Ethics, Empowerment, and Education:
A Neo-Aristotelian Case for the Public Duty to Educate and Train

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From Economics to Ethics

Economic rationalism has driven public educational policy in many first world countries since the seventies. It takes three logically distinct but practically convergent forms which are used to justify sharp educational, health and welfare cut-backs to the provision of public goods: the ‘minimal state’ thesis of both libertarians and economic rationalists; the argument for the assimilation of public to business sector management (‘managerialism’); and the deregulation/privatisation of public sector activities. Together they constitute what I will call ‘libertarian economism’. It could as well be called ethical agnosticism, or means ends reversal. The main problem with libertarian economism is that it is based on abstractions nowhere realised in fact, and dangerously agnostic about ultimate ends. The dependent instrumental terms in its discourse, terms like ‘productivity’, ‘client satisfaction’, ‘efficiency’, ‘cost reduction’, ‘flexibility’ and the like, are equivocal and can attach to immoral projects such as Eichmann’s dispatching of Jews to their deaths.

The classical economic theory and select game theory on which economic dry thinking draws assumes the abstract existence of the free market, its capacity to quantify and exchange goods, and calculating egoism on the part of individual market players. Competition between them allegedly tends overall to produce better outcomes than regulation through greater productivity, the ‘trickle down effect’, and other miraculous effects of the ‘invisible hand’ of the free market. But real markets are not competitive free for alls; they are limited by anti-monopolistic and anti-fraud rules, and limited to priceable commodities. They are actually socio political artefacts requiring state agencies like legislatures, judiciaries and police for there very existence, to monitor, support, and enforce their workings, notably property and contract law. Ideally they are regulated with an eye on ultimate goods. Governments and organisations, not just individuals, are market players.
On classical economic assumptions, co-operation, even inside business firms, becomes a puzzle. In real, more complex conditions of uncertainty and limited social cooperation and empathy, competitive egoism, while theoretically rational for one player can often be foolish for all players, or for joint players. Some optimal win/win social and organisational outcomes are only available to players jointly following principles of trust and reciprocity or respect for state and organisational authority and are cut off from sociopathic egoists who relentlessly compete. Cooperation under ethical rules of reciprocity, mutual restraint, and fair dealing increases joint value even in the market itself. Ethics, not unrealistic economic assumptions, must guide politics and policy in the direction of concerted public efforts to equalise personal empowerment and opportunity through education.

Even libertarian economism knows that ‘free markets’ cannot really organise themselves to produce goods such as ‘free’ (tax funded) public education. Yet they still think that public responsibility for education should be minimal; that competitive bidding by business and private sector providers should prevail to force tenderers for public money to compete on cost/price for a shrinking quantum of funds; and that private agents can equitably deliver public ‘goods and services’ to the ‘worthy poor’. Alford and Gregory (1997) however suggest, many public goods like knowledge, fair treatment safeguards, welfare, security, conviviality, and environmental sustainability cannot easily be produced, commodified and exchanged for profit in the same way as widgets.

One possible alternative to the dismal assumptions of classical economics which underpin much economic rationalism is an older and more realistic and acceptable socio-economic view: that associated with ‘virtue-ethics’. This approach is exemplified by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and their descendants. This provides a rationale for a politics which will warrant both public intervention in free markets and public administration of the common good. It is based on the notion that humans have the same distinctive raw capacities of thought, desire, perception and associated desires; with ideal objects like truth and good, and these when enjoyed make up our wellbeing/happiness. Enhancing dispositions of these common capacities, like the virtue of wisdom for intellect; courage and temperance for rational desire/will and fairness for their joint deployment in social interchange, help us to attain our common good and ultimate ends like friendship and knowledge; art and creativity; health and security. Moral virtues do so by curbing our natural selfishness through the finding a balance in passion and action, and the following of rules of reciprocity.

This paper concentrates on giving a positive descriptive overview of this alternative perspective of ancient and medieval virtue ethics and associated ‘just state’ politics which hopefully will show that these perspectives still have much to teach us, and more than most managerialists, economic rationalists and state minimalists realise. Unlike the latter they specify and talk about the ultimate ends of politics, governments, commerce and regulations, not just efficient means. Moreover they also presumed to judge means themselves by reference to these ultimate worthwhile ends, and to their supporting imperative principles and
precepts. They subordinate proximate ends of management, and the means, to explicit ethical criteria. Some goods should be completely excluded from the market.

Admittedly, the moral virtues, along with rules of reciprocity, make us vulnerable to others we trust. But in compensation, they hold out immense possibilities of greater knowledge, wealth and longevity, of wider and deeper friendship, convivial self-disclosure, aesthetic creativity, knowledge, self-perfection, and in general of wellbeing if only we can conquer the egoistic free-rider temptations. Virtues tend to good relationships, and vices to bad outcomes - and ultimately to violence. Greed is self subverting in the long term. Virtues will deliver wellbeing unless interference or bad luck occur. Virtues cannot prevent these but do not attract them. In the name of the equality in species of all persons; and the sameness of their ultimate goods and associated virtues, a unifying ethico-political approach can be articulated at a high level of abstraction. It is one in which the state, through its elected representative leaders, should follow ethics in its organisational design of a balanced ethico-political economy for the ‘body politic’: one which will balance group interests, somewhat as the intellect balances the claims of voluntary powers and the body balances the activity of its own powers in homeostasis. Such a regime will affirm the equality of our humanity; provide for our joint and individual empowerment to a practicable level; justify variable property rights, the imposition of taxes, some redistribution of opportunity and wealth, especially as they relieve social inequalities; and sustain the natural environment. It will legally constrain the bad behaviour of citizens in the name of the common, public good. Provided that it delivers on support for their autonomous search for virtuous wellbeing, and attainment of the common good, its policy intervention in many domains including the market, is justified.

This kind of moralised approach to the political problem is widely rejected or neglected by ironically self styled ‘realists’. They hold that ‘might is right’ or at least accept realpolitik. They reject the ethical approach to politics by appeal to reasons of state, prudent necessity, and moral agnosticism on the ground that virtue ethics exaggerates the degree of ethical consensus, or that it is excessively communitarian/socialist/ paternalist. But the more they stress such agnosticism, the less certainly their own views can be established. Their rejection will not be explicitly addressed and rebutted in the paper. But acceptance of the ethico-political stance offered here will by implication severely undercut any notion of the real existence or desirability of an independent Free Market.

