The national defense strategy under the regime of the 7th President of Indonesia to protect the exclusive economic zone of the Natuna Sea overlapping with China's nine-dash line

Andriamampionona L. Tienh, Yuwanto, Aprista Ristyawati, Amiek Soemarmi, Retno Saraswati

1 Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Diponegoro University, Semarang, Indonesia; 2 Faculty of Law, Diponegoro University, Semarang, Indonesia. Corresponding author: A. L. Tienh, tienhlai@gmail.com

Abstract. This research aims to examine what the Indonesian Government is currently arranging to protect the exclusive economic zone of the Natuna Sea overlapping with China's nine-dash line, particularly under the power of the 7th President of Indonesia. China's rejection upon the Permanent Court of Arbitration indirectly awards the Philippines in the 2016 Scarborough Shoal case. This circumstance has increased the warning status of EEZ in the Natuna Sea, and China's expression of maritime rights in the concerned area lately gave substantial notice to Indonesia; nonetheless, Indonesia keeps refraining in the South China Sea issue. Through the soft power strategy that is based on Javanese culture and economic-centered diplomacy for foreign policy, secondary data obtained from several sources such as books, scientific journals, theses, dissertations, and some other scientific papers are used as research materials. The result shows that Indonesia prefers to maintain the Status quo while keeping its high Economic Diplomacy with China. Living side by side peacefully with China is a staple characteristic of Indonesia's foreign policy, including in the problem management involving Natuna's EEZ and China's nine-dash line. Given the military strength that notably differs, there is no benefit to be achieved if Indonesia conducts a confrontation order against China. Besides, Indonesia does not want to risk its strong economic bonds with China. Soft power can be assumed to be advantageous for Indonesia, yet its continuity is somehow dubious. Although Indonesia appears comfortable prioritizing economic diplomacy, the fragility of its practice as a defense strategy is eerie. This study recommends the Indonesian Government to be extra consistent in determining resolution through a clear commitment regarding the concerned case. Bringing this issue to the international stage for further support from countries incorporated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is a promising opportunity.

Key Words: Natuna, maritime policy, soft power, Javanese culture, economic diplomacy.

Introduction. On July 12, 2016, the Arbitration Court, which handled cases between the Philippines and China, issued a judgment stating that China's nine-dash line was unconstitutional per the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982. The act and purview of Chinese claims in the so-called "nine-dash line" as displayed on the South China Sea's map have been an origin of long-run vagueness leading to conflict. The Tribunal found that any claim upon tangible and intangible resources based on historical rights such as the nine-dash line should have been eliminated as it was utterly "incompatible" with UNCLOS's Award on Merits Paragraph 246 (Whomersley 2017). China refused the initiation of arbitration by asserting that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case, and declined to participate in this case straightforwardly. Although the court's decision is "final and binding, and without appeal," China soundly rejects the verdict instead (Schofield 2016).

China's aggressive response to the Permanent Arbitration Court (PCA) regarding the Philippine claim could also have higher legal implications toward a less-affected country like Indonesia. Disagreement can be made because the nine-dash line undoubtedly interrupts the Natuna Sea's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Also, China's
increasingly aggressive posture in the concerned region poses a threat to Indonesia's sovereign freedoms. In 2016, the Chinese fishing vessel "Kway Fey" voyaged to the EEZ in Natuna and was seized by the Indonesian Navy while carrying out illegal trawl operations. However, when the unlawful vessel was pulled approaching Natuna Island, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel that was twice or three times larger and more advanced than the Indonesian's had dispatched and succeeded in freeing Kway Fey. After the incident, China declared that the northern Natuna Sea was a traditional Chinese fishing ground (Anam & Ristiyani 2018). Also, in 2017, China complained against the actions taken by Indonesia concerning the name change of the North Natuna Sea (Suryadinata 2017). Another case, on December 19, 2019, Indonesian people were shocked as the Chinese fishing vessels and their coast guards trespassed the EEZ in the Natuna waters. Those interlopers are deemed to have disturbed Indonesian EEZ and were also suspected of conducting Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF) (Utomo 2020). The Chinese Coast Guard Ship escorting the illegal fishing boat had a hull number of 4301 CCG 4301 (BBC Indonesia News 2020). The Indonesian Navy has taken action by loudly commanding them to immediately leave the EEZ of Indonesia, as stated by the Head of the Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla), at a press conference on Monday, December 30, 2019 (BBC Indonesia News 2019).

