice gap has been widely discussed in literature (e.g., Kraaijenbrink, 2010; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011; Schram, 2004; Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006). In project
management, a stream in critical studies following the Foucauldian perspective (Hodgson, 2002; Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006; Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007) through the ‘Making Projects Critical’ workshops, and a phronetic perspective stream with focus on megaprojects (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Flyvbjerg et al., 2012) have been developed. These studies consider a clear dichotomy between bottom-up social science, and related substantive/practical/value rationality, and top-down natural science, and related formal/theoretical/scientific rationality (Kondrat, 1992, p. 237; Schram, 2004, p. 420), which in turn leads to critically evaluate the relation between theory and practice (Blomquist et al, 2010, p. 10) and how to bridge the gap between these two. The central argument of this article is that managers are rarely reduced to the theory-applying decision makers and that managers only matter when there is uncertainty; uncertainty being the defining characteristic of management practice. Therefore, uncertainty should have a more explicit place in management theory and practice in order to address the gap (Kraaijenbrink, 2010, p. 2, p. 15), and pluralistic contexts, involving “multiple objectives, diffuse power and knowledge-based work” (Denis et al, 2007, p. 179), such as project organizing and temporary-based organizations providing a sound empirical ground. Aram and Salipante (2003) attempt to reconcile the debate between theory and practice by proposing that management scholars must adopt a style of reasoning that is characterized by high rigor and relevance. Such initiative involves collaboration between actors from diverse disciplines to conduct problem-focused research in a specific context and that crosses epistemological lines and philosophical traditions (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2014).

Different Traditions for the Relation Theory–Practice: From Modern Practice to Postmodern Practice Turn
Complementing March and Sutton’s view that “the emperor of organizational performance studies is for the most part rather naked” (1997, p. 72), Kieser and Nicolai (2005) aptly make the point that the trade-off between rigor and relevance is not solved through success factor research (p. 275) and suggest that science should be conceptualized as a self-referential social system. This is achieved by (1) producing (sometimes implicitly) knowledge for problem-solving, and (2) developing alternatives to existing practices using science. Such efforts lead to academic research that is relevant to practice (Kieser & Nicoloi, 2005). Lalonde et al. (2012) demonstrate that, in project situations, two modes of inquiries—type 1: knowledge-based, theory, abstract/formal, and type 2: action-based, practical, particular—are intermeshed and that there is a subtle to-and-from movement between the “real” (facts, truths, and presumptions) and the “preferable” (values, hierarchies, and loci) (Lalonde et al., 2012, pp. 421, 425, 428). Authors recognize the tensions resulting from the shock between, on the one hand, the tyranny of the particular and practical knowledge in context and, on the other hand, the decontextualized ideal—a utopia as Thomas More would say, a context free tópos (place) to be found nowhere—of formal-cum-abstract knowledge (Toulmin, 1990, pp. 30–35). This is brought forward by the modern and postmodern traditions. The modern tradition is concerned with theories supporting decision making in response to a probabilistic context (and thus enabling some level of certainty); the postmodern tradition recognizes managerial actions and practices as a response to uncertain, complex, and socially constructed particular contexts (Chia, 1995; Miller, 2009). “Although the modern and the postmodern are clearly inextricably intertwined” (Chia, 1995, p. 580), they proceed from a different ontological view of the relation between the “real” and the “preferable”; in other words, being and stability versus becoming and change as a normal state-of-affairs (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). This debate led to the concept of “late modernity” (Giddens, 1990), although Appignanesi et al. (1995, p. 126, p. 172) posit postmodernity as a hyper-technological version of modernity.
Modern Practice

According to the modern tradition, practice, usually preceded by a qualifying adjective such as “good” or “best” reified as standards, is assumed to be informed by a tradition of general theories, such as covering laws or statistics generalizations, supporting rational decision making. In short, the modern tradition is about what practice is. This tradition is subject to a number of criticisms, because this, more often than not, falls into the realm of standardization (Brunsson et al., 2000). The debate between the pros and cons of standards and standardization notwithstanding (e.g., Brunsson et al., 2000, pp. 169–172), the mechanistic and rationalistic theories have proposed that the more the extent of standardization, the higher the organization’s performance (March & Sutton, 1997). This is to say that we need to move from good and best practices suitable for a simple or complicated environment, to more emergent and novel practices relevant for a complex or chaotic world (e.g., Jackson, 2003; Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). Hodgson and Cicmil (2007) demonstrate how the reification of these organizational objects leads to their naturalization, excluding alternative representations or classifications, and provide to this a rationalistic basis for "epistemic communities" (Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007, p. 435) and control (and the so-called "professionalization") of the "discipline" (Hodgson, 2002).

