STATE OF THE ART

“PROTRACTED CONFLICT”

The Foreign Policy Research Institute “Defense Intellectuals” and Their Cold War Struggle with Race and Human Rights

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Abstract
Robert Strausz-Hupé (1903-2002) and Stefan Possony (1913-1995) were two scholars and policy makers who reached the peak of their careers as the tutelary spirits of the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), founded in 1955 at the University of Pennsylvania. Through the FPRI and its journal, Orbis, the influence of these two anti-“totalitarian” crusaders reached the high echelons of the United States military and U.S. policy makers. This article analyzes the way in which the intellectuals of the FPRI—“defense intellectuals”—tweaked concepts such as “human rights,” “freedom,” “democracy,” and “open society” in order to promote the interests of the United States’s military-industrial establishment, court racist lobbies, and accommodate problematic Cold War allies such as South Africa.

Keywords: Human Rights, Cold War, Propaganda, Racism, Nationalism, Fascism, Civil Rights, NATO

INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 has been saluted as a victory of the global democratic crusade waged by the United States against its “totalitarian” enemies in the name of human rights, a global free market, free elections, and an open society (Stewart-Smith 1980). Considered from this vantage point, the whole history of the Cold War reads like a triumphant story about the march of global democracy under the leadership of great men such as Robert Strausz-Hupé (1903-2002) and Stefan Possony (1913-1995), two scholars and policy makers who reached the peak of their careers during the Cold War as the tutelary spirits of the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), founded in 1955 at the University of Pennsylvania (Marlo 2012; McDougall 1995). Strausz-Hupé and Possony, together with William Roscoe Kintner, James E. Daugherty, Alvin J. Cottrell, and other FPRI researchers, authored and co-authored countless books and articles, which signaled them as the
“most vocal supporters of American military power” (Gottfried 1986, p. 72) throughout the Cold War and brought them a wide and multilayered audience (Buckley 1969). Their ascendance marked the pernicious role played by a certain strain of social science during the Cold War.

Strausz-Hupé wrote for both academic journals and the popular press (The New York Times, The Saturday Evening Post), and in the 1950s appeared on various radio and television programs warning against the communist danger and asking for increased military spending (Raymond 1958; Shepard 1956; Strausz-Hupé et al., 1972). The publications of Possony, Strausz-Hupé, and Kintner were translated into several foreign languages (Chinese, Italian, French, Spanish, Turkish, Japanese, and German) and, while received rather coldly in the academic world (outside the militarized perimeter of “area studies”), the popular press published glowing endorsements of the works of these FPRI “defense intellectuals” signed by, among others, Hans Kohn (1965), Paul M. A. Linebarger (1959), and C. L. Sulzberger (1959). Walter Lippmann (1947) found in Strausz-Hupé’s work a better explanation of the Soviet expansion than that offered by George F. Kennan, the diplomat who, in 1947, formulated the policy of “containment” and was at that moment at the height of his reputation as a Sovietologist. At one point in the 1960s, even Soviet journalists or military experts quoted Strausz-Hupé in the same breath as George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, W. W. Rostow, or Raymond Aron, and tried to debunk his “hackneyed lie about (. . .) the ‘Communist menace’” (Kunina 1966, p. 60; Rybkin 1966).

In 1964, commenting on a decade of FPRI intellectual production, the veteran conservative journalist and Russian expert William Henry Chamberlin (1964) wrote that Strausz-Hupé, Possony, Kintner, and Anthony Bouscaren have “produced a library of literature on means and methods designed to win the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union” (p. K7). A shrill “Cold Warrior” who taught political science at Marquette University and at the National War College in Washington, D.C., Bouscaren himself quoted as authoritative and insistently recommended the anticomunist literature produced by the FPRI intellectuals (1953, 1958, 1973). The Congress, and particularly the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), shared this enthusiasm for the expertise and unflinching patriotism of the FPRI intellectuals and invited them on several occasions for consultations on the thorny issue of the communist strategy for world domination, and the U.S. answer to it (Bartlett et al., 1962; Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate 1959; Committee on Un-American Activities United States House of Representatives 1958, 1959; Possony 1961a, 1961b, 1970).

Nelson D. Rockefeller invited Possony to join his two “psychological warfare” meetings known as “Quantico I” (June 1955) and “Quantico II” (August 1955), which recommended that the United States had to increase military spending in order to contain the Soviet Union (Slany 1987). The first one was produced by Kintner, who suggested it, recruited its participants, and oversaw the proceedings, while the second one was Henry Kissinger’s brainchild (Klingman et al., 1990; Rostow 2003). In 1964, Possony, Kintner, and Strausz-Hupé joined Barry Goldwater’s presidential campaign as advisors (Barnet 1973). By the 1970s, Strausz-Hupé came to be celebrated in certain circles as one of the founding fathers of the academic discipline of international relations, and during the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan administrations served as the U.S. ambassador to Sri Lanka (1970-71), Belgium (1972-74), Sweden (1974-76), NATO (1976-77), and Turkey (1981-89) (Hoffman 1977; Kennedy 2006; Naftali 2007). In 1961, Possony would become director of the International Political Studies Program at the Hoover Institution on War Revolution and Peace at Stanford University, from which he would retire as a Senior Fellow in 1981. Starting in the 1970s,
Possony dedicated himself to the exploration of the political and military implications of cybernetics and came to be widely acknowledged as the godfather of the United States Strategic Defense Initiative widely known as Ronald Reagan’s “Star Wars” program, which Possony popularized in both academic and “fandom” circles (Possony and Pournelle, 1970; Pournelle 1983).

Until August 1959, the FPRI was financed mainly by the Smith Richardson Foundation. During the 1960s, the FPRI found an ally in Adolph W. Schmidt, Governor and Vice President of T. Mellon and Sons, and President (1954-1965) of the A. W. Mellon Educational and Charitable Trust. Schmidt’s fervent anti-communism and Atlanticism allowed the FPRI to gain the financial support of the Mellon Foundation during the 1960s (Sicherman 2003). According to the FPRI profile compiled by MediaTransparency.org based on 990 tax forms, the FPRI would subsequently receive grants from the John Howard Pew Freedom Trust (Nielsen 2002), the John M. Olin Foundation, the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, and the Sarah Scaife Foundation (MediaTransparency.org, FPRI profile 2013).

The FPRI also relied on classified government contracts with the Defense Department and U.S. intelligence agencies, a fact that ultimately pushed the University of Pennsylvania to sever all ties with the Institute in 1970 (Wiarda 2010). For example, documents from the Operations Coordination Board (OCB), a cross-agency “psychological warfare” committee created by President Eisenhower in 1953 and abolished by President Kennedy in 1961, indicate that in 1957, as part of the propaganda efforts dealing with the CIA’s Guatemalan coup known as “Operation PBSUCCESS” (1954), the United States Information Agency (USIA) contracted the FPRI “to have Dr. Arthur Whitaker do a study of Communist infiltration of Guatemala,” and guaranteed to purchase a “number of copies” of the book (Greenup 2014, p. 4). Whitaker would eventually produce a generous introduction to the Foreign Policy Research Institute Book written by a then-recent PhD graduate, Ronald M. Schneider (1958). Concluding that the Guatemalan communists had infiltrated the Guatemalan government and were “conditioned by the international situation and attuned to the aims of the world Communist movement directed and dominated by the Soviet Union,” Schneider (1958, p. 274) reiterated the FPRI understanding of the Cold War as a conflict between the Free World and a monolithic and conspiratorial Communist World, and implicitly justified the U.S. intervention.

Through the FPRI and its journal, Orbis, Strausz-Hupé and Possony’s influence reached the high echelons of the U.S. military and policy makers to an extent decried by Senator William Fulbright in the 1960s as dangerous for national security (Fulbright 1961; Semple, Jr. 1969; Unna 1969). Indeed, at the 1958 National Military-Industrial Conference, which brought together Pentagon officials with corporate executives, the Richardson Foundation launched the Institute for American Strategy (IAS). In 1959, the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense entrusted IAS with the organization of a series of “National Strategy Seminars” for reserve officers. The director of the IAS was Frank Barnett, who was the research director of the Richardson Foundation, which provided the seed money and financed the FPRI between 1955 and 1959 (Lyons and Morton, 1961; Perlstein 2009). The first two series of National Strategy Seminars were held at the National War College in 1959 and 1960, respectively, and used as a textbook a book sponsored by the IAS and researched by the FPRI, American Strategy for the Nuclear Age (Hahn and Neff, 1960). The list of contributors to this collection of studies on the idea and tactics of a “protracted conflict” between the East and the West was dominated by FPRI researchers and included Strausz-Hupé with two articles on “protracted conflict,” Possony on “communist psychological warfare,” Alvin Cottrell and James Dougherty on

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the communist exploitation of anti-colonial movements, and Kintner on communist “instruments of terror.” They were joined by other hawkish figures such as Henry Kissinger, Gerhart Niemeyer, J. Edgar Hoover, Herman Kahn, and Walt W. Rostow.

Kissinger, Allen Dulles, and William Yandell Elliott were among the speakers at these seminars. According to Dan Smoot (1961), Strausz-Hupé also lectured on the obsolescence of the national state and the transformation of NATO into a supranational state. With Allen Dulles’ blessings, Barnett sent schools and civic educators “A Short, Annotated Bibliography of Readings in the Protracted Conflict” (Institute for American Strategy 1961). The beginner’s section of the bibliography recommended books and pamphlets by J. Edgar Hoover, and Harry and Bonaro Overstreet, while the advanced readings included Herman Kahn’s treatise on thermonuclear war and Strausz-Hupé, Kintner, and Possony’s A Forward Strategy for America (1961). To James Fulbright’s dismay, while Major General Edwin Walker used John Birch Society literature to indoctrinate U.S. troops in Western Europe against the dangers of communist infiltration, speakers such as Kintner and Barnett used the National Strategy seminars to warn reserve officers that the U.S. government was infiltrated by “communists” who pushed a “socialist” (that is, “communist”) agenda comprising disarmament talks and cultural exchanges with the Soviet Bloc, and the domestic expansion of the welfare state (Woods 1995).