By taking this multi-dimensional background into account, this paper aims to discover what the Indonesian Government is currently doing in addressing the overlapping territory between the Natuna's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and China's nine-dash line, especially during the 7th President of Indonesia's leadership.

Conceptual framework and methodology

**Soft power.** Soft power is the ability of a particular influencer to persuade others to do something as requested (Wilson 2008). According to Nye (2009), the persuasive ability is related to winning power, comprising attractiveness and emulation. Furthermore, it is closely associated with "intangible resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions."

The effectiveness of hard power and soft power methods depends on the accessibility of resources. Superpower countries such as the United States of America or Russia are financially well prepared to support large numbers of armed forces as they have high national revenues, and consequently, countries with weaker economies are under their pressure. Small countries usually have difficulty in equipping federal weapons (hard power). The convenience of soft power is pretty much related to the size of a nation, and they are expected to have more capacity on it; small countries certainly can build soft power (Melissen 2005).

Soft power is a more effective and efficient concept in contemporary global politics because its durability and sustainability are quite promising. Contrary, hard power is less compelling than soft power because a dynamic change of global policy shows a lack of a ceasefire (Wagner 2014). However, the concept of soft power has weaknesses. Cooper (2004) listed three points of vulnerability: first, cultural strength of soft power is not similar to political power (Amirbek & Ydyrys 2014); second, the desired outcome of soft power strategy depends on individual circumstances which are not necessarily influenced by the state/country; finally, the actual benefits and positive results of soft power practices are long enough to take effect, even until the pioneer/founder dies (Amirbek & Ydyrys 2014).

**Qualitative research.** This study was conducted from June 2019 to June 2020 and used the soft power theory by examining aspects of culture and foreign policy. Qualitative research relies on secondary data obtained from several references, such as books, scientific journals, theses, dissertations, and other sources from online science releases. The qualitative method was chosen because this study dominantly examined the implementation of government policies at the international level that might risk a country's particular relationship with any country (e.g., Indonesia and China).
Results and Discussion. The nine-dash line disrupts Indonesia's sovereign rights, especially the EEZ of the Natuna waters. Since Indonesia does not want to conflict with China, a peaceful defense strategy comes in the game. Soft power has a more profound and definite calculation than external force. According to Lin & Hongtao (2017), a country's soft power holds on three resources: culture, political values, and foreign policy. Indonesia's soft power related to EEZ issues in the Natuna waters relies on Javanese culture to maintain the status quo and economic-centered diplomacy on foreign policy.

Javanese culture. Humility is a unique feature of Javanese culture. The term "Ng lurug tanpa bala menang tanpa ngasorake" in Javanese means "attack without troops in, win without belittling" (Campus Javanese 2013). In Javanese philosophy, attacking without reinforcements means achieving something without requiring extraordinary strength or advanced facilities. Therefore, apart from China's powerful military forces, Indonesia considered defending the sovereignty of EEZ in the Natuna waters without violence. This non-confrontational approach is a typical strategy by Indonesia's current President, and he is indeed a non-confrontational politician (Syailendra 2017).

The President's strategy is also in line with another Javanese phrase "Sura dira jaya ningrat lebur bening pengestuti" which means "every crime or violence will be defeated by patience, tenderness, and thoughtful attitude" (Rachmawati 2018). Still, based on Javanese culture, patience, and an unemotional approach can help individuals determine the most appropriate step in every situation.

The concern in maintaining the status quo upon the EZZ issue of the Natuna waters is following the Javanese culture that was presented earlier. Indonesia's behavior seems contradictory, yet under the current President, Indonesia is balancing its response to the South China Sea issue while protecting the Natuna waters. Although Indonesia expressly rejects the legitimacy of the nine-dash line (Meyer et al 2019), it still represents to be a non-claimant in the South China Sea issue. Furthermore, all Indonesia's military sit-ins in the Natuna waters have nothing to do with blocking-related action against China (Laksmana 2019).