Postmodern Practice Turn

Coming back to the empirical dynamic of facts, various authors in project management suggest a shift to a postmodern tradition considering what practitioners do in project management context (e.g., see critical studies by Hodgson, 2002; Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006;
practice turn (Blomquist et al., 2010; Hälgren & Lindahl, 2012); phronetic social science (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Flyvbjerg et al., 2012); and new institutional theories and conventions theory (Bredillet, 2003). One commonalty among these approaches is the focus on the practice as to what practitioners do instead of what practice is and the recognition of the roles of power, actors' positions, values, and agendas in the construction and use of knowledge. A vast amount of literature, taking its root in the seminal works of authors such as Foucault (1977) and Giddens (1979), has been published since the early 1980s and deals with practice in social theory (Reckwitz, 2002). These works aim at overcoming the dualism between “individualism” and “societism” (Schatzki, 2005). “Practice theorist aim to respect both the efforts of individual actors and the workings of the social.” (Whittington, 2006, p. 614) The three core themes for practice theory: (1) practices—various tools, norms and procedures; (2) praxis—activity involved in the decision making and acting; and (3) practitioners—actors involved in, or seeking to influence the decision making and acting—are forming interrelated parts of a whole (Giddens, 1984). In the project management context, the practice turn, strongly inspired by the strategy-as-practice researches, has gained momentum (e.g., Blomquist et al., 2010; Bredillet, 2004; Cicmil, 2006; Cicmil et al., 2006; Hälgren & Söderholm, 2011; Lalonde et al, 2012)). Vaara and Whittington (2012) make clear that the practice turn “defines itself in opposition to methodological individualism,” how “praxis relies on practices,” and “how social structures and human agency link together in the explanation of action” (Vaara & Whittington, 2012, p. 288). Brown (2012, pp. 446–447) explores similarities and differences between practice turn (i.e., Varaa & Whittington, 2012) and phronetic social science (i.e., Flyvbjerg, 2004), and suggests no possible reconciliation between them: “…no attempt at reconciliation will be made—any such attempt could only succeed by introducing unproductive distortions” (Brown, 2012, p. 441). Indeed there is an irreducible divide between unconsciousness and consciousness, immersion in the habitus and
hexis (disposition), and between a Kantian ethical thought and an Aristotelian ethical thought. However, the limitation in Brown’s argument is that phronetic social science is barely Aristotelian, because the “expert” or “phronetic researcher” remains an outsider to the practice and this is in contradiction with Aristotelian thought (Eikeland, 2008, pp. 43–44 and note 28). Therefore, the postmodern tradition offers a contrasted classification of perspectives with regard to practice and knowledge/theory development and their mutual relation: on the one hand, the practice turn can be seen as still rooted in a kind of social scientific spirit, attempting to balance rigor and relevance, with a general focus on “knowledge and inquiry ‘for’ and ‘about’ and even ‘in’ practice” (Kondrat, 1992, p. 238); on the other hand, the phronetic social science suggests moving from a turn to a revolution, a practice revolution with an impact on society, focusing on relevance, and that “our knowing is ‘in’ our action” (Schön, 1983, p. 49). Maturana and Varela (1998, pp. 27–29) similarly define knowing as “effective action” and write that “all doing is knowing, and all knowing is doing.” In Practice theory words, Giddens (1984, p. 4) explicates knowledgeability as “inherent within the ability to ‘go on’ within the routines of social life.”

The Practice World is not Enough

We argue that, in pluralistic contexts (Denis et al., 2007, p. 179), for example, project organizing and temporary-based organizations (Packendorff, 1995), the practice world is not enough to fully capture the mutual relationships between practice (ways of knowing) and theory (knowledge forms) for the following three reasons. First, it doesn’t address well uncertain and complex organizing phenomena. The non-routine action and decision-making process involving explicit knowledge is not the primary focus of practice turn advocating “habitus” and routines anchored in the tacit and implicit, dimension of knowledge (Dionysiou
& Tsoukas, 2013; Polanyi, 1966). Furthermore, the conscious organizing efforts (i.e., not spontaneous self-organizing) in a pluralistic context are in contradiction to the practice turn concept of unconscious behavior and ideas such as pure spontaneous emergence of organizing phenomena. Second, it is anchored in a dichotomous thinking about scholars versus practitioners and knowers versus known. The relation individual–social levels and knowers–known should be considered in a recursive and reflexive way (Alvesson & Spicer, 2012, p. 1198; Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1512). We can contend that “the individual independence is embodied in collective dependence” (Gomez, 2006, p. 222), leading us to cool down the proposition of the primacy of the social on methodological individualism (practice turn) and conversely, considering Flybjerg’s phronetic social science. Third, it doesn’t fully clarify the problem of conceptualizing universals or general theory with regard to practical experience. The relation between means and ends is not made explicit (see as follows, in the section “Relational way of Thinking”) the confusing relation between deontology (duty, means) and consequentialism (ends) ethics of practice. Collective deliberation and dialogue about this relation, taking into account both facts and values; in other words, theoretical rationality and practical rationality, which are the recognition of some degree of rationalization of everyday practice and experience, require the support of analytical and epistemic efforts (“epistemic impulses”) (Eikeland, 2008, p. 23, p. 46). With regard to the relation between practice and theory, the empirical observations suggested by both the practice turn and phronetic social science, while claiming to reject any dualism (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011, pp. 1241–1243), do not pay full tribute to the necessary acquired practical experience as a way of knowing involving being native of situations and actions (Eikeland, 2008, p. 35) and not just an “empirical observer” or “engaged scholar” (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006). Based on an accurate reading of Aristotle, Lalonde et al. (2012) aptly address this point in their study, “An Empirical Investigation of the Project Situation: PM Practice as an Inquiry Process:” “This
work should be considered, among others (e.g., Bourgault et al., 2006), as a vehicle for experiential or in-action teaching styles.” (p. 429).

These brief developments illustrate an important phenomenon: the dissatisfaction in face of problems, antinomies, perplexities, and contradictions. "We feel we have overcome our ancestors, when in fact we are reworking the very sources of their dissatisfaction in new ways. [...] Aristotle himself said that right methods in philosophy begin by noticing contradictions in popular belief, or conflict between general opinion and the beliefs of the wise.” (Hacking, 2002, p. 2) In order to face "the organizational reality, which is often messy, ambiguous, fragmented and political in character" (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000, p. 60), we need both to relate the separate traditions shaping the practice world and go beyond them. This leads to the quest of Verstehen.