A Neo-Aristotelian Ethics

Aristotle himself, since he treated women, slaves, and aliens (foreigners) as non-citizens, would not have accepted the post-eighteenth century egalitarian ‘turn’ which argued for equality and liberty into his politics, hence the prefix ‘neo-’ is required. This restriction led to his opposition to full representative democracy, as opposed to a kind or restricted middle class democracy. His own definitions of the human person must however be pressed against him to include
women and slaves as citizens; his fears of total democracy allayed by reference to later constitutional devices like separation of powers. But his pivotal notion of ‘the human good’ or wellbeing (eudaimonia) of the person can and will here be recognised as sound. A set of his ‘marks’ of wellbeing like autonomy, perfection of the self’s ‘higher’ capacities; relative finality or ultimate quality; and so on will be spelt out and defended. In the light of these ‘marks’ of wellbeing, and of the analysis offered of the ideal end/objects of human nature’s capacities, orientations/ tendencies, and perfecting dispositions (virtues), the ideal end/objects of human capacities are linked with the needs identified in modern needs theory. The place of ideals, recommendations, and general and specific moral principles and rules in this virtue ethics will then be set out.

In justice as a virtue of individuals and states three egalitarian value/principles are alleged to be implicit according to this updated version of Aristotle’s ethics. They are (a) equal respect for persons and reciprocity; (b) the equal claim of all to individual human self-empowerment; and (c) consistent and continuous application of norms and rules governing differential individual desert. The relation of each of these to the general account of personal virtue and to state justice is explained and defended. Persons, states and also organisations are related systematically by the fact that states and organisations are caused by persons and are persons in an analogous sense; they are quasi-persons (See Aristotle Metaphysics 1003a 32ff and Nichomachean Ethics 1096b 25ff). Like persons in the primary or focal sense, states and organisations have six essential dimensions: i) goal oriented roles, ii) needs, iii) powers of control and conflict resolution, iv) cultures, v) differing status and opportunities to interact, and vi) dependency on the natural environment.

Intellect/will in the individual case and leadership groups in the organisational case can be characterised, and also managed, in ethical terms via a ‘frame’ based loosely on the work of Bolman and Deal on organisations with some supplementation proposed. Bolman and Deal pick out the first four concepts (goals, needs, conflicts, and culture) cited in (i)-(iv) above as each being crucial to a template or frame for understanding and managing organisations. Added here are two more: status and opportunity, and relation to the natural environment, (v) and (vi) above, which enter into an ethical frame with a ‘triple bottom line’-economic, social and environmental-orientation. This is done for reasons given in the ethics described. In the above six ways then individuals, states and organisations can be said to be agents, and ethical or just agents by analogy.

Using this analogy, and moving from organisations to persons and back, an argument for the duty of just organisations and just states to provide education and training can be sustained. In a just politics, policies of citizen empowerment through education, including moral education, and training programs aimed to support them via socially constructed opportunity and training, would have the highest moral/political priority, and would be a matter of justice or right. Educational policy would also, in accord with his ethics of autonomy, be devolved and self-administered by subsidiary bodies, not run by large centralised instrument/rational bureaucracies. Education would be a social justice program priority,
ranging quite generally across all the sectors corresponding to the spectrum of human social needs, with highest priority for physical/health education. In particular, provision of lifelong educational and training opportunities for all citizens who wished to use them would be a prime focus of government spending priorities. We begin our account with a sketch of the account of human nature or philosophical anthropology sustaining this ethic, set out in Figure 1.

**Figure 1**

**Neo-Aristotelian Philosphical Anthropology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Voluntary Power OR Controllable Emotion (A)</th>
<th>EG of Capacity/Inclination (B)</th>
<th>EG Of Voluntarily Acquired Disposition (C)</th>
<th>Ideal Perfecting Object/End or Need of Power (D)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intellect (Reason/Intuition/ Conscience and language use are its phases)</td>
<td>To Wonder about causes/ to Understand/ Believe/Infer/Assert/ Judge about theoretic and practical/universal and particular matters.</td>
<td>Wisdom (Self knowledge/ understanding/ Insightfulness/ prudence/ scientific knowledge)</td>
<td>Knowledge of truth and its causes; being understood;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wild/Choice</td>
<td>Wanting and choosing to understand the true human good/choice/ decision/command</td>
<td>Practicality; Temperance/Justice</td>
<td>The Good (Love/Friendship/ Joy; to be loved; to share with others and to respect/love them as they deserve)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memory</td>
<td>To remember Retentiveness</td>
<td>To remember the past: be remembered</td>
<td>Creative activity; to be an inspiration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imagination</td>
<td>To create Literary/Musical or Artistic Skill</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech/writing</td>
<td>Self expression / expression Articulateness</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMOTION</td>
<td>Courage Self-control Proportionality Humour Agility Self-control Visual acuity Good hearing Discriminatory taste Discriminatory touch</td>
<td>Security from harm Control/Order/Predict-ability To respond appropriately to misfortune/evil To feel good about oneself and enjoy one's life To move one's limbs at will To make love/have loved children The visual field Sounds Tastes Odours To elicit or control pleasure/arousal/pain/ alarm responses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>Be afraid Become angry To cry To laugh To walk/dance To make love/procreate To see To hear To taste To smell To touch/be touched</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sadness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delight</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobility</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sex/Reproduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>SENSES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sight</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hearing</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taste</td>
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<tr>
<td>Smell</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Touch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Autonomic Natural Powers and Sub Systems</td>
<td>Balance Receptivity to heat/cold; Immune Pleasure Pain Stress Nail &amp; Hair Growth</td>
<td>Response SystemS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digestion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respiration</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Roughly, the idea is that humans belong to the same species (homo sapiens) and as such they have common capacities and associated desires, ends or goals which differentiate them from other animals. The ‘ends’ towards which they tend to move are consciously apprehended in a way animals are not capable of. The nature we are presumed to share is sketched in Fig. 1. It is this nature which anchors ethics. We are here describing the human ‘phenomena’ at a high level of abstraction, and trying to beg as few questions as possible about the material/causal substructure of the capacities involved. The ‘object/ends’ of the relevant power in the right hand column of Fig 1 are not treated as contingently related to the power, but conceptually so as regards the formal and perfecting objects. The formal objects are identified by reference to what must be true of any object of the power in question, e.g. intelligibility for intellect; desirability for will; visibility for sight. Perfective objects are a smaller class than ‘formal’ objects. For intellect, truth is the end/object; for will, the true good.