One example of Indonesia's desire to preserve the status quo is expressed by its reluctance to conduct shuttle diplomacy through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) concerning the South China Sea issue. As stated by Connelly (2016), Indonesia's role in ASEAN has drastically changed. Formerly, the ASEAN principle relies on Indonesia's leadership in advancing regional norms and forging consensus to its peak; however, the current ASEAN's principle is no longer in line with the "foundation" of previous Indonesia's foreign policy, and already it has its own "foundation", as explained by the former presidential foreign advisor (Parameswaran 2014). Back in 2012 (Emmerson 2012), no one can rival Indonesia's efforts in building consensus among ASEAN members (Connelly 2016) right after the China-ASEAN ministerial meeting in Yuxi, China, in June 2016. When the Foreign Affairs Minister proposed a response to the Arbitral Tribunal decision in the case of the Philippines against China, the President initially struck every UNCLOS verdict on the dispute. After the intervention by the Indonesian President was carried out, the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, who was also well-known to the President assured that Indonesia's response must be added without luring China in anger (Connelly 2016).

The perception related to Indonesia's effort in maintaining the status quo and how Indonesia protects the EZZ in the Natuna waters that overlaps the nine-dash line is quite intriguing. Maintaining the status quo is believed to be the result of non-confrontational Javanese culture; peace and avoid disputes yet not getting a laissez-faire position. Today, there is no clear and decisive movement from Indonesia's stand. However, the EEZ in Natuna remained protected whenever a Chinese ship entered the area illegally as the Government promptly claimed that it was the Indonesian territory. The President's notion is said never to compromise Indonesia's sovereignty with any country yet also avoid actions that would endanger peaceful relationships with China.

Indonesia's desire to maintain the status quo in Natuna gives more room for bilateral economic diplomacy with China. The heart of Indonesia's foreign policy relies on
the second resource; the soft power strategy based on non-confrontational Javanese culture.

**Strengthening economic cooperation.** By strengthening the domestic sector, Indonesia is anticipated to show its identity as an archipelagic country with an influential maritime culture in preparing the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) idea (Alunaza et al. 2017). By examining the five pillars that have become the basis of Indonesia's ambition to become GMF (Laksmana 2017), the country has certainly had to find partners like China who can provide the requirements to complete Indonesia's ambitions. One of the needs that Indonesia aspires to strengthen is sea infrastructure, comprising 24 main ports and deep seaports that are expected to connect the Indonesian archipelago (Sriyanto 2018). So far, China is a significant trading partner and investor for Indonesia. With this established relationship, cooperation between China and Indonesia is also expected to achieve the goals of China's Maritime Silk Road (Zhao 2015).

Under the administration of the current Indonesian President, the role of foreign policy is weaker than economic development. The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was ordered to focus on 'simple diplomacy' (grounded diplomacy), defined as diplomacy that would be 'useful for the people' with a focus on trade and investment (Darmansjah 2015). Consequently, China has been pleased with that economic diplomacy because the Chinese Government is also committed to advance economic development (Hongyang 2014). Therefore, when the Indonesian President gave a speech at the "Next Chapter of Indonesia" on Seminar, November 19, 2014, the Chinese Business Authority announced that China was enthusiastic about cooperating with Indonesia. China is fully committed to implementing critical consensus by leaders in both countries to deepen economic and trade partnership. All of these cooperation schemes are projected to succeed in joint development (Hongyang 2014). The cooperation also led Indonesia and China to focus on infrastructure, marine economy, and industrial and agriculture sectors. China is also committed to strengthening its support in the financial domain by expanding imports from Indonesia and simplifying free trade arrangements.

Indonesia and China have the ambition to revive the glory and strength in the global maritime sphere; therefore, the mutual need must be maintained. The two countries have the potential to offer one another. Indonesia needs collaborative partners in building maritime infrastructure to unite the archipelago so that the entire marine area is truly worth as a GMF; in these circumstances, China can become a project facilitator. A stable relationship between partners is needed to develop strong bonds while presenting a vision of being a reliable next-door-neighbor. All contacts with China are expected to be fruitful to accomplish Indonesia's ambitions in strengthening the maritime region and becoming the GMF. On the other hand, China is expected to be more mingling with other ASEAN countries by actively interacting with Indonesia.