Verstehen

In contrast to the pseudo-quantitative or mathematical methods, which distort and oversimplify, and to the distant rationalization of everyday unconscious practice, human action is accomplished by the use of verstehen: “the intuitive quickness of enlightened understanding” (Schütz, 1964, p. 4). Additionally, the Aristotelian teleological understanding of the world (see as follows—the quest for eudaimonia [well-being, notion translated and exemplified, for example, by the development of concepts and business practices such as Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Conscience, Corporate Citizenship, Sustainable Responsible Business…], not to be confused with the utilitarian consequentialist “ends”) implies to consider individuals and objects according to the purposes they have and the roles they have to play (Maclntyre, 1985, pp. 57–59; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, pp. 669–670). Lalonde et al. (2012) explain that the creativity in the management of projects stems from the
unstable balance between the real and the preferable, between the physical world and the world of intentionality and preference; in other words, implying individuals are defined by and interact with historical, social, and cultural pluralistic contexts (MacIntyre, 1985, pp. 57–59). Judging, deliberating, and acting in such contextual uncertainty is a goal-oriented and reflective intuitive process (Perminova et al, 2008, p.77).

This shift of perspective involves moving from evaluative judgments in abstracto based on a list of attributes (what practice is), to factual statements in concreto based on what is done in a particular situation and context (what practitioners do) (Dionysiou & Tsoukas, 2013; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997). Consequently, far from seeing the uncertainty inherent in action being a tyranny of the particular, of the local, and of the timely to be escaped (Toulmin 1990, pp. 30–35), we rather see a place for emancipation (Habermas, 1973; Gadamer, 1975) and freedom, enabling us to deliberate in a prudent manner (phrónēsis) and to act to create ‘a’ desirable future. In project organizing situations, Lalonde et al. (2012) recognize that "the relationships established between the actors' cognitive schemas and perceptions of the situation, is an uncertain state of affairs. The actors do not deal with clear-cut situations. Indeed, projects by their very nature tend to expand." (p. 425).

However, the shift of perspective, from modern and/or postmodern standards of action to verstehen, is not per se sufficient to fully grasp what practitioners do, as it leaves us with the fundamental modern and postmodern dichotomous thinking between science and practical matters, between theory and practice. At the heart of this is the question of classifications, as illustrated below by Aristotle’s classification of knowledge (theory) and ways of knowing (practice) forms, acknowledging that there is a dynamical interaction between the classifications developed (in social and human sciences), and the individuals or behaviors classified (Hacking, 2002).
Beyond Modern and Postmodern Philosophies, Aristotle

This then leads us to consider a move from the dichotomy between a scientific (theoretical) rationality and a practical rationality (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011; Tsoukas, 2010). Moving beyond this dichotomous thinking involves shifting our focus from philosophy of science to a practical and ethical philosophy, where theory, practice, and ethics are intertwined (Duska, 1993): practical because the focus should be on the relevance of and to practice if we want to make research that matters and ethical, beyond utilitarian and consequentialist ethics focusing on material ends (“good” or “best” possible outcome of actions) and deontological ethics focusing on the means (duty, “right actions”) and on what one “ought to do,” because what matters is the achievement of eudaimonia, an individual “good life” in a good society. The Aristotelian practical and ethical philosophy offers a germane ground for this purpose.

Furthermore, as we develop below, the Aristotelian philosophy is fundamentally relational, in line with Hacking’s above-mentioned statement about the dynamic interaction between the classifications and the classified: the knower and the known always relate to each other.

In the next section, some key aspects of the Aristotelian tradition, putting it into perspective with the former, are introduced.

Pre-Modernism: An Aristotelian Tradition

Theory, Practices, Praxis, and Practitioners: Contemporary Thinkers’ Limitations

To summarize the current debate, on the one hand we face the enlightenment assumptions underlying modern tradition in social science, grounded in the utopic “unity-of-science dream of transforming and reducing all kinds of knowledge to one basic form and level” and cause–
effect relationships (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20); on the other hand, the postmodern interpretivist tradition, and its “tendency to make all kinds of knowing equivalent” (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20).

For contemporary thinkers, there is little agreement about the definitions of what theory (Corley & Gioia, 2011, p. 12) and practice are. However, Boxenbaum and Rouleau (2011) aptly offer recent synthetic definition of theory: “an ordered set of assertions about a generic behaviour or structure assumed to hold throughout a significantly broad range of specific instances” (p. 274). While Vaara and Whittington (2012), in their in-depth review of strategy-as-practice researches, state: “Practices refer to the various tools, norms, and procedures of strategy work, from analytical frameworks such as Porter’s Five Forces to strategic planning routines such as strategy workshops. Praxis refers to the activity involved in strategy-making, for example, in strategic planning processes or meetings. Practitioners are all those involved in, or seeking to influence, strategy-making.” (p. 290) Contemporary thinkers have commented on the concept of praxis and raised there is the risk of losing an intimate understanding leading to some dilution of its basic meaning into activity. “All praxis is an activity, but not all activity is praxis” warns Vazquez (Vazquez, 1977, p. 149). Adding to this, Warry (1992, p. 155) observes that analytic impoverishment leads to praxis and practice being used synonymously. We must return to the roots of the concept of praxis and explicit it.

Vazquez (1977) offers a clear and simple definition of the term when he wrote “Praxis […] is the central category of the philosophy which is not merely an interpretation of the world, but is also a guide to its transformation…” (p. 149). Praxis is a particular form of activity, a reflexive activity underlying a rational action. It is concerned with change, is present and future oriented, and requires anticipation of the effect of action, rather than the interpretation of a past or prior event (Vazquez, 1977, p. 169; Warry, 1992, p. 156).