Reaching popular, academic, political and military audiences, the FPRI defense intellectuals could claim that they supported in a bipartisan manner the authentic, long-term national interests of the United States of America. The FPRI was founded in the highly charged atmosphere produced by the triumph of the Chinese Revolution and the difficulties of the Korean War, two events that had brought about the end of the bipartisan foreign policy of the early Cold War and spurred the emergence of a Republican culture of harsh criticism of the early Cold War strategy pursued by the Democrat administrations of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. The birth in June 1953 of the United States Information Agency created by President Eisenhower with the help of John Foster Dulles, the publication of William F. Buckley’s National Review, the magazine that redefined mainstream conservatism in 1955, and the founding of the FPRI were all initiatives aiming to recreate a vigorous anti-communist momentum with academic demeanor and bipartisan potential (Hart 2013). The FPRI defense intellectuals spared no effort in order to fit the profile of this new, enlightened brand of anticommunism. Producing works through committees and publishing books signed by three or more amalgamated authors, the FPRI intellectual hawks conformed to the Cold War paradigm of behavioral scientists working in “interdisciplinary” teams—team work being one of the marks of scientific objectivity in the new, physical-sciences-driven world of the Cold War (Robin 2001).

As a result, books by the Foreign Policy Research Institute had very long lists of acknowledgments stressing the numerous official and unofficial discussions, seminars, and inputs that had contributed to the published work. Protracted Conflict (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1963[1959]), for example, the first and most successful in a fairly long list of books by the FPRI, was preceded by a few pages of acknowledgments listing the contribution of, among others, Henry A. Kissinger, Hans Kohn, and Paul A. M. Linebarger—FPRI Associates who had read and criticized the first drafts of the book. According to the preface of Protracted Conflict, a grant from the Richardson Foundation allowed Kintner, Strausz-Hupé, and Froelich Rainey to “separately or jointly” make “field trips to Americans missions around the world” (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1963[1959], p. xii). Prior to their visit, the FPRI experts sent to the American diplomatic and military personnel summaries of the work in progress. With the help of the Department of State, who arranged for the experts to meet with “top American political and military
personnel in the area visited and to discuss critical problems confronting American foreign policy," the experts could thus create a corpus of "recorded summaries of their conversations" with the American officials in the field (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1963[1959], p. xiii). In true anthropological fashion, this "extensive record of the field trips was sifted and analyzed upon the return of the FPRI team and subsequently was published in separate reports for selective distribution" (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1963[1959], p. xiii; for some of the reports, see Strausz-Hupé and Kintner, 1956; Kintner and Rainey, 1957a, 1957b). The FPRI experts duly performed the next step of the scientific process of producing Cold War expertise by publishing sections of the work-in-progress in Orbis, the quarterly publication of the Institute. Journal publication was followed by a seminar on protracted conflict with the staff and faculty of the Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The "valuable criticism" presented on that occasion by about forty staff officers would inform the "final drafting of the manuscript during the late summer and fall of 1958" (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1963[1959], p. xiii).

Casting the production of Protracted Conflict in terms that disclosed its ingredients, manufacturing process, and developmental timetable in a thoroughly industrial, scientific manner indicated that Protracted Conflict was no individual essay or mere academic literature. Newspaper reviews praised it as scientific literature of a higher order, produced by a team of experts in accordance with certain scientific protocols and in collaboration with the higher echelons of power (Chamberlin 1959; Linebarger 1959; Sulzberger 1959). This was highly specialized knowledge generated by a military-political-academic dynamo. It was a sort of "public orthodoxy"—a set of propositions requiring assent on ontological grounds and impossible to challenge without endangering the existence of the state (Whilhelmsen 2014). Whoever doubted the intrinsic goodness of the “Free World” or the absolute evil of the “Communist” adversary was, according to this public orthodoxy, a liability for national security (Paret 1962).

This might perhaps explain why historians have paid so little attention to the actual policies, causes, and discourses embraced by Possony, Strausz-Hupé, Kintner, and other FPRI defense intellectuals during the Cold War: the whole scene exudes an air of boring respectability, of solid public orthodoxy. Yet, a second look indicates that the FPRI intellectuals were ambiguous in their support for democracy and human rights. Although striving to defend what they called the “Free World,” the “open society,” or the “Western civilization” against its “totalitarian” enemies, Possony and Strausz-Hupé, together with their frequent FPRI collaborators, tweaked concepts such as “human rights,” “freedom,” “democracy,” and “open society” in order to court racist lobbies, accommodate problematic allies such as South Africa, and promote the interests of the United States's military-industrial establishment at the expense of the general welfare.

In the following two sections I will look at the ways in which Strausz-Hupé, Possony, and Kintner, together with their FPRI associates, addressed the questions of race/racism, national sovereignty and nationalism, colonialism, and human rights in the context of the Cold War. First I will discuss Possony’s engagement with the question of race from both a domestic and a foreign policy perspective. Then I will explore some of the larger implications of the FPRI take on race, such as the creation of a global American empire. Finally, in the conclusion, I will try to assess the impact the FPRI intellectuals had on policy making.

THE FPRI INTELLECTUALS, RACISM, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

In 1973, Possony wrote a memorandum to the American Council for World Freedom (ACWF) in which he denounced the extreme right-wing membership and ideology of the
Latin American chapters of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL). The ACWF functioned as the American chapter of the WACL, an umbrella organization dedicated to the global struggle against communism. Possony warned that the Latin American and especially the Mexican chapters of the WACL had been penetrated by fascist émigrés such as the Romanian Iron Guardists and Croat Ustashis and seemed to be “connected with several neo-fascist movements” (Anderson and Anderson, 1986, p. 85). The Mexican WACL literature, Possony complained, contained “no references to representative government, none to democracy or national self-determination,” being instead replete with anti-Semitic and anti-Masonic calls to arms (Anderson and Anderson, 1986, p. 86). According to Possony, this type of discourse was ultimately anti-American, and therefore dangerous. Possony and the ACWF left the WACL in 1975, but Possony would return into the League’s ranks in 1980, although none of the fascist organizations denounced by him in 1973 had been purged from the organization (Bellant 1991). In fact, Possony had a long history of collaboration with the American extreme right, and his on-off-and-on-again relationship with the WACL was no mere accident.

Thus, in 1968, Possony published an article on “UNESCO and Race: A Study in Intellectual Oppression,” in the January issue of *Mankind Quarterly*, a journal founded in 1960 by the Scottish physical anthropologist Robert Gayre with the explicit purpose of promoting White supremacist arguments (Billig 1979). Among the founding members of *Mankind Quarterly* were the British anthropologist Roger Pearson, who would go on to become a member of the editorial board of the FPRI (Anderson and Anderson, 1986); Robert E. Kuttner, an eugenicist affiliated with the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the University of Chicago; Corrado Gini, a sociology professor at the University of Rome who had been counted among the more racist academics of Mussolini’s Italy; and Otmar von Verschuer, a German eugenicist who had conducted experiments at Auschwitz where his assistants included Josef Mengele (Schmuhl 2008). Kuttner was the president of the International Association for the Advancement of Ethnology and Eugenics (IAAEE), the publisher of *Mankind Quarterly* (Tucker 2002), and claimed that racism provided an answer to forced “Communist equalitarianism” (Tucker 1996). Kuttner was one of the more prominent members of the Liberty Lobby, a White supremacist organization founded in 1955 by Willis A. Carto, a shadowy book publisher who deplored the fall of the Third Reich and had founded Liberty Lobby in order to strike “the strongest blow against the power of organized Jewry” by deporting African Americans to Africa (Winston 1998).

Channeling for his own purposes the American political tradition of articulating national identity and crucial political battles in terms of opposition to dictatorship (Alpers 2003), Possony established himself right from the start of the article as the valiant defender of the freedom of academic research against the thought control “exercised on a global scale” by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in the name of its anti-racist “dogmas” (Possony 1968a, p. 115). Possony’s immediate targets were UNESCO’s “Final Report,” published on December 14, 1967, and synthetizing the results of a “Meeting of Experts on Race and Racial Prejudice” which took place September 18-26, 1967 at the UNESCO House in Paris; four conferences on race problems sponsored by UNESCO; and the United Nations’ Resolution 116B (VI) 1948, all pointing out that race is a “social myth,” that there are no race hierarchies, and that all human groups are similar in mental capacities and dynamic in their physiological makeup (Conklin 2013). Indeed, in 1950, the French Maussian anthropologist Alfred Metraux became head of a UNESCO division dedicated to the study of racial questions. The cultural pluralism and racial relativism sponsored by UNESCO found expression in

UNESCO’s campaigns against racial prejudice were inspired by the anti-racist and anti-Nazi “manifesto” issued in 1939 by the Seventh International Genetics Congress. But Possony complained that, whereas in 1939 the scientific community had merely rejected the existence of any innate psychological, cultural, or intellectual characteristics associated with physical differences between “races,” the post-WWII UNESCO statements regarding race included demands for social reforms such as the improvement of the educational and welfare systems, the amelioration of problems with urban housing and public services, and “economic reconstruction.” Possony disparaged all these demands as examples of expert ignorance, of geneticists talking as public intellectuals about “economic and social problems[] about which they had no competence or even rudimentary knowledge” (Possony 1968a, p. 116). Worse than that, the UNESCO experts stressing the importance of environment over that of heredity were guilty of adopting “a purely Marxist philosophy” (Possony 1968a, p. 116). Sharing the feelings of defense intellectuals such as Anthony Bouscaren, who warned that “75 per cent of all speeches and memoranda in the UN emanate from Soviet sources” (1953, p. 59), Possony found that UNESCO’s campaign was “basically a plan for psychological operations” seeking to stifle free speech in democratic countries and to “propose socio-political reconstruction and revolution” in the name of legal and political equality (1968a, pp. 117-118). As such, anti-antiracism had to become a priority for all the intellectuals dedicated to the defense of the Free World.