As a result, Indonesia can use these economic interests to maintain its relationship with China while strengthening cooperation. Instead of dealing with sensitive issues such as the EZZ in Natuna, Indonesia decides to prioritize economic diplomacy. In case Indonesia's efforts to protect its sovereignty over the North Natuna Sea do not give a bright future, at least the status quo can still be maintained. By all means, Indonesia can always fully exercise its sovereign rights.

**Protection of the Natuna waters as sovereign territory.** The provisions contained in Articles 55 and 75 of UNCLOS 1982 revealed a range of interests: the sovereign rights of coastal countries to manage the zone in proper authorities; pay attention to the economic benefits of third countries; regulation of specific activities in the concerned area for particular purposes such as marine scientific research, protection and preservation of the marine environment, the creation and utilization of artificial islands, and installations and structures; freedom of navigation and overflight; freedom to lay submarine communication cables and pipelines; military-strategic control zones; and the issue of residual rights in the region (UNCLOS 1982).

Maintaining the EEZ in the Natuna waters that intercross China's nine-dash line implies that Indonesia is exercising the sovereign rights granted by UNCLOS. The
sovereign power allows Indonesia to explore and exploit its territorial jurisdiction freely and can stop China from conducting self-ruling activities without Indonesian approval.

Indonesia's coastal and marine waters are one of the most fertile fishing grounds in the world and stand as the second-largest fish producer in the world after China (Global Marina Commodities 2019). Therefore, presenting the fishing industry sector as a basis for claiming sovereign rights over EEZ in the Natuna waters is perfectly acceptable. According to the Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (2020), the potential of fish production in the Natuna Sea was around 961,145 tons. Total catches allowed were 768,916 tons. The catch in 2019 was estimated to touch 755,306 tons, excluding the number caused by illegal fishing (Shahab 2020). Recently, Indonesia has sent more fishing boats to occupy the North Natuna Sea to show that the concerned area is under Indonesia's sovereign territory. Several official patrols always supervise the fishing activities by Indonesian fishers for making them feel comfortable and safe (Jakarta Post 2020). Also, Indonesia has built a fishery and marine center at the Port near Lampa Strait on Natuna Besar Island, the outermost island in the Natuna Islands. Led by a former marine and fisheries minister, this facility was constructed to support fishing activities in the 711 Fisheries Management Area covering the Karimata Strait, Natuna Sea, and North Natuna Sea. The facility is furnished with a refrigerated storage system and some other equipment to support export activities for developing the local economy (Shahab 2020).

Indonesia is also increasing the exploitation of oil and gas in the EEZ of the Natuna waters, which is believed to be one of the world's most abundant untapped gas supplies. Many large oil companies are operating in the region as well. In block A, there are Premier Oil, Pertamina Indonesia, KUFPEC Kuwait, PTT Thailand, and Petronas Malaysia. In block B, there are Exxon Mobil, Total SA, and PTT Exploration and Production, Pertamina Indonesia, ConocoPhillips, and Chevron (Harsono 2019). The previous Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs stated that Indonesia wanted the Natuna region to become the core for gas processing and related enterprises (Fabi 2016).

Chinese ships operating in the North Natuna Sea without Indonesian permission are considered illegal. Despite some frivolous protests from Chinese ships, Indonesian coast guards have never practiced violence against them. For example, when the Chinese fishing vessel "Kway Fey" in 2016 entered the Natuna's EEZ and was seized by the Indonesian Navy while trawling illegally, Indonesia was not attacking aggressively once the ship that had been pulled towards the Natuna Island was freed by Chinese coast guards who arrived with bigger and more advanced ships; the Chinese ship was unfortunately cleared (Wijaya 2018). Also, on December 19, 2019, vessels owned by Chinese fishermen and Chinese coast guards entered the EZZ in the Natuna waters. The vessels were not only considered to have violated the Indonesian’s EEZ but also suspected of conducting illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUUF) (Utomo 2020). Nevertheless, Indonesia can command them to stop stealing fish and leave the area.