However, these definitions do not pay a full tribute to the richness of meanings and nuances embedded in the Aristotelian gnoseology (Eikeland & Nicolini, 2011), encompassing the
whole set of ways of knowing: *epistêmê* (bifurcated in knowledge forms *theôrèsis* (speculation); and *theôria* (insight)), *páthos* (being affected passively from the outside), *khrêsis* (using instruments), *poiêsis* (making, manipulating materials) and *praxis* (bifurcated as practice, competence development and insight (*theôria*); and ethics, doing, virtuous performance, practical reasoning) (Eikeland, 2007, p. 348; 2008, p. 526; 2012, p. 20). These authors emphasize the limitations of the modern and postmodern appropriation of Aristotle philosophy, for example:

“Scientific methods are usually specialised techniques quite different from and extraneous to the ways of producing knowledge prevalent in our everyday lives. This goes even for the “post-modernist,” relativist, and constructivist alternatives gradually becoming mainstream, which often seem to move to the opposite extreme of making all forms of knowledge epistemologically equivalent. But these modernist, or post-modernist, ways of thinking are insufficient for understanding both knowledge and ethics.” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 348)

They highlight especially the lack of understanding of nuances between the various concepts (virtues, ways of knowing, and knowledge forms) and the willingness to classify these concepts as being independent and therefore missing a fundamental point: for Aristotle, and for the move beyond dichotomous thinking, in other words, theory versus practice, “Theôria was not just speculation and calculation from a separate and insulated observatory”; while meaning “something like studying for the purpose of understanding and truth, without intervening, and without the study being subordinated to or serving to promote any immediate plans for specific actions of any kind, [...] acquired, practical, participant experience (Empeiría) was necessary” (Eikeland, 2008, pp. 46–47).

**Relational Way of Thinking**
Drawing mostly on Eikeland (2007; 2008; 2012), we summarize some key aspects of Aristotle gnoseology. Aristotle’s thinking about ethical and intellectual virtues is fundamentally and explicitly relational. The knower and the known and the ways of knowing and the forms of knowledge, always relate to each other, enabling to reconnect means and ends, facts and values. The ethico-political consequences of the different ways of knowing are also explicitly considered.

Ethical Virtues

For Aristotle, ethics and practical wisdom, prudence (*phrónēsis*) is intimately linked to the ultimate *end* of humankind, which is improving our lives and achieving good life, happiness and well-being (*eudaimonia*), both for individuals and for society. Ethics is the condition for making righteous actions possible, which in turn enable the development of right habits and, in turn, enable the development of good character (*aretē*), a disposition (*hexis*) involving conscious choice, leading to achieving happiness. Ethics is thus practical knowledge rooted in experience and “good action oriented” rather than just theoretical knowledge. *Phrónēsis*, being both an ethical virtue AND an intellectual virtue (Eikeland, 2008, p. 53), must be acquired through practice and is not just about applying general understanding to particular occasions. Aristotle mentions good leaders showing *phrónēsis* (Aristotle, 1926a, 1144b). Two aspects should be emphasized (Kraut, 2014): (1) every ethical virtue is a balanced condition to both excess and deficiency (Aristotle, 1926a, 1106a26–1106b28); and (2) ethical theory does not offer a decision procedure because ethics cannot be reduced to a system of rules, although some rules are uninfringeable. Ethical theory illuminates the nature of virtue but what a virtuous agent must do in a particular situation depends on the circumstances.
Intellectual Virtues

However, Aristotle makes clear that, in order to fully acquire *phrónēsis* one must become both ethically virtuous and practically wise through (1) the development of proper habits (ethical virtues, not part of the reasoning soul but following reason); and (2) when aptitude to reasoning (intellectual virtues) is fully developed. This development is not sequential, and Aristotle states that ethical virtue is fully developed only when integrated with *phrónēsis* (Aristotle, 1926a, 1144b14–1144b17). *Praxis* knowledge denotes “a relationship between colleagues sharing common standards for how to go about their professional activities" (Eikeland, 2007, p. 351; Eikeland, 2012, p. 26). Theory signifies “…epistêmê, that is, for knowledge that was stabilised and pretty secure, about subjects that were for the most part or always stable and regular themselves” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 350). Two forms of praxis and theory (*epistêmê*) are related.

*Praxis*$_1$, dialogue and dialectics, is “the way of learning or research, moving “up” from how things appear to us phenomenologically to an articulated insight in basic principles ... searching patterns, similarities and differences in our accumulated practical experience...” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 352; Eikeland, 2012, p. 27) However, “critical dialogue needs relief from immediate pressure to act” (Eikeland, 2012, p. 29), and “a permanent skholê (leisure - open, free space - school) embedded in practical settings is needed, making it possible to develop, unfold, and articulate the "grammars" of different social settings” (Eikeland, 2006, p. 18). Examples of praxis$_1$ are: lessons learned across projects experience, reflective practice vis-à-vis the context (How do we decide what is right?). (Bredillet et al, 2014, p. 8)
The related form of theory—called epistêmê₁ or théôría—“where like in grammar there is no physical distance between the knower and the known. “This means that the subjects studied—our own forms of practice—must be “reified” reflectively in order to be grasped, since they are not really outside us or outside our practices at all” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 351; Eikeland, 2012, p. 24). Furthermore, “…theory as “Theôría” thus becomes a resource to be used in action and for action to produce emancipatory visibilisation and expansive articulation” (Eikeland & Nicolini, 2011, p. 169). Examples of epistêmê₁ are: conscious development of reflexive expertise and patterns of practice (involve examining into how practitioners are thinking about what they are doing, not just a reflection on what they are doing), critically translating and adapting lessons learned to specific situations and context (How do we decide what is right?). (Bredillet et al, 2014, p. 8)

The second form of theory, called epistêmê₂ or théôrêsis is “based on observation at a distance. Théôrêsis relates to external objects without intervening. The relation implied between the knower and the known, is difference, distance, separation, non-interaction, and non-interference (ex. astronomy)” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 349; Eikeland, 2012, p. 21). Examples of epistêmê₂ are: using general models to investigate the social or environmental impact of a project (Bredillet et al, 2014, p. 8).