Neo-Aristotelian ethics is of a type called ‘teleological’ by moral philosophers. A teleological virtue ethics, or TVE for short, appeals to the notion that all human beings act for the sake of goals perceived as ordered to their wellbeing or happiness. All humans have a raw capacity and wish for wellbeing. Though only the wise know it, intellectual and moral virtues can in fact facilitate the attainment of their wellbeing. One acts in the belief that one’s action will advance one toward this vague good, which is often wrongly conceived in detail. This wellbeing has a specifiable content. Love, friendship, creativity and knowledge are among its main ingredients. This implies that well being needs to be shared to be securely attainable. The quality and scope of enjoyment of the common good by all is indirectly and obliquely the end and best measure of the worth of individual wellbeing, and vice versa. Gross constructed and removable inequalities of wellbeing, inequalities in ability to avail oneself autonomously of opportunity to attain wellbeing, are deplorable and indefensible rationally.

Virtue tends to wellbeing, but because one can have bad luck and/or attract the unwelcome attention of the wicked, even with virtue grounded in knowledge of the true good, this is not absolutely sufficient for wellbeing. But it is necessary, and greatly enhances one’s ability and prospects for attaining it. For example in keeping one’s word and being kind, one values truth and attracts and keeps one’s friends. Using an organisational metaphor, intellect and will are architectonic in relation to other powers, that for the sake of which the others operate. The powers of the self are seen analogically as quasi-hierarchically ordered with respect to versatility of repertoire, inherent nobility and worth roughly as indicated in the order of rows in Figure 1. The human good/ideal life has intellect/reason and will/choice at the top, and the rest of the powers under intellect’s ‘sovereignty’. The self though intellect identifies and describes ‘the highest human goods’ successfully or unsuccessfully; describes the nature of all the other human powers, including its own capacity and limits; identifies the proper objects of each power; and the categories of and means to perfection of power/needs fulfilment. It ‘rules’ well or badly, but ideally, intellect gets the story right. This innate ability to judge and rule other capacities is sometimes called autonomy or self-sufficiency. 1
This teleology assumes in other words that people act in the belief that their action will advance them toward whatever they take this wellbeing to be. It offers its own allegedly correct analysis of wellbeing (living well) by reference to a set of criteria or ‘marks’ of wellbeing. These marks of wellbeing are of intermediate specificity: delight/ecstasy, finality/ultimacy, self-sufficiency/autonomy, and relatively permanent cumulative self-perfecting activity, especially of our inner, immanent, ‘higher’ powers, intellect and will, about their ‘highest’ objects; and the leisure to enjoy these goods.  

At a high level of abstraction, the conceptual content of the ideal life for humans does not vary sharply across cultures; nor does the list of major human capacities and their associated wants. (Brown 1991; Bok 1995; Finnis 1980, 1997; Nussbaum 1988, 1995). For the mind, understanding and knowledge of truth are master ends. For the will such ultimate goods as love and friendship; for the body, food, health and safety from violence, pain and death are especially singled out from the good everywhere found. Capacities can be enhanced and developed by cultivation of dispositions like wisdom for the mind; courage and moderation and self mastery for will; kindness, fidelity and fairness for affiliation with others, good dietary and exercise habits for bodily health. As these virtues are acquired, well-being increases in a cumulative way; the more virtue, the greater freedom one has to engage in the relevant activities at will without the goods being removed. The good/worthy life consists in the pursuit of worthwhile goals. And this is the first of six features of ethical ‘personality’, broadly conceived. 

Many of the ‘most final’ worthwhile ends turn out to be interpersonal and/or collective, both as ends in themselves, and means to wellbeing. These most final or ultimate ends are preferred because they meet the other criteria set out as marks of wellbeing. They are delightful, develop and perfect ‘higher’ human capacities like intellect and will by assimilating their highest goods in a cumulative way. Human goods such as friendship and knowledge, meet the mark of being some of the highest non-instrumental goods available. Consistent with autonomy, delight, self-sufficiency, and cumulativeness of the good, goods like aesthetic/creative skill and expression, and intimacy, are to be made room for, and aspired to by the ideal person. Other graduated ends are fair treatment, health, and peace. The ultimate end test overlaps with the perfection of power test. Ethics is about freely and cooperatively trying to bring these goods into one’s individual life to the greatest extent possible via particular judgements of conscience in the light of the need for a common good, realised collectively by joint mutual reciprocity, justice, forbearance, and non violence. By reflecting on the necessary conditions of enjoyment of these preferred goods, one sees the need to actively follow moral principles and cultivate the associated virtues. Informal reason can be given for general principles like ‘Do not harm others’, ‘Act justly’, ‘Be reasonable’ and the golden rule of reciprocity, ‘Do as you would be done by’. Casuistry can then deploy practical reasoning to show the necessity for more specific precepts like those prohibiting murder, theft, and fraud. However, the range of principle, precept, and rule is limited. For the rest, appropriate
dispositions of character and the use of casuistry by conscience have to suffice, together with law and the other institutions for conflict resolution.

In a normative sense of need, one does not need just anything whatever which one fallibly thinks is necessary for well being, but only what reason and ethical reflection objectively graduates as a warranted want, or well-being component, truly necessary for the good life ideally conceived according to the criteria of the marks of wellbeing and the perfecting object/ends of capacity. Some physical goods are necessary for survival, like life, health, and freedom from violence. Some are necessary for a tolerable social life, like socio-political freedom to shape one’s own capacities; and some are necessary for the best life like friendship, knowledge and creative outlets. In ordinary discourse what is necessary for physical life tends to appropriate the moral space here, and need is not used of ideal goods. But relative to our higher ends or our higher powers, things like education and training, are needs. A second mark of ethics and ethical ‘personhood’ is that it fulfills our needs for empowerment in this normative sense.