While he insisted that recognizing the existence of “real differences” among races would not imply the refusal of “equal treatment to unequal persons,” Possony worried in essentialist terms about the harmful effects of legal equality: “For example, it would be unjust to apply the same criminal code to two different groups, one with a high frequency of the disorder known as ‘running amok,’ the other without this trait” (1968a, p. 119). Possony’s essentialism translated in fear of miscegenation, for while he conceded that racial purity is a myth, he noted that even Houston Stewart Chamberlain and Joseph Arthur Gobineau—the founding fathers of racial anthropology whose writings discarded the concept of pure races—were concerned about “the impact of migration and resultant mixing” (1968a, p. 121). Possony dashed the hopes of those who believed that intermarriages would eventually lead to the extinction of African Americans by pointing out that, instead of making them vanish, interracial breeding would only “propagate” African-American genes “more widely” (1968b, p. 320).

Possony’s attack on UNESCO was steeped in the *Mankind Quarterly* orthodoxy represented by Kuttner, Gayre, or Pearson and read like a sequel of his collaboration with Nathaniel Weyl, a pillar of *Mankind Quarterly*, and a contributor to the FPRI journal, *Orbis* (Weyl 1963). Weyl studied economics, philosophy, and history at Columbia University and at the London School of Economics. After publishing a handful of anti-Nazi and anti-communist works, Weyl started churning out a string of books and articles dedicated to race problems. Weyl’s *The Negro in American Civilization* (1960) argued that African Americans were inferior and could never hope to become a productive part of the American urbanized society. The book received good reviews in some academic journals (Gregor 1963; Stuckert 1962), was well received by mainstream conservative publications (Kendall 1960), and was praised by Nathan Glazer as “clearly free of any prejudice” (Glazer 1960).4 *Mankind Quarterly* touted it as a victory in the struggle against the anthropology promoted by UNESCO and a step toward replacing the “cult of equality” with the “emphasis placed upon individual liberty” (Fox 1961).
Weyl’s next book was *The Geography of Intellect* (1963), a book he co-authored with Possony. *The Geography of Intellect* attempted to demonstrate the racial and intellectual superiority of the “races” living in the temperate zones over those inhabiting the warmer climates. Some academic reviewers were horrified by Weyl and Possony’s argument that, since only the elites contributed to the progress of civilization, the West should embrace certain eugenic measures such as the sterilization of the “races with inferior performance,” and the artificial insemination of women with the “sperm of men of genius” (Dunn 1964). Yet, *Mankind Quarterly* praised it (Anonymous 1964), and the reviewer of the conservative quarterly *Modern Age*, founded by Russell Kirk in 1957, hoped the book would impress upon the public that the desegregation of African Americans and the resulting “deterioration in population quality” weakened the hand of the United States in the struggle against communism, and that a “satisfactory eugenics program” ought to have included the discouragement of mixed marriages (McGurk 1964, p. 422). The sociologist John H. Burma (1962) did not fail to notice the merits of the book, while the Indiana University professor Stephen Sargent Visher wrote that it was impossible to read *The Geography of Intellect* without coming to agree with its major conclusions regarding the genetic nature of intelligence and the fact that “extraordinary intellect (genius)” is extremely rare “among Negroes,” people living in the “hot regions,” and “manual laborers” (Visher 1964). By the latter, he was referring to the Mexican *braceros*, or highly skilled agricultural laborers, imported by U.S. companies between 1942 and 1964 in order to alleviate the shortages of manual labor caused by the sudden but continuous growth of industry during and after WWII. Even Seymour Martin Lipset (Lipset and Ladd, Jr., 1971) quoted Weyl, and not in order to criticize him.

Understanding and dealing profitably with racial differences was therefore essential for waging the Cold War in defense of the Western civilization (Newby 1969). Whereas UNESCO’s 1964 and 1967 statements found that the racial differences were of “limited scientific interest” and encouraged the study of differences between individuals, Possony argued that the racial study of populations was of the greatest political and social interest and represented a “legitimate” (1968a, p. 125) field of study, especially at a time when the politics of race exploded on the American political scene (in the 1960s). Possony found that it was impossible to tackle the problem of African American integration (the White Anglo-Saxon Protestants’ “self-imposed and perplexing task”) through assimilationist methods and court orders such as the 1954 Supreme Court ruling *Brown v. Board of Education*, mandating the desegregation of schools (1968b, pp. 320-321). The demands for racial equality had no political answer because only science was able to deal with what intelligence tests indicated to be the significant IQ gap between racial groups. Possony claimed that, even though both genetic endowment and the environment interacted and shaped the development of any human being, the impact of environment was significant only in the case of those with IQ scores situated between 70 and 90. Based on this data, Possony advanced the standard neoliberal argument that man’s epistemological weakness makes social planning as inefficient as economic planning, that whatever our attitude toward poverty, inequality of chances, equal access to education, nutrition, family practices, and all the other factors that fall under the heading of “environment,” the sad conclusion was that “psycho-socio-economic environmental ‘planning’” was an “illusion” (1968a, pp. 125-127, 129).

Possony was an early member of what historians called the “neoliberal thought collective” (Denord 2009). Possony was close to Ludwig von Mises in the 1930s, and both of them would participate, together with Friedrich Hayek, at the *Colloque* Walter Lippmann (CWL) in Paris, France, from August 26 through August 30, 1938.
The Colloque marked the emergence of neoliberalism as an answer to the challenge of socialism and the CWL’s anti-statist program would be revived after the war by the Mont Pèlerin Society, the very influential neoliberal think tank founded by Hayek in 1947 and counting Possony among its members (Hülsmannn 2007). Skeptical about the benefits of the state’s intervention in the economy or involvement with social welfare, Possony argued that the capacities of “underperforming” or “handicapped” races could be improved only through “medical action,” infinitely cheaper than a “social revolution whose cost is exorbitant and whose outcome is uncertain” (1968a, p. 129). As part of the clinical approach to the “mind-body problem,” Possony called for the revival of “ethnic brain studies” and of “electrophysiological research,” and pointed out that medical treatments such as electroshocks might offer a solution: “The memory of mice can be improved by injections with metrazol and other drugs, by implanting strychnine crystals into a particular brain region, and by implanting electrodes into the brain and effecting tiny electrical shocks. Interesting enough, the less intelligent strains of mice benefit more from such treatment than the more intelligent strains. All this is not more than suggestive, but it illuminates the way we should take to solve the problem” (1968a, p. 144). Possony reiterated his arguments in favor of a technological solution to the “dysfunctions” and the “intellectual handicaps” of certain social and ethnic groups as late as 1974, when he published in the same Mankind Quarterly an article praising the eugenic research of Nobel laureate William Shockley, a Stanford physicist (Possony 1974). Shockley’s eugenicist discourse was a throwback to the days of Cesare Lombroso and Max Nordau, being developed around concepts such as “population pollution,” “degeneracy,” and “bad heredity.” Like Possony (Glaser and Possony, 1979), Shockley argued that welfare programs were unable to cope with the social problems generated by the “growing frequency of insufficient human intelligence” (Possony 1974, p. 36) and that, instead of spending billions of dollars on social welfare programs, the U.S. government should invest in medical research and in the development of new technologies capable of tackling this problem (Possony 1974, p. 39). Shockley proposed to lighten the genetic burden of the American society by the introduction of state-run programs of compulsive sterilization of criminals, offering persons with low IQs financial incentives to accept voluntary sterilization, and in general targeting “the dysgenic fertility of the black population” (Ramsden 2006, p. 37; Connelly 2009). For Possony, Shockley and Carleton Coon were “contemporary Galileos” (1974, p. 36) persecuted by liberal intelligenstia for their pathbreaking research on racial differences and eugenics.

Besides being cheaper than the modification of social patterns and cultural traditions, technology was an essential component of the Western identity for, according to Possony, the West itself was a “technological-commercial-military civilization” whose cultural achievements were “in large part, attributable to men of genius” (1968a, p. 141). As Strausz-Hupé also liked to point out, the Western culture was not the product of any particular nation but of the entire “white race”: “Western culture, including its technology, is the product not only of environmental factors, physical and historical, but also of a race, to wit, the white race” (1952, p. 111). While avoiding any discussion of whether or not the “white race” was “superior” to other races, Strausz-Hupé pointed out that the “white race” was clearly superior to all the other races, “the yellow included,” in technological matters (1952, p. 111). Therefore, there was nothing wrong with appealing to medical technology to close the cultural gap between different ethnic groups. And there was nothing amiss either with Possony’s fear that mating outside one’s ethnic group would lead to a contraction of the superior IQ levels, for a desegregated society would have fewer of the geniuses whose accomplishments allowed the West to flourish. The cultural war against UNESCO’s
equalitarian, left wing “dogmatism” was part and parcel of the global confrontation between the Western Civilization and its various Communist, or “colored,” politically or racially non-aligned foes. The racial problem was therefore a national security problem.

Indeed, Lt. Colonel William R. Kintner (1915-1997)—who co-authored with Strausz-Hupé and Possony seminal FPRI books such as *Protracted Conflict* (1963[1959]) and *A Forward Strategy for America* (1961), and who would serve as director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute between 1975 and 1982—argued in his 1950 book *The Front is Everywhere: Militant Communism in Action* (1950) that the Communist leaders’ favorite tactics was that of “termite warfare,” of “bit by bit” disintegration of the enemy by “deliberate cultivation of social dislocations, moral breakdowns, ideological bankruptcy, leadership failures, economic paralysis, and social hatred” (p. 172). Considered from this perspective, the Civil Rights Movement appeared as a suspicious-looking “termite” attempt to subvert the United States by challenging the public orthodoxy and the social order on any number of issues, from economics to ethics.

Possony ranked *The Front is Everywhere* among the “major studies” dedicated to the question of “soviet strategy and tactics” (1953, pp. vii-viii, 122) and agreed with Kintner that, in their quest for world domination, the Soviets would use the anti-colonial movements to weaken the Western civilization. Possony also estimated that, since the advances of American technology and social welfare had made American workers immune to the obsolete Communist promises, the role of the proletariat would be played in the United States by African Americans, whose revolutionary potential had already been singled out by the *Theses of the Sixth Comintern Congress* (1928) (Horne 2003). Possony warned that International Communism would exploit “the growth of the Negro proletariat” in the United States by giving orders to their local agents to: stimulate the “struggle for a complete and real equality of the negroes,” set up Black revolutionary organizations, demand the right of self-determination for “the predominantly Negro areas in the United States,” and set up Soviet-backed Black independent states in the South of the United States (1953, p. 165). Still, both Possony (1953) and Strausz-Hupé (1960) urged their readers to keep their eye on the potentially subversive Chinese minority, presented by the two authors as a monolithic, secretive, well-off group more loyal to its ethnic group or distant homeland than to its host countries.