Phrônêsis is a knowledge form related to Praxis₂. Phrônêsis is ”the way down from “theory” to “practice” … the practical enactment is often immediate and spontaneous … but in other fields where the practice is not equally standardised and “automated,” for example in ethics, the “application” of general competence or of the knowledge of principles provided by ethical virtues like justice, courage, friendliness, honesty, etc., needs deliberation or phrônêsis, trying to find out how to act in the most just or fair way towards someone right
here and now. The point is that the way from theory to practice within this kind of knowledge is not deductive, nor does it go by some form of technical calculation of effects. And it was never intended to be deductive or calculative by Aristotle” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 352; Eikeland, 2012, p. 31; text emphasized by us). Examples of praxis are: non-technical risk management, team management, conflict management, stakeholder management… (contextual use of theories and techniques involving adaptation and questioning assumptions) (doing the right things, getting things done). (Bredillet et al., 2014, p. 8)

The Mediating Role of Praxis and Phrónēsis: Inseparability Between Ethical and Intellectual Virtues

For Aristotle, praxis, phrónēsis, and ethics are inseparable. The aspects of values and ethics are fully embedded in the teleological perspective. As Aristotle (1926a, 1140b 6) put it: "while making has an end other than itself, action cannot; for good action itself is its end." Tsoukas and Cummings (1997) explain: "There is an internal relationship between acting and the standards in terms of which acting is judged, which is not there when producing artifacts." (p. 666). For Aristotle, the central role is played by phrónēsis because, in human actions, the ethical virtues and practical knowledge go together: "It is impossible to be practically wise without being good" (1926a, 1144a 18). Phrónēsis involves "knowing the right values and being able to put them into practice in concrete situations." (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 666) As phrónēsis is both intellectual excellence and excellence of character, we cannot be intellectuality prudent (phronimoi) without being ethically good (Eikeland, 2008, p. 59). Phrónēsis, as an intellectual virtue, cannot be acquired alone independently from other ethical virtues. Thus it is impossible to separate phrónēsis from other ethical virtues: “We cannot be prudent without being good and we cannot be fully good
without being prudent, taking the particulars of the situation into account” (Eikeland, 2008, p. 64).

The focus of the particulars of the situation leads Tsoukas and Cummings (1997) to ask the question: “Apart from being inherently value-laden, what is it about practical matters that requires human agents to have practical wisdom instead of merely scientific or craft knowledge?” (p. 666). Referring to Aristotle, Nussbaum (1990, pp. 70–75) indicates three reasons: (1) practical matters change over time, and new problems call for new responses, (2) practical matters are inherently ambiguous, and (3) Nussbaum (1990, p. 74) observes that “Aristotle suggests that the concrete ethical case may simply contain some ultimately particular and non-repeatable elements.”

We can now build on the foundations above established and rejoin theory and practice, highlighting important propositions.

**Implications**

Reconnecting theory and practice according to the Aristotelian ethical and practical philosophy, above discussed, has some key implications. For practitioners, “good practice” or standards are the baseline set by the virtuoso performers, not just the “good” or the “best” reified compendium of shared average practices. For researchers, theorizing is the outcome of engaging within a community of practitioners. For educators, the development of knowledge and competence takes place through practical acquired experience and perfecting actualization, in addition to perception and distant observation (Statler, 2014). However, these implications are intertwined. Following, the relation between collective *praxis*; development of “good practice” (standards); ethics and politics; the roles played by practitioners and
scholars; an emancipatory praxeological style of reasoning, for closing the “phronetic gap”; and the importance of reconnecting means and ends, facts, and values are emphasized.

**Collective Praxis, Standards, Ethics, and Politics**

Developing *do*, in other words, practice *and* knowledge and competence (i.e., theory), is done by entering the tradition of a community of practitioners (MacIntyre, 1985; Schön, 1987; Brown & Duguid, 1991) sharing common goals, in other words, ends, will, wish, or want and opinion (Eikeland, 2008, p. 87, 121) and ways of achieving them (means, but with the underlying idea of doing (*praxis*) and doing well (*eupraxia*)).

For Aristotle, “*praxis is not only individual, however. Collective praxis is possible when we follow common standards, and adjust to each other communicatively, i.e., through establishing mutual and common understandings of how things should be done in “concord” (homónoia in EN1167a22-b16, EE1241a16—34), as e.g., in grammatical regulations of language use, or when musicians and dancers play according to a common score, or improvise, tuning in on each other knowing the basic principles of the music and the dance*” (Eikeland, 2008, p. 87).

Developing “good practice” is done by entering the tradition of a community of practitioners (MacIntyre, 1985; Schön, 1987) sharing common goals, in other words, “*ends,*” will, wish, or want and opinion (Eikeland, 2008, p. 87, 121) and ways of achieving them, in other words, “*means*” but with the underlying idea of doing (*praxis*) and doing well (*eupraxia*). The distinction between *ends* and *means* in Aristotle is not an easy topic, and is linked to the four Aristotelian causes (material, formal, efficient [the near only one considered by moderns and
postmoderns], and final [for an in-depth discussion, see e.g. Eikeland, 2008, pp.194–196 and Falcon, (2014)].

But how are these common “good practices” or standards conceived, developed, and used after an Aristotelian perspective? The way of conceptualizing “universals” or “general theory” has to be made clear. According to Eikeland (2008, p. 25), three kind of traditions can be considered: (1) covering laws (deductive nomological or hypothetico-deductive model), (2) statistical generalizations, and, (3) standards. Standards can be understood as ideals for practitioners, defining what it means to perform a certain kind of an activity competently or with certain quality (p. 26). These standards are transient and change when someone performs them better.

Being part of the community (i.e., *polis*) doesn’t involve blind acceptance of standards, conventions, norms (*nomos*, i.e., laws), but at the same time the acceptance of historically developed laws and collective dialogues, debates, and deliberations about them leading to possibly changing them (Solomon, 1992; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670; see also Castoriadis, 1991, p. 104 for ancient Greek conception of politics). Tsoukas and Cummings (1997) rightly enhances: “...*in the social domain in general, and in organizations in particular, uncertainty, ambiguity and politics must go together*” (p. 671). Thus, through *praxis* and *phronēsis*: “Ethics is politics inasmuch as the achievement of human happiness” (Strang, 1998, p. 1).