There is no doubt that China has tried to increase its self-affirmation in the North Natuna Sea by assuming to have what is called "historic rights" in the concerned region (Fravel 2016). However, Indonesia remains stringent by practicing nonviolent resistance tactics when interlopers disturb their EEZ. Indonesia maintains the status quo in order to sustain interests without risking its relationship with China since the two countries share complementary potential and are partners in various sectors, especially in the economic sector.

**Economic benefits.** Under the regime of the current President, economic cooperation between Indonesia and China is exceptionally dynamic in various ranges. China is a significant export destination for Indonesia and is a source of investment through multiple mechanisms such as the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) and the One Belt One Road (OBOR) program (Anam & Ristiyani 2018).

In line with the President's foreign policy, the Governments of Indonesia and China agreed on bilateral cooperation to synergize the idea of the GMF and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative. The concept of a GMF was agreed to facilitate
maritime connectivity through infrastructure development. The preferential buyer credit from China that has been used so far is USD 1.8 billion, with an additional loan commitment of USD 4 billion (The WIRE 2018). Also, the Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises and Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) initiated a significant plan by constructing the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Train (HSR). The HSR began its construction in early 2016 and was completed in the first quarter of 2019. Railroad and signaling constructions were carried out by Indonesia while China supplied rolling stock or railroads. As much as 75% of the total investment amounted to USD 5.5 billion was financed by the China Development Bank (CDB), and the rest funds were obtained from a consortium of Chinese-Indonesian SOEs, PT Kereta Api Cepat Indonesia-China (KCIC) (Indrasiti & Winarto 2016).

Trading ventures by both parties were also highlighted. China has become Indonesia's fundamental trading partner. The volume of Indonesia-China trade continues to increase in the last five years, with an average rise of 19.58% (e.g., in 2011 amounting to USD 49 billion, in 2012 amounting to USD 51 billion, and in 2013 amounting to USD 52 billion) (Siwi 2013). Another evidence of collaboration between Indonesia and China is the Belt Road Initiative project or broadly known as BRI. According to Green (2018), the BRI project has two routes: the land-based trade lane (Silk Road Eco-belt) and the sea-based trade lane (Maritime Silk Road or MSR) covering the area from Europe to Central and East Asia. Jakarta is one of the essential elements that can connect Chinese trade in the Southeast Asia region. Some experts view the BRI project can positively influence Indonesia's national economy. In 2016, the value of Indonesia's non-oil and gas exports to China showed an increase of 13.97%, from USD 13.3 billion to USD 15.1 billion.

Upon a visit to China in April 2018, Indonesia's Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs, serving as a special representative in managing strategic cooperation with China, stated that five partnership contracts worth USD 23.3 billion had been signed under the Belt and Road Initiative. That cooperation includes two hydropower projects, one power plant, and a steel mill (The WIRE 2018). In a joint statement between China and Indonesia, it was declared that both parties were content to succeed in infrastructure development. Such cooperation has been exercised in recent years; the construction of the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway Project and discussions on developing a Regional Comprehensive Economic Corridor for BRI and GMF. Both parties agreed to increase efforts that can accelerate the success of the desired projects.

The economic ties between Indonesia and China are indeed prominent and influential, and they both have benefited each other from this economic alliance. Furthermore, the two countries still crave to strengthen economic ties; and for now, this aspiration is considered to be more influential rather than just contesting the EEZ in the Natuna waters.

Conclusions. Indonesia, under the current presidential administration, uses soft power in maintaining the EEZ in the Natuna waters that overlap with China's nine-dash line. Based on two resources, Javanese non-confrontational culture and economic diplomacy, Indonesia avoids all types of conflict with China and also disagrees with the pretension of China's historic rights toward the North Natuna Sea. For now, Indonesia preserves its interests by maintaining the status quo rather than exhibiting aggressive behavior that might cause significant loss in terms of finance, material, and population. In achieving the ambition as the Global Maritime Fulcrum, Indonesia needs prominent investors like China. Attracting investors and advancing infrastructure developments by promoting economic diplomacy is the heart of Indonesia's current foreign policy. Therefore, focusing on strengthening economic cooperation with China has become a top-notch priority.