So the argument goes from capacity or power of the self as subject or substance to its ideal object; to its perfecting disposition; to practices necessary for its attainment. The ideal object and normatively inflected, objective need are the same. Thus in this way needs theory and virtue ethics converge. Normative need satisfiers and satisfactions are virtuous activities. If the person fulfills the needs for such higher goods, then ceteris paribus the lower powers flourish and attain their functions well. The perfecting object/ends of the powers listed in the right hand column of Figure 1 qualify on the criteria of the marks of happiness as relatively ultimate, agent perfecting, autonomy promoting, and more (intellect) or less (physical) distinctively human higher ends. In Aquinas’ version of this system the vague account of happiness as ‘a complete and sufficient good of one’s nature’ is said to be the object of a universal, at least idle wish by all humans in (symbolised by Ha and filled out more specifically by the wise as having features in row Hm in Figure 2 below). Together with a descriptive anthropology of powers, virtues, objects and ends (in Figure 1 above) intellect graduates only some candidate desires or wants out of an infinity of possible wants. Only a few ends are warranted worthwhile specific ends or needs, fit to be the ingredient ends which constitute the ‘true’ specification of the worthwhile life. These are what those who do wish for Ha should wish for if they are to have their wish fulfilled, according to the best of perennial human wisdom as expressed in the literature over the centuries as the life of the ideal person. We have denoted this as Hs.
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**Figure 2 Marking Out Needs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ha</th>
<th>‘A HAPPY LIFE’ (Eudaimonia (Greek); Beatitudo (Latin); Well-being . Flourishing . Success)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hm</td>
<td>best objects of the best powers of human nature (differentia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hl</td>
<td>Perfective / operational NEEDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. PERSONAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. SOCIAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. PHYSICAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The argument goes roughly thus:

1. All wish for a vague human wellbeing (inevitably), and pursue what they believe is a good ordered to this end, Ha

2. The specifying marks of human wellbeing are as indicated by the italicised terms, and denoted by Hm. (See Figure 2 above.)

3. Given the characteristic human powers/inclinations and their object/ends of Figure 1, and using the marks, Hm, of happiness as standards of selection, assimilating the goods identified in Hs (its list of ingredient ends) best fulfils the wish for Ha. The ends denoted as needs in Hs of Figure 2 have the requisite marks in decreasing degrees as they become less diffuse and more specific, from personal to physical.

4. The goods graduated by the marks, even personal and physical ones, are in the broader sense socially dependent and so social. They fall into six categories: (i) identification of worthwhile ideals; (ii) provision of normative needs satisfiers, (iii) fair conflict resolution processes (iv) cultural transmission processes, (v) distributive justice, and (vi) a safe, clean environment. Because it is indispensable to attaining these goods, social justice is required and in
turn requires respect for the equal dignity of all citizens as persons; assistance to virtuous self empowerment and normative need satisfaction, and reward/punishment for contributions/ offence

5. The initial merely passive wish for any good in Hs (to be/have g) should, and will tend to, turn one towards active display of that good as a means show reciprocity, via the relevant perfecting disposition. To be respected/loved one must be respectable/love; to be told truth, one must live in largely truthful community as a truthful person; and so on for the other ‘hyper- goods’ (Taylor, 1989).

6. Thus (a) one should ‘Seek good and avoid evil’ and (b) ‘Do as one would be done by’ (c) and ‘Avoid harming or oppressing others.’ These ‘principles’ are either self-evident, or dialectically derived from premisses #3 and 4. They correspond in practical matters to theoretical axioms like the principle of non-contradiction, and causal generalisations like: ‘If you help/harm people, they will tend to help/harm you back’ in the assertoric or factual order.

7. Therefore (given 6(a) and (b)) a wise person will imitate the abstractly ideal person by trying to incorporate the ingredients of Hs into their own individual life, given their powers and circumstances. Let’s denote any given individual happiness by Hi. It will ideally require for its attainment by i, a commitment to an overall trajectory in life, in which goods are rank ordered in accord with some approximation to Hs (i’s ‘vocational adaptation’). Ethical rules concern only a small band of activity not permitted, or required, not the important areas of praise, recommendation, and supererogation.

8. Premiss 5 and premiss 6 entail one should wish others to do so and attain their Hi and ethical ideals and more specific precepts, and counsels encourage this, eg Do not murder, steal, or defraud.

At Step 6(a) and 6(b), the first principle of practical reason, (6(a)), and the principle of reciprocity or practical consistency (Golden Rule, generalisation, principle 6(b)) are to informal practical reason what the law of non-contradiction and other axioms and rules of inference are to formal assertoric logic, and control. The principle of justice and the no harm principle further social and physical wellbeing by allowing for the generation of conflict resolving precepts and legal processes at step 7. Conflict resolution is a third mark of the ethical.

Specific precepts of morality are suspended, as it were, from the good objects and ends of human powers – their perfective objects. For example, taking ‘truthfulness’ as a virtue, the rule against lying is suspended from the fact that the perfecting object/end of assertoric (theoretic/speculative) intellect is truth. The ‘No (physical) harm’ principle protects the physical body /autonomic systems; the ‘Avoid offence’ principle protects certain of the emotions; the reciprocity and justice principles protect the socially ordered capacity to freely co-operate for a common good. Bok (1995), Brown (1991) and others have drawn attention to the considerable cross-cultural human unanimity with regard to such principles, and institutions for resolving conflicts without violence where reciprocity and no harm principles are insufficient. Virtue-ethics tries to identify and articulate the ‘higher,’
more indeterminate ideals and goods composing ‘the good or happy life’ (denoted by the terms in the row Hm in Figure 2 above) as far as possible. It takes for granted that we want the best life possible and tries to figure out its content from the marks or criteria of such a life, and express them in cultural stories and myths. Intergenerational transmission of ethical culture is the means of social perpetuation and is a fourth mark of the ethical.3

So far we have seen a place for worthy goals, needs satisfaction, conflict resolution, and ethical culture in a moral system. We turn now to the doctrine of justice in persons and states implicit in this account of the needs-virtue-principles and person/organisation connections implicit in (1)-(6) above.