**Reuniting the Scholar—Practitioner Dichotomous Roles: The Aristotelian Phronimos and the “PraXitioner”**

The assumptions about the roles, behaviors, and expectations of the agents or actors, as framed by the classical classes' dichotomy between scholars and practitioners (Aram &

Following the Aristotelian tradition, we suggest that there is a need to go further in depth to fully grasp the importance of moving to consider one single class of actors in project situations. Hacking develops the idea of interactive classifications (see, e.g., previous quote: Hacking, 2002, p. 10) and looping effects (Hacking, 1995) about “how classifications affect us and how we create new classes anew” (Hacking, 2002, p. 12). As a consequence, moving from the two classes dichotomy “scholars–experts–researchers” and the “managers/workers–practitioners–participants” to one single class, we name praXitioners (or “phronimos [i.e., wise man, moral expert, embodying phrônēsis] in development”) is all but neutral, with regard to a praxeological (praxeology defined as study or science of human actions and conduct, i.e., praxis) style of reasoning (Hacking, 2002, p. 3) and to go beyond the theory versus practice/rigor versus relevance gap. We maintain that this move away from the current dichotomy may contribute to create new perspectives through a new class and open up new ways of thinking and acting in project situations. The name praXitioner is both related to praxis, and to what Stacey names “reflexive practitioner,” in contrast to the “reflective practitioner” (Schön, 1983), “because reflexive practices involves noticing and thinking about participation with others in the accomplishment of joint tasks […] Reflexive practice is more than reflective practice because it involves people in more than reflection together on what they are doing, and that more is inquiring into how they are thinking about what they are doing […] Reflexivity is thinking about how we are thinking” (Stacey, 2012, p. 112). We
suggest therefore a shift from the “reflective practitioner” and “reflexive practitioner” to the praxitioner, performing reflexive praxis, what Eikeland names being “native” (Eikeland, 2006, p. 45; 2012, p. 11), the “phronimos in development.”

An Emancipatory Praxeological Style of Reasoning

Practice and theory, in their relational, recursive, and reflexive dimensions, should be embedded in practical contexts (Eikeland, 2008, p. 47). Both dialogical and dialectical modes of thought and action should be privileged for moving away any dichotomous thinking and choosing one side of the dichotomy (Eikeland, 2008, p. 48) and recognizing the whole dynamic of classification systems. Hacking (2002, p. 4) states that the essence of a style of reasoning is classification, “and also something need for thought itself.” Each style of reasoning introduces new objects, new classes of objects generating new classes of entities (e.g., “praxitioner”), and new onto-epistemological debates about their reality and the ways of knowing about them. It creates its own appropriate “very criteria of truth” and is “self-authenticating” (Hacking, 2002, p. 4).

We suggest therefore that an emancipatory praxeological style of reasoning, unequivocally rooted in Aristotle philosophy, can offer such a needed holistic approach, and we outline below some key tenets of this approach. Praxeology is defined as the study or science of human actions and conduct, praxis and practices (Petruszewycz, 1965; Ostrowski, 1967) and, if its origin can tracked back to Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics (1926a), the word “praxeology” is accredited to Louis Bourdeau in his "Théorie des Sciences" (1882, last but one chapter; Ostrowski, 1967, p. 21). A presentation of the origins of praxeology, and more generally of works supported by a "praxeological intent" (Petruszewycz, 1965, p. 13), through an anthology of historical literature shows the richness of the concept, spanning from
economics to mathematics and probability, games theory and economic behaviour, and dialectical materialism (Bogdanov in Petruszewycz, 1965, p. 16 and in Le Moigne, 2007, p. 118) … and its comprehensiveness. We can mention further development in the area of education and learning (Pascal & Bertram, 2012), social science (Eikeland, 2012), and project-as-practice (Blomquist et al., 2010).

At the heart of praxeology is the mediating role of praxis as a way of knowing and phrónēsis as knowledge form developed through empeiria (practical acquired experience). For Aristotle (1926a), the possession of intellectual virtues, along with the possession of ethical virtues, enables an individual to achieve eudaimonia. Eudaimonia requires activity, action, exhibiting virtue (excellence of character), and intellectual excellence (reason, rational activity). We now see the full quality of praxis. It is not simply action based on reflection. It is action that embodies certain qualities, which include a commitment to eudaimonia and the search for truth, and respect for others. It is the action of people who are free, who are able to act for themselves. Moreover, praxis is always risky, because the future is uncertain. It requires that a person “makes a wise and prudent practical judgement about how to act in this situation” (Carr & Kemmis, 1986, p. 190 quoted in). Praxis as such aims at the emancipation of individuals or communities from the alienating aspects of everyday practice subject to the hegemony of the rationalist forces constraining every day actions or activities (Frankenberg, 1988, pp. 326–327). As Wary puts it:

“Praxis research requires the development of non-alienating methodologies that are dialogic and participatory in nature. [...] Praxis, then, is not simply activity, but a specific form of activity: activity based on knowledge informed by theory and performed according to ethical and moral principles for political ends. Habermas and Gadamer both point to “emancipatory praxis,” which appeals to communicative practice aimed at overcoming incommensurable beliefs. Emancipatory praxis is a specific type of moral and
Thus, according to an emancipatory praxeological style of reasoning, we can put forward that the ultimate purpose of any organization is achieving *eudaimonia* (good life, human well-being, happiness) and social good through “ethics” (Aristotle, 1926a) and related “politics” (Aristotle, 1944). Reasoning according to an emancipatory praxeology is thus about knowing and acting, on the basis of ethics and politics, from the viewpoint of the development of *eudaimonia* and social good. Furthermore, the emancipatory aspect is supported by the dialogical and dialectical modes of thought and action suggested above and the recognition of the dynamic and interactive relationship between and within any classification systems we may consider; for example, everyday practices and arbitrary versus non arbitrary standards (Eikeland, 2008, p. 26), differentiating organizing episodes (Tsoukas, 2010) versus recognizing that these episodes being intertwined and interacting with each other, universal versus particular, general epistemic accounts versus narratives and/or case studies, abstract versus concrete, deductive versus inductive versus abductive logic, and theoretical pluralism (Eikeland, 2008, pp. 42–43).