Possony’s interest in the subversive potential of the struggle for national liberation and civil rights survived the successes of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s and the cultural shift toward a more liberal American society in the 1970s. Samuel Moyn (2010) has suggested that the “breakthrough year” for the human rights discourse was 1977, when Amnesty International received the Nobel Peace Prize and President Jimmy Carter’s Inaugural Address announced a new bipartisan, anti-Soviet, U.S. foreign policy based on the global defense of human rights. Moyn’s thesis is confirmed in a tortuous way by *Victims of Politics: The State of Human Rights* (1979), the fruit of Possony’s collaboration with Kurt Glaser, professor of government at Southern Illinois University and a staunch apartheid supporter (Archer 1976; Kuper 1974). Academic reviewers noted that the book was part of a wave of publications stirred by President Carter’s human rights turn (Campbell 1979). Yet some reviewers (Fitzgerald 1980; Quigley 1980) noticed that Glaser and Possony’s heavy treatise on human rights was an academic calzone stuffed with right-wing ideological leftovers from the 1950s and 1960s. Glaser and Possony still fought for the merits of segregation and argued that the American school system, where “the goal of integration has been interpreted in terms of racial mixing,” oppressed the White children: “The mixing retards the education of and thus discriminates against the higher achievers, who are usually white” (Glaser and Possony, 1979, p. 323).
However, the two authors made no reference to Pearson, Kuttner, McGurk, and other Mankind Quarterly/“IAAEE” “experts” who bashed IQ tests for being too culturally determined to serve as universal standard and who translated in neoliberal economic terms Possony’s earlier more openly racist arguments.

Defining discrimination as “deprivation or denial of rights, privileges, or property a person or group might otherwise enjoy,” Glaser and Possony objected to what they perceived to be the U.N.’s failure to explicitly distinguish between “discrimination,” “segregation,” and “separation” in the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) (1979, pp. 18, 21). The point was an important one, since Glaser and Possony argued that, in certain instances, human rights included the right of ethnic groups to live apart, and sometimes non-discrimination required segregation and separation, as in the case of the South African “separate development” policies endorsed by the two authors for their humanitarianism (Glaser and Possony, 1979, pp. 24, 145; Possony 1968b). In fact, racism consisted precisely in the denial of “the right of independent group development” through “the imposition of artificial handicaps and hindrances” on certain classes (such as the upper-middle class, beset by progressive taxation) or ethnic groups (such as the American Whites suffering because of affirmative action, and the South African Whites fighting against “domination” by the “racially alien” Black majority) (Glaser and Possony, 1979; Possony 1968b, p. 331). Victims of Politics saw affirmative action as harmful and insisted on the subversive nature of the graduated income tax, “one of ten program points advocated by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in The Communist Manifesto (1848) as steps toward abolishing bourgeois conditions of production” (Glaser and Possony, 1979, p. 97). Like Weyl (1972), Glaser and Possony complained that the progressive taxation that made possible the creation of the welfare state was in itself a violation of human rights since it took away “property and economic liberty without due process of law” and prevented people from increasing their wealth “through the market” (1979, p. 329).

However, the merits of the free market and decentralization stopped at the door of population control, essential for Possony’s brand of “togetherness.” Taking a cue from the South African government, Glaser and Possony explained the benefits of internal migration control. The irony was that, on the one hand, Possony (1968b) claimed that the South African government implemented inner migration control policies as part of a plan to create so-called “independent” nation states for the Blacks and to keep at bay the alleged danger of Black majoritarian tyranny. On the other, Glaser and Possony’s arguments in favor of internal migration control and the end of the “open housing” policies aimed to discourage Black separatism while insisting that such measures would strengthen African Americans’ local and national political representation (1979, p. 402). Moreover, Glaser and Possony did not venture to explain how the bureaucracy fostered by South Africa’s “pass laws” (Brookes and Macaulay, 1958), restricting the movement of Blacks in the cities, would have squared off with the “small government” they advocated for in the same breath with the introduction of inner migration control policies that took away “property and economic liberty without due process of law” and prevented people from increasing their wealth “through the market” (1979, p. 329).

The target of the proposed legislation was the rural population spurred by “unrealistic expectations aroused by the glimpses of the modern economy” to move from the countryside to barrios, bidonvilles, and ghettos. Once in the cities and unable to get a job, these migrants became prone to crime, disease, and, most of all, to the political radicalism generated by the revolution of rising expectations, or the “radicalism generated by the proximity of wealth and poverty” (Glaser and Possony, 1979, pp. 328, 402). Social engineering worked only for repressive purposes; improving the education or the healthcare system was futile, but restricting the freedom of movement of poor Black and White Americans saved them from alienation and hence from falling prey to subversive communist demagogues.
The thrust of Possony and Glaser’s argument was that, in the context of the Cold War, national security considerations should prompt Americans to think about ways of altering or discarding altogether traditional concepts such as “liberty, equality, democracy, self-determination, and anticolonialism” (Glaser and Possony, 1979, p. 547). The authors insisted that in order to function successfully, democracy must be based on “unified body politics,” and on “substantial homogeneity in political behavior” (Glaser and Possony, 1979, p. 548). In “Nationalism and the Ethnic Factor,” an article published in 1967 in the FPRI journal, *Orbis*, Possony argued that nationalism was a set of ideas regarding the improvement of “the management of the ethnic factor,” a way to defend “ethnic integrity” (Possony 1967a, p. 1223). This concern for the ethnic factor was “rational and mandatory,” because governments need the trust of the people they govern in order to negotiate with foreign nations, and therefore “the rational policy is to ensure that each ethnic group is run by a government of its own ‘kith and kin’” (Possony 1967a, p. 1229). Therefore, the one-man-one-vote democratic principle was “non-oppressive” only in monolithic nation-states, and since this principle served well only the numerical majorities, this system would have to be abandoned if the “American Negro” and “the Indian” were to “achieve effective representation” (Possony 1967a, p. 1230). Possony’s racialized understanding of democracy led him to argue that multinational or multitribal areas could be ruled only in a non-democratic—colonial or domestic—fashion, that nations should seek to preserve their homogeneity by choosing not to assimilate people perceived as radically alien, and that dominant White minorities or majorities should strive to maintain their hegemony if forced to cohabit with other ethnic groups (Glaser and Possony, 1979).

The best embodiment of these social Darwinist ideals was South Africa, one of the most active members of the Free World in the fight against the twin evils of racial and social equality—that is, miscegenation and communism. Possony defended South African *apartheid* not only in writing, but also by taking the stand and testifying on behalf of the South African government in front of the International Court of Justice in October 1965. In 1958, Possony had denounced South Africa as a “racist” state ruling by “oppression,” like the Communist states (Possony 1958, p. 40). Yet, in 1965, Possony couched his testimony in front of the Hague International Court of Justice in the language of axiological pluralism. The complainants from the African Bloc argued that the *apartheid* regime enforced policies violating the “international human rights norm of non-discrimination or non-separation” as formulated in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the General Assembly’s Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. In his testimony, widely disseminated by South African propaganda (directed by Eschel Rhoodie), Possony rejected any appeal to a global order underpinned by universal human rights and stressed the importance of cultural diversity, of “continuity and respect for the historical tradition,” warning that: “Mankind with all its diversities has never accepted a single writ. To impose a single formula would be ideological imperialism” (Possony 1967b; International Court of Justice 1966, p. 708).

As both this trial and Possony’s 1979 book on human rights indicate, Moyn’s thesis that in the 1960s the Third World preferred to fight for decolonization in the name of national rights and national independence, and not of human rights, needs perhaps to be qualified. For during 1965-1966, the African Bloc countries appealed to human rights in order to challenge South Africa’s right to exercise a U.N. mandate over West Africa, but the argument was rejected by Possony, and finally even by the decision of the International Court of Justice, in the name of historicist arguments based on the concept of national sovereignty (Irwin 2010). Yet, despite historicist appeals to axiological diversity and attacks on the European “universalism” and “cultural imperialism,”
Possony defended in the South African *apartheid* regime precisely its European-ness, ultimately resting his defense on the fact that White South Africans had created a corner of Europe in Africa—that they had built a stable, industrialized, and thus modern society—according to the neoevolutionist pattern of Eurocentric modernization theories devised by W. W. Rostow and Samuel Huntington (Brick 2012; Harootunian 2004).

The point was emphatically made by the South African propaganda expert Eschel Rhoodie in his book, *The Third Africa* (1968), to which Possony contributed a substantial concluding chapter. For Rhoodie, the “Third Africa” was the southern part of the continent, dominated by Whites, as opposed to the Arabic Africa in the North and the Black Africa in the center. The Third Africa stood for the superiority of Western civilization over the “warring, primitive,” “illiterate,” “immature, uneducated and economically backward” tribes of Africa that European colonial empires hoisted from the “iron age” into the first stages of civilization (Rhoodie 1968, pp. 118, 189). According to Rhoodie, before the advent of the European colonizers, the native African cultures of Third Africa had completely ignored not only the wheel, a writing system, paper, or the rudiments of sailing, but even the noble art of gardening and the right way to pray. But, as Rhoodie argued, the “Western, or Christian, civilization” imposed on the African natives a whole new way of life characterized by “the rule of law, freedom of religion, free enterprise, state aided education, modern communications, a monetary system, postal and telephone services, health services and a limit to the absolute power of the Chiefs” (Rhoodie 1968, p. 10). The secret to these accomplishments was the refusal of a dogmatically and misinformed liberal-egalitarian approach to the problems of multi-racial, multi-national Southern Africa (Glaser 1973; Rhoodie 1968).

Possony backed Rhoodie’s case with a substantial conclusion in which he blamed the outrage of American public opinion on the subject of *apartheid* on two factors. First, South Africa played the “role of surrogate scapegoat” for the United States’ own troubled relationship with the African American minority. Secondly, Possony blamed the “melting pot” American ideology for leading Americans to believe that there was no obstacle in the integration of different ethnic strains in the fabric of one unitary culture. Possony protested that the melting pot functioned effectively only with persons of European descent, and that it was impossible to throw in the melting pot ethnic groups with “distinct racial characteristics and living at clearly distinguishable ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ cultural levels” (1968b, 311-313). Possony found that South Africans coped openly with the “fear” of miscegenation that haunted the psyche of the American White majority but was mentioned only in private conversations, “while public objections are raised on different grounds; but the private fears and attitudes regulate behavior, and the public language serves to veil the reality” (1968b, p. 319).