The Virtue of Justice

It has been argued that the ideal life is one in which one is able to develop one’s human powers in an autonomous manner and be supported in community to deploy one’s higher capacities virtuously in a complete life. Exercising virtue in order to meet ones physical, social, and personal needs relative to the ideal life means that justice must be made possible if we are to meet our common goal of wellbeing. Justice is the virtue of persons and institutions which is ordered to realise the ends of the other virtues in reality in the order of the practicality of their attainment. Physical survival and some associated social needs are everyone’s equal and causally more urgent needs, and in accord with the paradox (explained in footnote 3) that the strictest obligations at the personal level are to refrain from physical harm and preventing others from meeting their needs, in inverse order to their intrinsic worth. As we move up the scale of need through social and personal, the duty to positively assist trails off, but those social needs necessary for basic or primary need -satisfaction are at the high end of the scale of moral modality-strict obligation.

Aristotle quite sensibly thought that personal and institutional justice tended to produce the wellbeing we all wish for, and which we have been discussing, for all citizens. He saw justice as being about finding a kind of mean or equilibrium between selfish egoism or greed on the one hand and relentless altruism on the other. Reciprocity and the golden rule encourage behaviour lying between selfishness, in the sense of greedy, grasping behaviour on the one hand, and altruism on the other. Justice is giving each person their due, treating them the same in those species defining respects which they are the same; and differently in respects in which they as individuals are different.

From what we have seen regarding the human well-being, power, virtue, needs connections, a summative formula for personal and institutional justice in Aristotelean terms might be this:

Justic is (i) equal respect for the shared natural species abilities and autonomy of each person, in a context free from violence, with (ii) equalised empowerment opportunities to meet their needs freely and virtuously by exercise of their abilities, including acquired ones, in a supportive institutional context, via
(iii) evenhanded provision of differential reward or recognition for their efforts, deserts and contributions or lack of same, relative to the sector or domain in which the activity takes place.

This suggests a balance is to be struck between fundamentally equal parties, and that the three clauses in the analysis of justice govern the three steps in the passage from bare human capacity to enhanced or developed, virtuous, well-disposed capacity; and thence to actualised self differentiation as an individual.

Because of our unequivocal equality in species, the need for equal opportunity for self empowerment (developed capacity), and equal consideration of our different deserts, it follows that the virtue of justice and institutions of just distribution, retribution and commercial interchange must be seen to run on the basis of respect for sameness (equality), need for self development (empowerment); and desert (difference). Justice requires just people and institutions to attempt to assure and protect:

(i) Equal negative liberty from harm and reciprocity in exchange and interpersonal relations, for all persons without regard to social status or gender;

(ii) Equal positive liberty and empowerment of all persons as far as practicable to attain minimal perfection of their capacities (need fulfilment) through virtue supported by provision of opportunity and resources necessary to this goal.

(iii) Equal and impartial administration of criteria based on differences of desert, performance and contribution - giving each what is his/her due (benefit, burden, punishment) as an individual. The same behaviour should receive the same treatment; different behaviour should receive different treatment. For different (good and bad) behaviour this will be done via distributive, commercial and retributive justice.

Equality and justice then are tied together even at (iii), which acknowledges the respect due to difference, by the virtue of the requirement of intellectual consistency; treating like cases alike; and presumptive impartiality, defeasible by citing different behaviour. The overarching norm of ‘justice as equality’ requires (i) equality of respect for the subject as passive being (subject) and negatively freedom from bodily harm. The norm of ‘justice as empowerment’ requires (ii) positive freedom and ideally support for self-actualisation and self differentiation. The norm of ‘justice as desert’ requires (iii) recognition of the individual subject as active (fully flourishing in action/performance) i.e. as striving for fruition or enjoyment of individual fulfilment. A just politics/policy will strive to enable all citizens to fulfil their individual potential (normative equality) by achieving as much as they can, and being rewarded and recognised for this achievement (desert). Justice is therefore a complex state or virtue requiring respect for all persons’ freedom; empowerment by the community; and reward for contribution: a balance of equality, empowerment, and desert. This egalitarian thrust is a fifth mark of an ethical, just politics. Education and training would be a derivation from this fifth mark and a vital necessity in such a politics.
Finally, although there is no space to develop it here, a safe and health-supporting natural physical environment is the absolute precondition of a good life for anyone. We saw at the end of part one the paradox that protection of physical integrity of the person is the strictest obligation and usually the most enforced in legal codes. The care of the physical environment both in the sense of physical security/health and respect for the integrity of nature must be taken to be of near absolute value and beyond discussion in any acceptable ethical system. As we saw at the start of this paper, the tragedy of the commons and other environmental and social pathologies due to externalities inherent in the free market are precisely the fate to be avoided by any ethical non-economic irrationalist political economy. We must note the that environmental integrity and sustainability must appear in any ethico-political frame of reference which we may care to adopt as the foundation and rationale for educational and training policy.

The Just State vs the Minimalist State

A plausible way of thinking of the just state from such a neo-Aristotelean point of view is as a quasi-person i.e. on the analogy of the individual person. The metaphor of the higher parts of the person being hierarchical ‘sovereigns’ over the lower parts runs deep, and it is drawn in part from organisational relationships where one group is the authority with respect to another for their common good eg. horse riders to bridle makers; architects to builders. The architectonic relation in found in persons, organisations and elsewhere, including states, as Figure 3 suggests.

We can see our individual selves from an ethical standpoint as in some way like a quasi-community or organisation of parts or powers who/which ought to: (1) attain worthwhile purposes; (2) meet our needs; (3) resolve conflict fairly; (4) support an ethical culture; (5) contribute to the uplift of the disadvantaged; and (6) respect nature. Conversely, the metaphor suggests the possibility of a six point ethical ‘frame’ for organisations locating the roles for the leadership and staff of the relevant organisation to follow in the context of practices. For example, in business, the rules should specify for leaders a set of goals like: (1) quality, employment and profit; (2) respect for needs of all stakeholders; (3) fair conflict resolution processes; (4) an ethical organisational culture; (5) respect for the egalitarian ideals in the social contract with the wider society; and (6) respect for the natural environment.