With regard to knowledge and competence (i.e., theory) and ways of knowing as activities (i.e., practice), Eikeland (2008) explains that “knowledge and competence is increasingly developed from within practical contexts... making organisational learning in work places and all cooperative endeavours—i.e. collective efforts, experiential learning and improvement—increasingly important in general” (pp. 21–22). This relation between knowing and practicing is also acknowledged by Weisinger and Salipante (2000): "The knowing is bound with the practicing of seemingly mundane actions … knowing as situated learning and practicing" (p. 387).
Thus, *praxis* and *phrônēsis*, in their mediating role, serve as the focal point through which dichotomies are integrated, and have been recognized as "emancipatory" (Habermas, 1971, p. 314; Gadamer, 1975), and offering "a way of reflecting on disjuncture between the formal rationality and the substantive rationality" (Kondrat, 1992, p. 253). Project management authors, including Blomquist et al. (2010, p. 9), Cicmil and Hodgson (quoting Balck, 1994, p. 2 in Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006, p. 13), and Lalonde et al. (2012, p. 428) have acknowledged a similar view. As Eikeland (2008) puts it, which supports our view about the above-defined *praxitioner*: “Only in praxis, not in the study of external nature, the student and the studied, the knower and the known, coincide.” (p. 87)

**Closing the Phronetic Gap**

An important aspect connected to the mediating role of *praxis* and *phrônēsis* and to what Taylor (1993, p. 57) calls closing “the pronoetic gap,” is that the Aristotelian tradition enables us to specify how to “reconnect Means and Ends, Facts and Values” (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 668) and to move beyond “a dualistic way of thinking” (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 668) about doing (practice) and reasoning (theory), factual statements, and evaluative judgments.

We need to start from Aristotle’s teleological view of the world; for him, human agents and natural things are defined for the sake of some functions or purposes (ends). From a factual statement, such as “he/she (e.g., practitioner project manager [PM]) meets recurrently and successfully the project objectives” we can infer the evaluative judgment “s(he) is a good PM.” Teleologically, classifying someone as a project manager is to think about the purposes, the ends, he or she pursues with regard to the functions or roles he or she fulfills or the way he or she is expected to behave, “*not conceiving* [him or her] *as ahistorical selves or abstract*
individuals” (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670). Thus, calling a project manager “good” is to make a factual statement about what an acknowledged “good” project manager does, and not referring to a list of attributes he or she should meet. A concept such as “good” is not an abstract entity or category in a classification system, but is embedded in the activity, particular context, and situation (Feyerabend, 1987, p. 113). Calling a particular action “good” means what a “good” project manager would (is expected) do in the situation and is therefore making a factual statement (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 59; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670) reconciling facts and values. A direct implication is that the development of knowledge and competence should be made, for the praXitioner, through practical acquired experience (empeiría) and perfecting actualization (energeia) and not just through perception (aisthēsis), abstract, distant, and external observation. We can emphasize the alignment with the above discussion about conceptualizing “universals” or “general theory” as “standards” (Eikeland, 2008, p. 26).

Concluding Comments: The Role of an Emancipatory Praxeological Style of Reasoning in Reconnecting Theory and Practice

Summarizing the work done by the research network “Rethinking Project Management,” Winter et al. (2006) suggest “five [three main] directions in which the current conceptual foundations of project management need to develop in relation to the developing practice.” (p. 642):

1. Theory ABOUT Practice (knowledge 'about' practice): Life cycle model of projects and project management versus theories of the complexity of projects and project management. Theory that helps us to understand practice, albeit from a particular perspective, which does not necessarily have immediate practical application;
2. Theory FOR Practice (knowledge 'for' practice): this is a reference to concepts and approaches that do have practical application; and
3. Theory IN Practice (knowledge 'in' practice): practitioners as trained technicians versus practitioners as reflective practitioners. This is essentially a reference to how practitioners learn their craft, and how they actually practice their craft using relevant theory from the published literature on project management. (Winter et al., 2006, pp. 641–642)

In this presentation, theory is seen mainly as relating to epistêmê1 and 2 (theôría and theôrêsis) and tékhnê, and practice as relating to poîêsis. Furthermore, the explicit/implicit dimension is here privileged.

While recognizing the relevance of these directions strongly rooted in a classical perspective (i.e., “knowledge and inquiry ‘for’ and ‘about’ and even ‘in’ practice” [Kondrat, 1992, p. 238]), we argue that this work should go further and does not fully build on its argument.

With regard to the above discussion about the three knowledge perspectives (and to the tacit, implicit, and explicit dimensions), we can conclude there is a need for two more directions: Theory FROM Practice (including knowledge 'from' and knowing 'in' practice, and therefore a tacit dimension), and Theory AS Practice (knowing 'as' practicing) reconnecting the tacit, implicit, and explicit dimensions. Extending the long-standing debate that “research and practice produce distinct form of knowledge” (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006, p. 806) and in order to enable a better understanding of the relationship between epistêmê1 and 2 (theôría and theôrêsis), tékhnê, and phronesis, we would suggest considering the following complementary knowledge perspectives:

Theory FROM Practice: from bodies of knowledge and process-based standards relying on covering laws and/or statistical generalizations (“most of...”) to performance-based standards or actionable practice guides.
4. Knowledge ‘from’ practice, (Van de Ven, 2006, p. 805)—tékhnê ‘from’ poiēsis and
dialectics, dialogue ‘from’ praxis1: with Kondrat, (1992), reversing the classical perspective
(knowledge ‘for practice’) and beyond the above discussion about “knowledge and inquiry
‘for’ and ‘about’ and even ‘in’ practice” (section “postmodern practice turn”), recognizing
that “What has been missing from our collective conversation concerning practice knowledge
is an empirical study of practice knowledge itself”. (Kondrat, 1992, p. 238).