As we have seen, Glaser and Possony’s *Victims of Politics* would translate these private fears in the public language of economics and of human rights.

In September 1966, Possony traveled to Pretoria, South Africa, to take part in a conference of the National Council to Combat Communism. The conference was organized by the Inter-Church Anti-Communist Action Committee of the Dutch Reformed Church with the goal of defending South Africa’s “Christian heritage” against Communist subversion. In fact, the “subversive” activities targeted by the organizers of the 1966 conference were not necessarily inspired by communist ideology or carried out by Communist party members since, according to the Suppression of Communism Act (1950), any form of protest against the *apartheid* regime could be classified and punished as statutory communism (Frye 1968; Modisane 1986). The chair of the conference was J. D. Vorster, a brother of Johannes Balthazar Vorster, the
South African prime-minister between 1966 and 1978. Other participants included Suzanne Labin, who would become head of the French section of the WACL, and Nathaniel Weyl, a great admirer of South Africa and Rhodesia (Weyl 1967). Hendrik Johan van den Bergh, the head of the South African Bureau of State Security (BOSS) and a close associate of Rhoodie, delivered the main address of the conference talking about how the Communists subverted the White South African way of life by engaging in “psychological sabotage” (Van den Bergh 1967, p. 21). Van den Bergh pointed out that the leaders of these Communist attacks were “white so-called intellectuals,” most of whom, he pointed out in answer to a question coming from the floor, were Jewish, because “Communism was the highest form of capitalism” (Van den Bergh 1967, pp. 21-45). Possony (1967c) warned that mixing anti-Semitism with anti-Communism risked harming the anti-Communist cause because “the emotionalism” of the anti-Semites made them natural allies of the equally irrational Communists (Anonymous 1967, p. 29). Possony’s address might have been an attempt to answer the consistently pro-Nazi van den Bergh, but van den Bergh’s position was endorsed by the leaders of the White supremacist and anti-Semitic Candour League of Rhodesia, which collaborated with Robert Gayre, the tutelary spirit of *Mankind Quarterly* (Macklin 2010).

Possony’s collaboration with *Mankind Quarterly* and with Rhoodie indicated that, at the end of the 1960s, the White Western anti-Communist card trumped any concern he might have had about the anti-Semitism prevalent in the radical anti-Communist milieus he frequented.

**FPRI, COLONIALISM, AND NEOCOLONIALISM**

The FPRI literature produced by Possony, Strausz-Hupé, Kintner, and their constant collaborators argued that the only way to defend White Western Civilization against Communist “Oriental despotism” was the development out of a military confederation such as NATO of an Atlantic Union—a political confederation under American hegemony, and, as Possony argued as early as 1949, the creation of a world police (Possony 1949, 1953). This institutional structure would allow “Western democracies” a virtual monopoly on technology, natural resources, and violence. As a Cold Warrior impatient with the “verbal magic” of the empty legal formulas of international organizations and agreements, Possony maintained that there was no other way to maintain peace than war and the increase of the capacity to wage war, defined as “the purge of the enemies of the new order” (1949, pp. 294-295). For Strausz-Hupé, the United States was “the most powerful nation of European stock” (1945, p. 108), a fact of enormous importance according to the theories of Third Reich geopolitician Michael Hess, quoted by Strausz-Hupé. Hess argued that only the “white race”—through its mastery of technology—was “truly ‘space-bridging,’” the other races being of the space-bound variety (Strausz-Hupé 1942, p. 91). That meant that both the geographical position and its technological prowess designated the United States as the main “arsenal” of an “international police force,” and as the master of the “nucleus” of great powers that would control the balance and the stability of the “new and universal order” after the defeat of the Axis powers (Strausz-Hupé 1942, p. 194-195). Quoting Karl Haushofer’s judgment that the United States “possessed all the geopolitical prerequisites” for achieving global hegemony, Strausz-Hupé warned that Haushofer had hoped that the Americans would eventually fail in their bid for world supremacy because they were “race-biologically retarded” and torn apart by internal racial tensions (Strausz-Hupé 1942, pp. 66-67).
The keen interest manifested by Strausz-Hupé, Possony, and Kintner for the role played by “race” during the Cold War seems to betray their fear that Haushofer was right and that lack of racial homogeneity would indeed compromise the U.S. bid for global leadership (Glaser and Possony, 1979). It is indeed difficult to understand Strausz-Hupé’s work without taking into consideration the way in which Nazi geopolitical theories informed his racialized approach to the Cold War (Crampton and Tuathaila, 1996; Raffestin et al., 1995). Nazi Geopolitik—with its concept of a dynamic frontier and perpetual international instability fostered by the dynamic of growing, expanding versus shrinking, and dying, states—was interpreted by Strausz-Hupé in terms of an opposition between the stable, “civilized order” of Europe and “the Asiatic aversion to fixed boundaries” (Strausz-Hupé 1942, p. 220). Europeans, Strausz-Hupé argued, could not be reasonably expected to forget the “pungent meaning of Asia” (1942, p. 91). Strausz-Hupé discovered some sense even in Hitler’s frenzied attacks on “Asiatic bolshevism” and warned that, since the history of Russia bore the mark of the Mongols and since Russia had inherited the role of Asian oppressor of Europe, the Cold War was merely another stage of the eternal clash of “men of the steppe against the man of the sown; the mounted horde against the dwellers of the city; mass against form” (1952, p. 82). These premises allowed FPRI intellectuals to defend both the legacy of old-fashioned European colonialism and new-fangled American imperialism by denouncing any anti-colonial movement or non-aligned state as an “Asiatic,” unruly, “primitive” threat against the “real,” civilized, democratic “New Order” dominated by the United States (Strausz-Hupé 1942, p. 196). The United States led the Free World in a global struggle for the “preservation of the Western Community” (Strausz-Hupé 1952, p. 3).

Since this struggle was a psychomachia, a clashing of spiritual worlds, Strausz-Hupé rejected any “optimistic idea” about a meeting of the cultures and argued that only a “whole,” “unitary,” and pure Western culture could hope to successfully meet the challenge of the East. According to Strausz-Hupé, one of the ways in which the West could transform the “discrete whole” of European culture into a world culture was to abandon the antiquated and ultimately petty cult of national heroes and promote instead the “heroes of its common undertakings,” the conquerors and colonizers who were the true global heralds of the West: “The exploits of Cortes, Pizzaro, Clive, Stanley, Bugeaud, Lyautey, Rhodes, Muraviev were conquests on an Asiatic scale” (1952, pp. 7-8, 12-13). Western colonial expansion indicated a thriving Western culture (although the West was supposed to be at the same time essentially static, a victim of Asiatic restlessness). In order to defend this way of life, America had to vigorously embrace military, economic, and cultural imperialism, a benign form of imperialism whose weapons were not merely “military force or political coercion,” but also “anti-imperialist” discourses (Strausz-Hupé 1952, p. 294). It also had to create an Atlantic Union and increase spending on propaganda in order to advance the vertical and horizontal integration of Western culture, that is to discourage the multiplication of people with lower IQ levels and to encourage the adoption of the same Weberian pro-capitalist Protestant values by the entire “Free World.” The creation of an Atlantic Union would be both the result and the safeguard of these efforts.

It is hard not to notice that FPRI books insisted on the idea of the eugenic value of the free market economy. Thus, William Yandell Elliott, a Southern Conservative and FPRI pillar who taught in the Government Department at Harvard and played mentor to Henry Kissinger, argued that, like Western democracy, the free market was another non-ideological, “natural” product of a superior way of life: The operations of the free market depended upon the diverse natural endowments of different nations and ethnic groups and as such put an end to the demographic growth of economically
irresponsible and politically immature populations (Elliott 1958). Modernization and population control—or even depopulation as in the case of southern Vietnam (Brick 2012)—were interconnected: “The device of the market tends to produce a division of labor that corresponds to the capabilities of the inhabitants. It does not offer the nostrum of sharing the wealth in accordance with counting heads where there is no limit to the creation of heads” (Elliott 1958, p. 450).

The Atlanticist Léo Moulin, professor at the College of Europe in Bruges, argued in *Orbis* that “Europeanization,” “Westernization,” “Americanization,” and “Atlanticization” were all synonyms, since they all signified the process whereby the White European and American powers colonized and “civilized” the globe in the name of the Western universal values (Moulin 1967, p. 1093). Moulin ridiculed European intellectuals who deplored the “Americanization” of the Old World. The so-called “Americanization,” Moulin pointed out, quoting Raymond Aron, was merely an example of the industrialization of traditional European society, the assimilation of the last pre-modern corners of the continent into a scientifically-organized society dedicated to mass production, and the increase of productivity. For Moulin, the Asian and African national liberation movements, and even Marxism-Leninism, were instruments of the Europeanization of the Third World, while the anticolonial “tirades” of the colonial nations were a “pathetic and simplified” rehashing of previous European anticolonial ideas by “the colored man.” Unable to complete his own “intellectual decolonization,” the “colored man” failed to find his own voice. Therefore, “every time they spoke, often with great eloquence, it was still Europe that spoke,” argued Moulin (1967, p. 1094), illustrating what Blaut (1987) would later identify as one of the major neocolonial tropes: that of nationalism as a Eurocentric “diffusion” of modernization.

Moulin welcomed this unshakeable Europeanization of the colonial nations, and saw in it the harbinger of world peace and unity. But in order to achieve that unity, the Europeanization had to transform not only the intellectual discourse of the colonials, but their way of life too—their most intimate and, at the same time, most socially imbedded behavior. As Moulin argued, a civilization possessed an organically integrated and structured set of forms and values, and Western technology was culturally embedded: “Our techniques are also values, Western or Atlantic values” (1967, pp. 1095-1096). Western technology was in this way, like Western democracy or the free market, naturalized. But their naturalness did not preempt their export; it merely changed the order of priorities.