Following these pointers, the ‘organisation to organisation’ relationship too can be virtuous and friendly, as a relationship between two ‘quasi-persons’ understood in this analogical way, as forming a quasi-community, and running their affairs on the same basis of the ethical ‘frame’ above. Good organisational relations like person to person ones are built on acknowledgement of: (1) the worthwhile goods of our common humanity; (2) equality of human need; (3) respect for differences of personal interest, (4) contribution and commitment to an ethical culture; (5) equal practicable aid to all, especially the naturally disadvantaged where necessary; and (6) sustainable environmental practices.
From here we can extrapolate to states as organisations of organisations, or of communities. Exploring the analogy and checking the headings of our six-point ‘frame’ we get:

Figure 3 The State/Organisation as Quasi-Person: The Virtuous Group as Frame Users/Responsible Role Enactors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Person</th>
<th>State/Corporate Analogue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Powers</strong></td>
<td><strong>Role in</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellect/Reason/Conscience</td>
<td>Leadership’s Knowledge/Corporate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will/Choice</td>
<td>Intelligence and Ethics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memory</td>
<td>Executives/Strategic Plan in Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imagination/Creativity</td>
<td>Corporate Records/History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech</td>
<td>Research and Development/Marketing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception/Senses</td>
<td>Public Relations/Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement</td>
<td>Information Gathering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomic Powers</td>
<td>Corporate Mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Digestion,</td>
<td>Routine Function(aries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respiration,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circulation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>History</strong></td>
<td><strong>Corporate History</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth</td>
<td>Incorporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>Merger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Offspring</td>
<td>Parent/Subsidiary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sickness</td>
<td>Destructive Internal Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death</td>
<td>Bankruptcy/Wind-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activities</strong></td>
<td><strong>Joint Action</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Goals</td>
<td>For corporate Survival,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Needs</td>
<td>perpetuation,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific/Philosophical/Truth</td>
<td>and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artistic/Cultural/Beauty (Self knowledge)</td>
<td>Corporate Research/Retreat/Social Audit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendship</td>
<td>Corporate Culture and Sponsorship of Arts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport/Play</td>
<td>Inter-Corporate Groups/Trade Associations, Professional Bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Bearing/Rearing/Self-Perpetuation</td>
<td>Corporate Sponsoring of Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eating</td>
<td>Parenting of Subsidiaries/Succession Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleeping</td>
<td>Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security from Violence/Theft</td>
<td>Acquiring and Sustaining Income/ R&amp;R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Virtues</strong></td>
<td><strong>Worthy Corporate Goals and Practical Strategic Plan/Ethical Culture</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisdom</td>
<td>Sticking to the long-term good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courage</td>
<td>Corporate ‘Self’ Control/Auditing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperance</td>
<td>Arrangement for Fairness to Customers, Clients, Employees and Shareholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Some Outreach to Community and Needy re inequality of life chances/power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compassion/Charity</td>
<td>Corporate Vision/Symbolic Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty</td>
<td>Keeping to Agreements, Contracts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Faith</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hope</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidelity</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The individuals in the leadership group in the top right hand cell will be guided by the organisational variant of the six category frame set out in the propositions below.
An Ethico-Political Frame For Individuals, State Educational Policy, and Organisations

(1) Worthwhile goals: a virtuous person will subject their personal goals to moral scrutiny in the light of Hs of Figure 2 above, and attempt to edit out of their plans, Hi, those they deem incompatible with well being. A virtuous state will try to provide support for the attainment by all citizens of such goals, especially those more basic goods like freedom from hunger and physical violence that are necessary for any others to be attained, and require cooperative enforcement. A virtuous organisation will select one or two of these as its target, and specialise in moral and efficient delivery of the means to its attainment.

(2) Human needs: a virtuous person, state, or organisation will follow parallel strategies, since in the normative sense explained, needs are simply ethically warranted goals. They are attained by following justice and the rules of ethics, especially clause (i) of the analysis of justice re. respecting persons equally. An ethical state seeks the fulfillment of such needs for all as its goal. An ethical organisation will do likewise.

(3) Conflict resolution between goods: a virtuous person rank orders goods in the manner set out in Figure 2 above, and resolves intra personal conflict by reference to casuistry after consideration of inherent worth, practicality, time, and the morally relevant circumstances. The virtuous state provides a legal and alternative dispute resolution system; and institutions to reward and punish different individual contributions or offences in accord with clause (iii) of the analysis of justice. An ethical organisation has an ethical conflict resolution process.

(4) Ethical culture: a virtuous person will at birth occupy a determinate place on a scale of social inequality and imbibe and support an ethical/just culture which will assist all those below to attain a needs-fulfillment minimum; an ethical state will try through its cultural interventions to promote such equality; and an ethical organisation will try to create it.

(5) Equal empowerment opportunity: a virtuous person will try to assist disadvantaged persons to approach social equality in accord with clauses (ii) of the analysis of justice: a virtuous state will reflect the empowerment to opportunity clause (iii) of the analysis of justice. A virtuous organisation will have those playing the analogous roles of intellect, will and so on such as leadership groups, adopting the six point ethical template in part two.

(6) Respect for and sustainable use of the natural environment. Since the natural physical environment and the human body is the sine qua non of all human activity, personal state and organisational enforcement of those restriction necessary to preserve it are the most morally exacting. Without physical life and health, there is nothing.
Self-accounting; organisational accounting, and social accounting or audit of goal achievement, are the practical analogues of verification in the theoretic sphere. In neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, practical reasoning moves from abstract goals satisfactory to happiness (Hs) to their satisfaction in a process of informal imperative logic in which one moves to identify and bring about outcomes by means satisfactory relative to the goal concerned. States are like persons in some ways because persons cause them to come into being; annex or dissolve them; create and dissolve their constitutive roles; are affected by them; and speak of them as doing things like waging just wars.

The individual is replaced in the analogue with the abstract quasi-person such as ‘Australia’ or ‘The U.S.’ and its identity is derived from its history and constitution. Its governing ‘powers’ are roles set down in the constitution, its rules for rulers and its civic norms in law and custom. To individual ends and needs correspond widely shared common or communal needs, and/or national goals. To wise practical plans of the individual will correspond plans and politics of the leaders of the ruling bodies ordered to create and sustain enabling institutions and infrastructures operating in some measured and practical way to attain for all citizens an instantiation (approximate) of the abstract human good. The state too has its ‘needs’ in an analogous sense: those necessary conditions of its fulfilling its adopted mandate viz. to fulfill the first order needs of its citizens. However, with respect to the relationship between powers and goals, the direction of argument is the reverse of the individual case. Instead of our natural human species powers’ presenting as a given, determining that some wants are warranted as needs, worthy of satisfaction through the achievement of appropriate goals, we now have adopted goals assigned to roles and role incumbents by a leadership group forming direct social policy and these goods are the measure of the effectiveness of artificially willed ‘powers’ i.e. institutions, and structures.