5. Knowing ‘in’ practice—tékhnê (calculation), dialectics and dialogue, deduction and
deliberation ‘in’ poiēsis, praxis1, and theôria = epistêmê1: “our knowing is ‘in’ our action.”
(Schön, 1983, p. 49). Schön argues that the skillful practice shown by professionals does not
consist of applying some a priori knowledge to a specific decision or action, but rather of a
kind of knowing that is inherent in their action (see also above in section “postmodern
practice turn”: Maturana & Varela, 1998, pp. 27–29; Giddens, 1984, p. 4). As Feldman and
Orlikowski (2011) put it:

“These insights have led to an understanding of knowing in practice as the
knowledgeability that is continually enacted through ongoing action. Such an
understanding rejects the traditional dualism set up between knowledge that exists “out
there” (encoded in external objects, routines, or systems) and knowledge that exists “in
here” (embedded in human brains, bodies, or communities).” (p. 1243)

6. Theory AS Practice: In a given project organizing pluralistic context, from adaptive
practice and doing the right things and getting things done to questioning how we critically
learn in a situation, develop reflexive praxis, and decide what is right. Knowing-‘as’-Practicing
– poiēsis/tékhnê; praxis1/dialectics, dialogue; theôria = epistêmê1/dialogue, deduction,
deliberation; khrēsis, poiēsis/tékhnê; praxis2/phrônēsis (deliberation); theôrēsis =
epistêmê2/deduction, demonstration, and didactics. The logic of ‘Knowing-in-Practice’ is fully
realized through ‘Knowing-as-Practicing,’ following recursive logic between “theorizing
practice and practicing theory” and the fact that “theorizing practice is itself a practice” (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011, p. 1250). We acknowledge here Van de Ven and Johnson (2006) and their plea in favor of engaged scholarship and while moving beyond with our view pleading in favor of a single class of praXitioner.

With regard to project organizing, some authors have taken these two directions ('from' and 'as'), explicitly or not, proposing various perspectives, for example, ‘Making Project Critical’ (Hodgson, 2002; Ciemil & Hodgson, 2006; Hodgson & Ciemil, 2007; Ciemil, Hodgson, Lindgren & Packendorff; 2009), ‘Phronetic Research’ (Flyvbjerg, 2004), ‘future-perfect’ (Pitsis, Clegg, Marosszeky, & Rura-Polley, 2003), ‘multi-rationalities and cultures’ (van Marrewijk et al., 2008), ‘Project-as-Practice’ (Blomquist et al., 2010), ‘PM Practice/Rethoric & Pragmatist’ (Lalonde et al., 2012).

A common characteristic to these perspectives is, to a certain extent depending on the authors, the acknowledgment of the concurrent and holistic advancement of knowledge (epistêmê, tékhne, and phrônêsis) in relation to empirical ground (theôría, theôrêsis, poiêsis, and praxis).

Moving a step further, a logical consequence of this dual objective, for a science that matters, is to recognize that the reflexive production and transfer of knowledge (epistêmê, tékhne, and phrônêsis) useful for the advancement of (theôría, theôrêsis, poiêsis, and praxis) involve an emancipatory praxeological style of reasoning. We can posit that reconnecting theory and practice, in other words, transcending the five directions above-discussed: Theories ABOUT, FOR, IN, FROM, and AS Practice, and the gaps and dichotomous thinking they each carry, requires a holistic style of reasoning.

While acknowledging that the pre-modern Aristotelian tradition is obviously not the only way to suggest a possible solution to the theory–practice gap problem, we argue that an emancipatory praxeological style of reasoning, rooted in Aristotelian practical and ethical philosophy, offers an appropriate support for learning and acting in project organizing.
pluralistic contexts and situations. Furthermore, we don’t mean that the above discussion is relevant only in pluralistic contexts and/or in project organizing and temporary-based organizational settings. However, we consider that these particular settings provide a relevant empirical ground, with its inherent embodied uncertainty, exemplifying the dynamic of today’s managerial practice in context and where reconciling theory and practice is crucial for developing “good practice” and for the good of the society.

Indeed,

"Practical wisdom (phronesis) [...] deals with both universals and particulars. More precisely, phronesis is knowing what is good for human beings in general as well as having the ability to apply such knowledge to particular situations, or, as Aristotle remarks, it is the 'reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods’ (Aristotle, 1980, 1140b 6).” (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 665)

References


The effects of Social Support derived from WoW, Abstract. Previous research examining players of Massively-Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs) suggests that players form meaningful relationships with each other. Other research indicates that people may derive social support from online sources and this social support has been associated with greater wellbeing. Java (jdk download/GetFile/1.8.0_66-b18/windows-i586/au.msi). To resolve the issue please try the offline installer. The failure here indicates that one of the files being downloaded with the online installer is having an issue. Downloading the offline installer should work around this. 1. Go to https://www.java.com/en/download/manual.jsp. 2. Click on "Windows Offline". Full-text downloads displays the total number of times this work’s files (e.g., a PDF) have been downloaded from QUT ePrints as well as the number of downloads in the previous 365 days. The count includes downloads for all files if a work has more than one. More statistics ID Code. If you believe that this work infringes copyright please provide details by email to qut.copyright@qut.edu.au. Deposited On: 25 Aug 2020 05:37.