This osmosis between culture and technology, between a set of beliefs and a set of techniques, precluded the successful adoption of the techniques without the assimilation of the Western cultural values and a change in the whole way of life of those seeking to duplicate Western technological prowess and economic success. In particular, Moulin warned that Asian and African peoples would not make any economic progress while remaining bound by traditional structures. The neoliberal path to development depended upon the abandonment of all the traditional safety networks and traditional patterns of behavior: “One cannot move the economy to the ‘take-off’ point while enjoying the advantages of social security. One cannot continue to bring children into the world at the same rate as in prepenicillin days and expect to live in comfort and plenty” (Moulin 1967, pp. 1095-1096).

Moulin’s notional “Europeanization” was in fact very much a “Protestantization” of mankind, since his criticism was leveled not only at the Third World countries, but also, in some respect, at the Southern European, Catholic countries that did not fit the Weberian archetype of the “Protestant ethic” favoring the development of capitalism. Moulin explained clearly that Europeanization, or Atlanticization, depended upon the adoption of the “socio-cultural traits of puritanism,” whose activism was
more progressive than the Catholic virtues of “general resignation on the part of the pauper” (1967, p. 1097). By contrast, Moulin’s notional and arch-Weberian Puritanism stood for all the progressive virtues that made the modern world possible: “individualism, rationalization of behavior and motives, careful management of one’s resources, a spirit of abstinence and frugality, an individual’s concern for his own welfare, confidence in social institutions, punctuality and the prudent use of time” (1967, p. 1098). Moulin found that neither most of the European Catholic countries, nor Latin American, African, or Asian nations exhibited any of the mandatory “traits of puritanism” that made “good government,” or “Western democracy” possible (1967, p. 1099). Although by the late 1960s numerous anthropologists published a significant body of literature that dispelled the myth of the irrational economic behavior of colonial peoples or the idea that traditional cultures did not value saving because they were “indifferent toward the future,” Moulin based his contribution on outdated literature and dubious generalizations and closed his argument by stating that his convictions were not steeped in “Western or Atlantic ethnocentrism,” or in the feeling of “racial superiority” (1967, p. 1101). He was merely convinced that the invincible strength of the Atlantic community was in Atlantic values, characterized by “universalism,” the “basic belief in the unity of mankind,” and a universally applicable rationalism, while the nationalism of the emerging nations was the most “regressive” “factor of stagnation” blocking the orderly development of the Third World nations in cooperation with the West (Moulin 1967, p. 1102). By stressing the importance of individual psychological characteristics, Moulin recycled the arguments of a modernization theory that both confirmed the exemplarity of the American society and path to development and denied the responsibility of Western colonialism for the “underdevelopment” of former colonial areas (Park 1995).

FPRI Atlanticism was deeply influenced by Strausz-Hupé’s familiarity not only with the ideas of European federalists such as Moulin, but also with the written work and institutional networks of Clarence K. Streit, author of tracts such as Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Leading Democracies (1939) and Freedom’s Frontier (1940) (Strausz-Hupé 1995, pp. 173-174). Strausz-Hupé was a member of the board of the International Movement for Atlantic Union (IMAU), founded in Paris on July 3-4, 1955. The President of IMAU was Streit, whose “one-worldism” was shared by many influential bankers, industrialists, and intellectuals active in the Bilderberg Group and the Atlantic Institute. This vast network militating for Atlantic unity was partially financed by the CIA and grew out of the American interest in discouraging European isolationism and anti-Americanism, especially among the elites. As such, one of their main targets was Charles de Gaulle. Strausz-Hupé would recruit many of the collaborators for his volume on the Idea of Colonialism, such as Moulin, or for the special issue of Orbis dedicated to Kohn in 1967 from these “Atlanticist” circles (Aubourg 2003; Osborn 1958; Strausz-Hupé 1961b). The insistence of many Atlanticists on the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty (1949) affirming the determination of the “Parties” to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their people” reads rather ominously in light of their insistence on a certain cultural orthodoxy or eugenic homogeneity.

One of the most active Atlanticists was the Southern industrialist Hugh Moore, whose Malthusianism influenced the emphasis of the Draper Report on population control in Third World countries. Due to the Draper Report, population control became part and parcel of the U.S. anti-communist crusade and foreign aid policies seeking to secure the stability of Third World countries and, thus, the safe access of NATO countries to their raw materials (Hartmann 2002; Hoff 2012). Moore’s interest in eugenics prompted him to become, in the 1960s, the president and financial
benefactor of the Association for Voluntary Sterilization (AVS), founded in 1937. The AVS leadership attempted to persuade obstetricians to “be more sterilization minded” and to talk “those who need fertility control the most—the morons, the ignorant, the irresponsible,” and the “half wits” into accepting sterilization (Dowbiggin 2002, pp. 63-64). Under Moore’s leadership, the AVS changed its focus from the domestic to the international arena and lobbied for the introduction of mass sterilization programs in overpopulated countries such as India. Like Possony, Moore warned that the domestic increase of the population with poor intellectual or genetic quality would mandate the increase of taxes in order to fund the welfare state. As revealed by Donald Critchlow (1999, p. 32), Moore also confessed to John D. Rockefeller III that he feared “the use which Communists make of hungry people in their drive to conquer the earth.” Rockefeller concurred and, as president of the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, created by President Nixon, urged the Congress to control the movements of population and warned that any further population increase would only sap the “vitality of business” (The Commission on Population Growth and the American Future 1972, p. 4).

The Hugh Moore Fund’s racially controversial advertisements advocating population control and pleading with the U.S. government to save the world from communist enslavement by bolstering the foreign aid programs with programs to regulate the fertility of Third World nations appeared in all the major U.S. publications and were endorsed by, among others, William Shockley (Dowbiggin 2002). President Nixon found in 1969 that Moore’s “dedication to easing the problems of world population growth” had led to “significant public service” (Lader 1971, p. 84). Moore was also, like Strausz-Hupé, one of the most active members of the Atlanticist think-tanks. According to Kohn and his fellow FPRI Atlanticists with whom he organized the “Conference on the North Atlantic Community” in Bruges in 1957, the United States was NATO, and NATO was Western civilization, or “Christian civilization,” as the conservative Russell Kirk wrote in praising the conference (Gordon 2010, 2011; Kirk, 1958).

Strausz-Hupé would return to the idea of an Atlantic Union and of U.S. benevolent hegemony in three very well received “Foreign Policy Research Institute Books”—Protracted Conflict (1959), A Forward Strategy for America (1961), and Building the Atlantic World (1963)—co-authored with Possony, Kintner, James E. Dougherty, Alvin J. Cottrell, and several others, less well-known FPRI lights. The gist of these books was that the United States was engaged in a decades-long “struggle for the mastery of the globe,” that the Soviet Union used colonial conflicts to hurt the West, and that the West allowed itself to be “Blackmailed” by “backward peoples” who exploited Western guilt (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1963, pp. 4, 22, 26). This FPRI trilogy helped the Cold War effort by casting the conflict between the West and “the Rest” into a clash between “Open Society” and “Closed Societies” (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1963, p. 133). Democracy was the way in which Western society functioned and, as such, it was non-ideological, while communism was an ideological construct and therefore inherently totalitarian, as postulated by the entire body of Cold War conservative literature dedicated to the nature and dangers of ideologies (McDonald 2004). The purpose of the U.S. Lincolnian struggle on behalf of the global “open society” was to free the slaves of the closed societies by finding ways to “adapt democracy and the Western concept of human dignity to new environments” (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1961, p. 36). Since it was dedicated to a pragmatic, empirical, “non-ideological,” open-ended political philosophy, the West was ready to accept that there was no universally valid blueprint for world order, and that colonial and developing peoples might find certain Western concepts of political democracy too “advanced” for them. Quoting the examples of such Western allies as King Saud in Saudi Arabia or Shah Reza Pahlevi of
Iran, Strausz-Hupé, Kintner, and Possony hastened to point out that the West must not allow its prejudices to stand in the way of a just understanding of the usefulness of authoritarian and military regimes friendly to the United States (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1961, pp. 60, 269). Building a democratic society was an arduous task and a very long process punctuated by revolts, famine, civil war, corruption, and a host of other ills. Sometimes only authoritarian or one-party regimes could provide the kind of “dependable and effective government” strong enough to build a democracy (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1961, p. 239), while insisting on freedom for certain parts of the colonial world would actually diminish the sphere of freedom by creating the “ideal precondition for a communist takeover” (Bouscaren 1953, pp. 185-186).

The contributors to The Idea of Colonialism, published under the auspices of the FPRI in 1958, that is to say at the beginning of the most important decolonization decade, argued that the reality of Western colonialism was much more benign than the “myth” peddled by enemies of the West such as the Soviets and their Third World cronies (Heckscher 1958). Hans Kohn’s opening essay “Reflections on Colonialism” (1958) started from the idea that anticolonial sentiments were the product of liberal colonial regimes, and that oftentimes anti-colonialism was simply xenophobia, and as such it could and should be prevented in the name of higher, cosmopolitan ideals. “Russia” shared its tyrannophilia, “agrarian backwardness,” and “lethargy of its church and its masses,” with the Asian nations, who therefore looked more favorably upon the Soviet Union than on the “dynamic, individualistic, and progressive West” (Kohn 1958, p. 8). Against the “widespread propaganda” claims that Western powers impoverished, exploited, and discriminated against the Asian and African populations which they subjugated, Kohn argued that the Western powers were not guilty of injustices and cruelties worse than “the normal cruelties in Asia and Africa,” continents rife with tribal warfare, caste systems, and racial discrimination (1958, p. 11).