Although soft power strategy has long-term effectiveness, employing this method to protect sovereign rights over the North Natuna Sea appears to have shortcomings in terms of continuity. Maintaining the status quo does not guarantee that China will no longer increase aggressiveness in the concerned territory. It is common knowledge that China is keen to control the South China Sea by all means. Economic diplomacy as a
defense strategy in the EEZ of the Natuna Sea is considered considerably flimsy because its effectiveness depends on the performance of individual countries; any failure performed by Indonesia could risk the entire economic cooperation.

The non-confrontation order toward the overlapping issue between the North Natuna Sea and China’s nine-dash line can be understood as a safe strategy by the current Indonesian Government. As a first recommendation, the Indonesian Government must have a consistent self-affirmation and continue to defend national sovereignty following the President’s statement saying that Indonesia will never accept compromises. Second, if there are bilateral negotiations made regarding this issue, official documentation must be made following the principles of good governance per Law No. 14/2008 regarding Public Information Openness. Finally, although this overlapping issue appears to be a regional-based case, the Indonesian Government must lift up this matter to the international stage to get more support from countries incorporated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Acknowledgments. The first author, Andriamampionona Lalaina Tienh, thanks all the team members for their solidarity and moral support in accomplishing this study.

References


Fravel T., 2016 Traditional fishing grounds and China’s historic rights claims in the South China Sea. Maritime Awareness Project, 5 pp.


Siwi A. P., 2013 Bilateral free trade: Hubungan Perdagangan Indonesia-China dalam Kerangka ACFTA. Jurnal Departemen Hubungan Internasional, Universitas Airlangga, 4 pp. [in Indonesian]


Suryadinata L., 2017 What does Indonesia’s renaming of part of the South China Sea signify? ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, No. 64, 6 pp.


Received: 21 June 2020. Accepted: 17 July 2020. Published online: 31 July 2020.

Authors:
Andriamampionona Lalaina Tienh, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Diponegoro University, Jl, Prof Soedarto, Tembalang, kec. Tembalang, Semarang City, Central Java 50139, Indonesia, e-mail: tienhla@yahoo.com

Yuwanto, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Diponegoro University, Jl, Prof Soedarto, Tembalang, kec. Tembalang, Semarang City, Central Java 50139, email: Yuwantosaja@yahoo.com

Aprista Ristyawati, Faculty of Law, Diponegoro University, Jl. Prof Soedarto, Tembalang, kec. Tembalang, Semarang City, Central Java 50139, Indonesia, e-mail: aprista_r@yahoo.co.id

Amiek Soemarmi, Faculty of Law, Diponegoro University, Jl. Prof Soedarto, Tembalang, kec. Tembalang, Semarang City, Central Java 50139, Indonesia, e-mail: amiek_hk@yahoo.com

Retno Saraswati, Faculty of Law, Diponegoro University, Jl. Prof Soedarto, Tembalang, kec. Tembalang, Semarang City, Central Java 50139, Indonesia, e-mail: saraswatiretno@yahoo.co.id

This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

How to cite this article:
The need to develop a maritime strategy stems from the simple fact of Indonesia’s archipelagic geography, which underscores two fundamental elements in its strategic thinking: the notion of national unity amid a fragmented geography and the dilemma of a maritime crossroads. Although the archipelago’s seas can serve as a medium of interaction among islanders, they can also be a source of division as they separate “islands from each other politically, economically, socially, and culturally.” In Indonesia’s case, the sea has become a natural medium to promote national unity through socio-cultural The Law of Nations developed along the lines proposed by Grotius. More and more, the principle was recognized that the high seas should be open and free for the use of all nations. No nation could prevent another from carrying on traditional activities at sea. The exclusive sovereign claims over vast areas of the sea had to be abandoned. [7]. Centuries have passed since acceptance of the Grotian view that no nation may claim or exercise sovereignty over the world’s oceans, with the exception of a narrow band of water extending from the nation’s coast known as the territorial sea. National defense strategy. INTRODUCTION The Department of Defense’s enduring mission is to provide combat-credible military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our nation. Should deterrence fail, the Joint Force is prepared to win. Reinforcing America’s traditional tools of diplomacy, the Department provides military options to ensure the President and our diplomats negotiate from a position of strength. Today, we are emerging from a period of strategic atrophy, aware that our competitive military advantage has been eroding.