Almost everything in the political domain is a practically-rational collective social ‘construction’ of roles ordered to common goods, not discovery. The objective constraint is the indirect and temporally relatively remote but ultimately normative one of the account of an abstractly flourishing life provided by ethics. This account emerges from virtue ethics as a solution to the problem set by the natural wish for happiness. The State ideally adopts as its telos widespread attainment of this abstract good (ie. the virtuous good or wellbeing of the ideal person as attained for all citizens) as the common good. The analogues of the virtues are well planned and run institutions, social and organisational structures. That is, well planned institutions ideally foster, through the perfect enactment of the powers of the State, the good of all to the extent deemed appropriate, not the good of designated elites of individuals. If politics is justified by ethics as Teleological Virtue Ethics ((TVE) holds, then an organisation, or collective/ community or group of communities/state or region, is one which follows the above ethico-political frame.

What ‘the just state’ must strive to do given this analysis of justice is provide justice in the form of public goods, and structures and processes like legislatures, judiciaries and executives, which enable all individual citizens to meet their (true)
needs as well as possible through the exercise of their powers. The roles designed by the State into itself as a quasi-person must be ‘virtuous’ in the analogical, derivative sense that they must be designed ‘for the sake of’ and in order to bring about just and virtuous individual flourishing. They must enhance and support all the ‘functions’ of human powers; and meet their needs to the extent appropriate and possible given resources. This will entail institutions that maximise wise choice and wise conflict resolution through knowledge and decision sharing, empowerment through education and training required by imperative 5 above; and the sharing of the benefits of the association itself. Law and other conflict resolution processes, and some measure of democracy, are needed because of the plurality of goods, the fact of individuality, the need for personal autonomy and the brute fact that scarcity of resources causes interpersonal (and inter-group) conflict over the distribution of diverse divisible goods in the hierarchy of goods. Since people are indeed on the one hand equal in species and (broadly speaking) in their human needs, but on the other unique as individuals in a variety of ways, some of which are arbitrary and some are voluntarily correctible, then the above three prescriptive principles of justice as equality will be necessary to identify and in some cases redress removable and undesirable social inequalities and threats to or violations of the natural environment following frame imperatives 5and 6 above. This is the challenge of politics, and should inform educational policy in a just state.

The State, represented by spoke #3 on the hub in Figure 4 below can be conceived as itself a quasi-person or a person ‘writ large’, but not necessarily as Plato thought with an educated elite of ‘guardians’ as personified intellectual wisdom, must address the needs of the main human capacities, e.g. of intellect for education, of will for social contact, of the body for health, security and a clean environment. The needs of all to attain the goods available to the ideal person as far as practicable for all in the circumstances of time, place, and resources is the goal. The leadership groups of functional departments acting jointly as quasi intellects and wills will artificially set up departments of State within which are designed role structures to provide social supports for each citizen to freely assimilate goods like those of the ideal person, and to assure accountability in domains 1-
FIGURE 4 Why Ethical Precepts Must Presumptively Prevail Across all Domains and Sectors

Ethics of semi-organised Fields (market, Internet, theatre)
Ethics of commercial eg copyright practice
(8)

Ethics of organisational Fields
(a) Public
(b) Professional
(c) Private

Norms of Communities of Purpose:
e.g. Consumer Protection Groups
(7)

Organisational Ethics
(6)

Individual Person’s Ethics: for one
(1)

Family/Kinship Group Ethics:
e.g. relatively unconditional and uncritical acceptance for all in the scope of the class Ethics for us
(2)

Ethics for all citizens
Communal, Social or Political Ethics
(a) Constitutional
(b) (i) Executive;
(ii) Judicial;
(iii) Legislature
(c) Institutional Sectors
(i) Public;
(ii) Professional;
(iii) Private (Profit and Non-Pro
(3)

Specific Account Of the Human Nature’s Good and Ethics, Norms

Norms of Communities Of Place and Time:
e.g. geographic region, shared history or age
(4)

Customs and Rules of Civil Society:
e.g. traffic, conduct of meetings, etiquette

David Ardagh
The major ends of the good life in Figure 2, which are needs in the normative sense must be catered for somewhere in the ideal politics indicated at spoke #3. Recall that in the above three-clause analysis, justice is a multi clause/multi place predicate, with social, temporal, and other contextual variables. Provided one understands the usage as analogical or ‘equivocal by reference to a paradigm’ it is harmless to talk of a State or of a State’s cluster of functional departments as just, virtuous or unjust. The only requirement is the ideal one of capacity to realise through its roles/departments for every citizen an adequate participation in (apportionment of) all the human goods that compose a worthwhile life as far as resources allow. In short, an enabling State dedicated to autonomy for all citizens to the degree resources permit, run by a wise and just leadership group. As Figure 4 suggests the content of the human good remains as ethics spells it out. The aim of politics in domain 3 of Figure 4 is to help all to attain it.

The state’s own pivotal and intermediate moral warrant is partly strict duty- to provide and protect law and order; part strongly recommended policy - empower all citizens through basic education in self-provision of public goods; and partly ideal- recognise individual and group desert through its institutions. These institutions and organisations must be funded and supported as a positive duty in a just state in order to meet the criteria spelled out in the three clause analysis above. These organisations in turn must look to the six imperatives given to the state in (1)-(6) above. **There is no warrant to directly serve the market or the global economy; or, without reference to ethical ends , productivity; flexibility; and the litany of instrumental goods that pepper the discourse of the current dry economists.**

The spokes of the wheel in the model above are numbered, indicating a hierarchical priority structure. The description of the abstract species-good, general moral principles, specific precepts and norms, as outlined by ethics on the basis of philosophical anthropology/psychology, are the hub- the foundational assumptions. The spokes represent conclusions based on more determinate assumptions added to those of the or platform from which is suspended all the practical reasoning used to supply increasing determination or specification, and finally to address particular cases via casuistry in the domains/spheres represented by the spokes numbered 1-8. Each of these supplies its own ideals and defeasible imperative presumptions and norms to sort and grade its own specific sector’s factual data. But the onus is on officers and agents in these domains to show cause why a negative, prohibitive rule of human morality at the hub or of personal ethics on spoke #1 eg. against lying, fraud, theft, or murder belonging to species ethics (the hub) should be overthrown in a given case, for example because of compelling state security considerations There can be extraordinary cases, and casuistry concedes them. Likewise, any positive precept of ethics enjoining an obligation or positive reciprocity, justice, care, cooperation, support for the needy or special education of the disadvantaged, must be given presumptive validity over non-moral claims.
Conclusion