Possony agreed that colonialism was merely “the emotional issue of the decade,” and that by pushing for decolonization, Western liberals played right into the hands of those inciting racial strife as part of their plot for a “world-wide Communist revolution” (1958, p. 17). Like Kohn, Possony argued that there was no universal recipe for colonial or decolonization policies, and that some ethnic groups were not “eligible” for national self-determination. “Wholly illiterate populations” still “indulging in pagan blood rites” could not be seriously considered ripe for self-government (Possony 1958, p. 20-21). Countries with festering class or ethnic conflicts were also disqualified from the right to divorce the metropole; so was any still “violent and undisciplined” people. Unevolved political societies such as tribes or populations unable to “practice self-restraint” could merely aspire to having their interests “considered” and their rights protected by the colonial government (Possony 1958, p. 23). But legitimately raising the question of independence was out of the question since “the fundamental premise of colonialism—that some populations need to be governed by outside states which are administratively and militarily capable—( . . . ) appears to be basically sound” (Possony 1958, pp. 26-29). According to Possony (1958), instead of bursting into nation states, colonial empires should have evolved into federations, with the control over the colonial areas transferred from the European powers to the international system of alliances dominated by the United States. As Strausz-Hupé’s FPRI manifesto, published in the first issue of Orbis, put it, “the mission of the American people” was “to bury the nation state, lead their beheaved [sic] peoples into larger unions, and overawe with its might the would be saboteurs of the new order,” that is of the “American universal empire” (1957, pp. 26-27).

Once decolonization was recast as merely one of the battles of the Cold War, the FPRI defense intellectuals could safely attack the national liberation movements in the
name of the cultural evolutionism and fake idealism that characterized much of the mid-century U.S. foreign policy discourse on colonialism (Krenn 1999). The FPRI intellectuals blasted resistance to the United States’s global anti-Communist crusade and imperial deployment as xenophobic, backward, isolationist, and totalitarian, and argued that the West had to pool together all of its propaganda resources in order to help the “Western man” carry out his noble task of helping the underdeveloped nations “break away from a primitive past” and launch into a “difficult and challenging future” (Kloman, Jr. 1958, p. 382; Possony 1958, p. 20). Harry W. Hazard and Paul M. A. Linebarger, who worked for the Operations Research Office, noted that the term “pre-literate societies” was only “a nice, modern sociologically sound euphemism applied to peoples who once were called ‘barbarians,’ then ‘savages,’ and, more recently, ‘primitives’” (1958, p. 462).

The cultural evolutionism of the FPRI intellectuals was made even more corrosive by their penchant for pathologizing and attacking anti-colonial positions as emotionally imbalanced states. According to the FPRI psychosociological approach, anti-colonialism was not just wrong, it was a virus, a disease, a psychological complex. Neutrality was, according to Linebarger and Hazard, “a pustulent symptom of a profound and persisting spiritual malignancy,” a “neurotic or paranoid pattern” that disqualified the afflicted individuals or nations from contributing to global prosperity (1958, p. 468). Since colonialism was approved as “a normal phenomenon in history, which has served a legitimate, constructive end,” it was only logical, for example, that Jawaharlal Nehru’s concerns regarding colonialism would be those of a “monomaniac,” and India’s non-alignment a symptom of a “post-puberty self-consciousness in India’s attitude to colonialism,” “something adolescent,” an “immaturely one-dimensional” understanding of the normal human relationships (Kloman, Jr. 1958, p. 364). The Latin American countries, fearing the U.S. manipulation of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (better known as the Rio Treaty 1947), and seeking to resist any “hemispheric anti-Communist movement” supported by Washington, D.C., were berated by Arthur Whitaker for their irrational attitude and lack of political “maturity” (1958, pp. 177, 185). Commenting on the non-aligned Asian and African countries that had gathered at Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, the FPRI collaborator Irene W. Meister sarcastically noted that communists preyed on the lack of economic maturity of underdeveloped countries who conceived of any economic exchange as one pitting the inimical camp of foreign investors against the interests of their own nation (Meister 1958). As a result of this nationalist mistrust in foreign investors cultivated by Communist forces in many non-aligned nations, Western companies were unable to attain from many Third World governments mutually rewarding deals for the exploitation of oil and other natural resources (Fraser 2003).

William Elliott agreed that communist propaganda obscured the fact that modern Western colonialism was nothing else than a manifestation of the Western interest in, and capacity to defend, the “rights” of the colonized peoples and of native minorities (1958, p. 434). Beyond and above these rights, lay what Elliott identified as the right of “the world” to have access to the natural resources that newly independent nations tended to keep for themselves. Elliott protested that national sovereignty should not allow the ragtag coalition of tribal rulers and immature nations to threaten the vital resources of the West, that is of the “most civilized peoples, who bear the hopes of a free world” (1958, pp. 444-445). Elliott proposed the creation of a type of “international servitude” guaranteeing the right of NATO countries to “develop” the subsoil resources of countries incapable of doing so (1958, p. 447). The protection of minority rights and of the Western right to exploit the natural resources essential to the development of the
West and of the entire world made colonialism, “good colonialism,” both “inevitable and necessary” (Elliott 1958, pp. 436-437, 439).

It is hard not to notice that the FPRI defense intellectuals and their government sponsors shared a common conceptual universe when reading in a CIA memorandum written in preparation for the 1954 Guatemalan coup that the socio-economic reforms initiated by the democratically-elected President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman were nothing else than “an intensely nationalistic program of progress colored by the touchy, anti-foreign inferiority complex of the ‘Banana Republic.’” The de-legitimization of neutrality depended upon the demotion of Third World nationalism to the status of just another form of “envy” of the haves by the have-nots, and thus to an ignoble form of class-struggle. In order to defend the Free World, the FPRI defense intellectuals appealed to mutations of orthodox Marxism by way of Cold War psychosocial theories.

CONCLUSION

As academics and public intellectuals, the FPRI authors studied in this article imparted respectability to pernicious dichotomies—between the West and the Rest, “open” and “totalitarian” societies, civilized and “primitive” races or countries—that framed analyses of both foreign and domestic issues. Ethnic minorities (such as African Americans, Latinos, or Chinese Americans), social categories (e.g., the poor), or subcultures (e.g., hippies, pacifists) were frequently represented as somehow un-American in the literature generated by the FPRI defense intellectuals and their confederates. Foreign countries (Latin American, non-aligned Asian and African countries, and even Southern European countries) were judged according to the same starkly Manichean way of understanding history as a “protracted conflict” between the worthy, or the righteous upper quarter of the world (the “Free World”), and the backward, underperforming rest of humanity. From an epistemological perspective, the work on communism of the FPRI defense intellectuals—stressing the single ideological source, the absolute coherence, and the unity of command of any action of the Communist world—placed them in the ranks of the radical right obsessed with Communist plots and analyzing past or contemporary history in the unfalsifiable light of conspiracy theories (Holsti 1974). This essentialist understanding of the Communist world, dominated by the idea of a “blueprint” for “world domination” through a “protracted conflict,” combined in the case of the FPRI intellectuals with racial or cultural essentialism. As a result, the international relations theories devised by the FPRI intellectuals were nothing more than ways to instrumentalize international law, human rights discourses, and various humanitarian and cultural ideals in order to muster support for the Western (neo) colonial powers and their global democratic crusades (Guilhot 2014). The FPRI intellectuals sought to influence policy making, and their ability to identify institutional carriers for their ideas and to open up ideological space for institutions capable of translating their ideas into policy was formidable.

As defense intellectuals, Strausz-Hupé and Possony, together with their FPRI collaborators, contributed decisively to two of the main growth spurts of the U.S. military-industrial complex during the Cold War. The first one occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when, as strategic culture insiders have shown, FPRI tracts such as Protracted Conflict served to propel the United States from the relatively isolationist position of “fortress America,” with its massive program of nuclear buildup undertaken in the name of “massive retaliation,” into a long history of global military interventions initiated under the name of “limited wars” (Abshire 1982). FPRI’s concept
of conventional “limited wars” and “hands-on warfare,” coupled with calls for Third World development through “foreign aid” in answer to Nikita Khrushchev’s endorsement of national liberation wars, provided in the early 1960s the much needed ideological skeleton for the American Cold War global democratic and “nation-building” initiatives that justified increased military spending and covert military and paramilitary foreign interventions (Abshire and Allen, 1963).

For example, between 1959 and 1961, the FPRI had contracts with the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee and with the President’s Committee to Study the United States Military Aid Program. The Committee, led by William H. Draper, Jr., was created by President Eisenhower to answer those who argued that U.S. military aid should be scaled down in favor of economic aid (Strausz-Hupé 1961a). The Draper Committee found that, as long as the United States was engaged in a “protracted conflict” with the Communist world, economic aid could not replace military aid since military assistance programs (MAP) promoted democracy and progress and therefore were a form of economic aid (Rabe 1988). Since communism thrived on poverty and instability, the United States could deter communism by promoting political and economic stability. And the best provider of stability in Third World countries was the army, the “principal tool” for anti-communist nation-building (The President’s Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program 1959, 1:59). The recommendations of the Draper Report were passed into law by the Mutual Security Act (1959), which legislated the use of the military’s civil capabilities in order to strengthen the U.S. promotion of democracy abroad (Christiansen 1998). The arguments advanced by the Draper Report furnished, for the next three decades, the main justification for the United States’ government support of military juntas and paramilitary activities in Latin America, Africa, and Asia (Schoultz 2014).

The FPRI contributed to the Draper Report by preparing the key “Study of United States Military Assistance Program in Underdeveloped Areas.” The study was written by Alvin J. Cottrell, James E. Dougherty, Walter F. Hahn, and Robert C. Herber, under the supervision of Strausz-Hupé. The evaluation and the recommendations of the FPRI study are, essentially, those of the final report. FPRI experts found that military aid fostered economic growth and should not be replaced with purely economic aid because the economic gains would be upset by security losses resulting from the fact that, short of dollars, the “recipient countries” would start buying weapons from the Communist bloc instead of the United States (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1959b, p. 49). According to the FPRI experts, MAP should have encouraged the officer corps to become more active in promoting economic progress and internal security; that is, to become involved in running the economy and in police operations.

The FPRI report stressed that the military component of the mutual security program was of paramount importance since “insecurity is incompatible with economic development” and “aggressors or subversives” were capable, in the absence of a solid military aid program, to wreak economic and political havoc in various Third World countries (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1959b, p. 50). Therefore, the FPRI defense intellectuals stressed the MAP’s importance for “antiguerrilla training” (of the type to be provided starting in the early 1960s by the U.S. Army School of the Americas) and for the development of “small, highly mobile and decentralized military units” able to perform both internal (police) and external (army) security operations (De Pauw and Luz, 1990; Massoglia et al., 1971). They also asked MAP to provide support for the development of anti-Communist “troop indoctrination programs” and for counterintelligence units able to identify and eliminate the “subversive elements within the indigenous armed forces” (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1959b, p. 58). Since government
officials in “underdeveloped areas” were deemed to be too naïve to take more than a “narrow” view of communism, and since governments were subject to regular reshuffles and many changes of personnel, the continuity of anti-communist vigilance remained to be assured by what the FPRI experts called “auxiliary organs”; that is, by “dedicated groups of citizens who can lend some consistency to anti-Communist operations” (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1959b, p. 76). MAP would help the progress of these “disciplined” groups of citizens through a training program “designed to generate a healthy spirit” (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1959b, p. 76).

The counterinsurgency and indoctrination programs recommended by the FPRI experts and the Draper Committee would facilitate the financial and logistical support extended by the Reagan administration to, for example, the Nicaraguan Contras and the death squads in Guatemala and El Salvador. The Latin American policy of the Reagan administration was largely inspired by the literature produced by the Council for Inter-American Security (CIS), founded in 1976 to oppose the Panama Canal Treaty ratification. CIS organized the opposition to the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty in conjunction with organizations such as the Task Force on the Panama Canal, on whose board Possony sat. CIS flourished in the 1980s under the presidency of Lynn Francis Bouchey, who was groomed for right-wing think-tank glory by Possony, who co-authored with him one of the most influential books of the then-emerging “terrorism industry”—*International Terrorism: The Communist Connection* (Herman and O’Sullivan, 1989). The book represented Bouchey’s auctorial debut and was written in the conspiratorial key and shrill, anti-communist tone that was specific to FPRI productions and that set the pattern for all the CIS publications on Latin America Bouchey authored or prefaced (Bouchey and Piedra, 1980a; Bouchey et al., 1980b; Waller et al., 1987; Whelan and Jacek, 1988). The Latin American “protracted conflict” served Bouchey well during the Reagan administration, when CIS functioned as one of the most active Washington lobby groups and U.S. propaganda outlets for the Contras and other Latin American counterinsurgency guerillas (Peace 2012). CIS members included Bouscaren, while retired Major General John Singlaub served as adviser. Singlaub was president of WACL, on the board of whose new U.S. chapter—the United States Council for World Freedom (USCW)—sat Possony. Under Singlaub, WACL became, with the approval and support of the White House, the main conduit for nongovernmental or covert government support for rightist “freedom fighters” (Sklar 1988).

Another triumph came in the same period—the late 1970s and early 1980s—when the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), created in 1976 during the Ford Administration, “articulated and amplified the fears of the time and played a leading role in opposing the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II)” and in supporting national security and military policies, including the nuclear buildup, of the early years of the Reagan presidency (Johnson 1994, pp. 44-45). The CPD board of directors included President Reagan himself and many important figures of his future administration, including Strausz-Hupé (Boies and Pichardo, 1990; Sanders 1983). The FPRI was at the forefront of the organizations opposing SALT II, criticizing the SALT agreements in a series of articles, pamphlets, books, and conferences spanning the 1970s (Burt 1974; Davis et al., 1975; Foreign Policy Research Institute 1973; Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, 1973; Kruzel 1973).

The way in which the rhetoric of the “protracted conflict” fueled opposition to the SALT agreements can be noticed in a letter sent on December 29, 1979, to Senator H. John Heinz III by the Pittsburgh businessman Adolph W. Schmidt. Schmidt wrote that after participating in or supporting the work of organizations such as the Atlantic Council, the FPRI, and the Committee on the Present Danger, he came to recognize that: “As long as the ideology of Communism exists there will
be ‘protracted conflict’ between West and East, because the basic issue is Freedom vs. Tyranny” (Schmidt 1979). Therefore, he found that SALT II was “a bad treaty” and urged Heinz to vote against its ratification (Schmidt 1979). The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would prompt President Carter to ask the leader of the Senate, on January 3, 1980, to delay any discussion of the treaty. However, Senator Heinz had no inclination to vote in favor of SALT II since, in fact, in December 1979 - February 1980 he sought the advice of Strausz-Hupé on NATO and SALT II (Heinz 1979-1980). President Reagan himself consulted Strausz-Hupé about SALT II in that same period, and in a January 1980 letter he sent to the hawkish Republican House Minority Leader Robert H. Michel, who denounced SALT II as “deadly” to U.S. national security, Reagan wrote: “I believe we live in perilous times. Not too long ago, Robert Strausz-Hupé told me he believed that if we didn’t immediately do what you yourself have suggested, it is five minutes to midnight for the United States” (Skinner et al., 2004, p. 400).

One of the most vocal and efficient opposition campaigns against the ratification of SALT II was mounted by the American Conservative Union (ACU), on whose board sat Possony as a founding member (Skidmore 1996). As one of the most influential organizations of the New Right, the ACU draped social conservative positions on civil rights, busing, or criminal rights in neoliberal language. Possony’s translation of his earlier open support for racial segregation into the language of economics conferred academic respectability to these crucial ideological shifts of the 1970s, when New Right/ACU ideologues such as Kevin Phillips (1969) and William Rusher (1975) started to deal with racial issues in the coded language of fiscal conservatism and resistance to government “intrusion.” Studying President Nixon’s stance on race and civil rights issues, John Ehrlichmann found that Nixon hid his conviction that Blacks were “genetically inferior to Whites” under wide political and economic considerations regarding the various failures and inefficiencies of housing integration, school busing, and affirmative action (Ehrlichmann 1982). Nixon’s 1970–1971 housing policies, which amounted to suburban segregation, were couched in the sort of neoliberal discourse used by Possony, a language that carried no hint of racism, even if it consolidated it (Lamb 2005; Schuck 2003).

Possony was very active at the Conservative Political Action Conferences (CPAC) organized by the ACU in the second half of the 1970s, participating at the CPAC panels on “Domestic Intelligence” (1975), “National Defense” (1977), and “Conservative Initiatives” (1978) (Harold B. Lee Library. MSS 176). The ACU’s Truth Squads, grassroots campaign through leaflets distribution, letter writing campaign, and direct lobbying of Congress helped them contribute to the defeat of the national health insurance act, and to the adoption of President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (Possony’s “Star Wars”). Another major campaign launched by the ACU in 1979 was in support of the White minority rule in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

The ideological staying power of the FPRI authors indicates the extent to which they were able to shape and be shaped by what Ron Robin called the “common ‘universe of discourse’ and (. . .) pool of ‘shared assumptions’ permeating American society” (2001, p. 4) during the Cold War and even beyond. Understanding this universe would help us understand how, throughout the Cold War, the FPRI defense intellectuals were able to embed concepts such as “freedom,” “equality,” and “human/individual rights” in an ideological scheme spacious enough to allow neo-imperialist tendencies, racial discrimination, military spending, and authoritarian leadership.

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NOTES

4. Weyl (1964) reciprocated and gave a positive review to Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s *Beyond the Melting Pot: the Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City*.
5. Van den Bergh’s conspiracy with the South African information director Eschel Hoodie and the cabinet minister Connie Mulder to secretly buy mass-media outlets around the world in order to spread pro-apartheid propaganda would lead in 1978 to the fall of the Vorster government.
6. Moulin (1967) made the distinction between “sociologically Protestant” Catholic countries such as Belgium, France, Austria, Ireland, and Italy, and countries such as Spain or Portugal, both of whom embodied the underdeveloped Europe along with Malta, Greece, or Turkey.
7. See “The Atlantic Union Resolution” (1951).
8. See the Conclusion section for more information about the FPRI contribution to the Draper Report.
9. Strausz-Hupé (1952, p. 66) found “ludicrous” Karl R. Popper’s attacks on Plato as a proto-totalitarian apostle of Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin, but he recognized early on the propaganda potential of Popper’s *The Open Society and Its Enemies*.
10. See the CIA’s (1953) Memorandum on Guatemala.
11. See the Task Force on Panama Canal and the CIS correspondence in the Jimmy Carter Library.
13. See Harold B. Lee Library Collections. Among the most prominent figures of the ACU was Phillis Schlafly, who in 1965 attended, as vice-president of the National Federation of Republican Women, the National Defense Seminar organized by the Liberty Lobby, the organization founded by Willis Carto. Schlafly was a prominent figure of the ACU, speaking not only on social issues but also on national security issues, appearing in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 7, 1979, to testify against SALT II.
14. ACU leaders Robert E. Baumann (Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives 1979, pp. 100-107) and Stanton Evans (Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives 1979, pp. 47-54) testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs for lifting the sanctions imposed by the U.S. government on Rhodesia and also forwarded the Committee the ACU report on their “fact-finding mission” to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia (Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives 1979, pp. 253-280). William Kintner, appearing in front of the committee as an “independent observer of election eve situation,” warned that Rhodesia was part of the conflict between the Free West and the Communist East, and asked for the immediate lifting of the sanctions imposed on Rhodesia (Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives 1979, pp. 44-47).

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Protracted armed conflict is not a legal category or legal classification of armed conflict but does that mean the word has no significance for IHL applicability? In this issue, Dustin Lewis looks at as it affects international criminal law’s jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes in non-international armed conflicts. Protracted social conflict is a technical term that generally refers to conflicts described by other researchers as protracted or intractable; complex, severe, commonly enduring, and often violent. The term was presented in a theory developed by Edward Azar. Protracted social conflict as Edward Azar termed it, denotes hostile interactions between communal groups that are based in deep-seated racial, ethnic, religious and cultural hatreds, and that persist over long periods of time with sporadic. When we’re locked in a protracted conflict with another person, there’s one critical step that’s usually necessary to reach a resolution in which both parties feel a sense of trust and remain committed to the relationship: The higher-status person must express vulnerability first. Here’s why it’s so important, why it’s so difficult, and what to do about it. Conflicts are concluded in the absence of vulnerability and empathy all the time. In some cases the higher-status person increases the pressure or waits until the lower-status person submits. Protracted conflicts are a major source of human suffering and can cause long-term displacement and development reversals. Although protracted conflicts can take many forms, they are generally characterized by their longevity, intractability and mutability. Authorities involved in situations of protracted conflict face complex challenges, particularly when it comes to ensuring that international humanitarian law (IHL) is respected by their armed forces.