It is time to sum up and draw out the implications of the analysis for tertiary education and training. This argument should be seen as flowing from Ethics to Politics. As far as Ethics goes, there is a common human desire for ‘well-being’ vaguely conceived, ‘Ha’. This concept has certain criteria or marks, Hm. Applied to the performances, objects, and ends of the human repertoire of capacities, Hn, we can reach a specification of the most final human ends/needs, Hs. Then we can articulate dialectically through practical reasoning general moral principles, specific moral precepts, and a set of moral virtues. It is then for the individual to articulate his/her own adaptation of Hs given their powers and circumstances, Hi, and use their conscience to judge particulars through casuistry articulating this ethic into the eight domains, and the state leaders must craft just institutions corresponding to spoke 3, and public organisations in spoke 6.

Justice has three struts each of which has strong egalitarian implications: respect for persons, the need for freedom of all from harm (negative freedom), which cannot be secured without law and order and reciprocity; social empowerment to autonomously meet one’s needs in a supportive context; and appropriate social response for individual performance, good and bad (desert). Virtuous and just state constitutions and institutions are must empower all as far as possible to attain their individual adaptation of Hs, Hi. Functional departments through elected leadership should design role structures targeted on the empowerment of all to meet their human needs for habitat, shelter, health, defence, (peace); and education, conviviality, conflict resolution, commerce, law and order; (justice).

Education and training at all levels is obligatory but in the rank order of urgency primary, secondary, tertiary. This supports physical and social needs as targeted socio-political practices and so ‘out rank’ support for personal needs. It is not a state responsibility to meet personal needs or to do more than foster and protect the necessary conditions for love, friendship, intimacy; individual and joint artistic and cultural performance and plays. However, it is obligatory to empower all citizens to attain their basic physical and social needs, and desirable that they do more than this. Measures for equal access to empowering education and training opportunities at the highest affordable level (which are themselves fair and just) follow from propositions (2)- (5) of the frame. Measures for physical security of the body and a sustainable natural environment flow from proposition (6). The more closely the education and training approaches a necessity for bodily sustenance, social survival and equalisation, the stricter the duty to provide it.

Thus in a modern state, education and training, even at tertiary level if possible by the qualified, are not to be seen as a gift of the state: they are after security, law and order the closest thing to a moral right. Given principle (1), of what we called the political frame for an Aristotelian politics concerning the goals of a just state, moral censure attaches to individuals, state, or organisations which wilfully omit to assist in meeting educational needs fulfillment at the basic level.
of physical and social needs. In the individual case, domain (1) of Figure 4, where one’s own needs are met to basic level; and one can meet the need with a little personal or joint effort; and the means are at hand which are going to be effective, one ought to assist others in need. Strict moral prohibition attaches to deliberate obstruction of basic-level fulfillment of needs of others, with greatest strictness of prohibition going to attacks on the physical life and capacity of persons because social and personal goods are extinguished by violence and killing of individuals by individuals or states.

Equal claim to empowerment, the second clause of the analysis of justice, mentioned in the ethico-political frame at (2) above, is understood here as meaning that all have equal claim to attempt to fulfil their human needs, where needs are understood in the normative sense of the term explicated in the neo-Aristotelian rationale offered. These select, normatively warranted needs are physical, social and personal. Needs of the three kinds can be satisfied at basic, intermediate and perfective level. In fulfilling these needs individuals can legitimately follow a partiality-driven priority in responding to the claims of others roughly in the order: family and kin; friends and co-workers; fellow citizens and fellow humans. States however while not required to actively fulfil personal needs, must assure their necessary supporting social conditions on an impartial basis. Education and training in physical and social goods attainment are in this category, and can qualify as major types of needs-satisfier in the account. Given proposition (3) of the frame above, to be praiseworthy the just state must make its positive business to design and impartially apply rules of justice -distributive, commercial and retributive-in processes of fair institutional responses to individual good and bad behaviour in these spheres, and provide minimal social and educational support and training in their use. If it does not, it is a moral imposter. Given proposition (4), it must provide moral education as a contribution to its own ethical culture and the environment. Given proposition (5), it must see education as an indispensable tool for social equalisation of opportunity. Given proposition (6), it must use education to bring home the message about the tragedy of the commons from primary school onwards.

If the argument of this paper is sound, many developed countries which presently tout their commitment to economic rationalism, boasting about their lean and efficient social and educational policies, privatising and cutting to bone their social and educational expenditure and support are muddled about their own raison d’etre and headed full-steam in the wrong ethical direction. Their failures which repeatedly hit the headlines are not episodic lapses in an otherwise sound ethically warranted policy, but symptoms of a chronic failure to recognise that ethically one of the three most central tasks of a government is to empower and educate those who need it to attain their wellbeing autonomously, and to do this from common or public resources.
References

Books


David Ardagh


**Articles:**


**Notes**

1 Architectonic relations are exemplified best between architects and builders; generals and soldiers; horse-riders and saddlers. But by analogy the relation can be seen as holding between capacities in an organic entity, functions in a machine, speech acts and phonetics, subject disciplines, social practices, needs, organisations and much else. The intellect and will are architectonic in relation to the power of voluntary movement, the perceptual capacities, and even the autonomic powers of the body which they must take care of with food and air. Organisational relations, as paradigm instances of the architectonic relation, are here used to throw light on the relation of our individual human powers by appeal to analogy.

2 These vague criteria of wellbeing are usefully collected and summarised by Aquinas from scattered remarks by Aristotle at *Summa Theologiae, Pars Prima Secundae, Q 2,4-8;3, 2,5;3-4;* and *Pars Secunda Secundae, Q 182*. They overlap largely with the marks of the organising principle in an architectonic relation.

3 Paradoxically, relentless pursuit of what is best is not always good. What is best or better when it is good than anything else whatever, may not always be good, or best pursued relentlessly. Although physical needs are inherently less distinctive of humans and their fulfilment in a sense less worthwhile than those of higher powers, such as intellect and will, their need satisfiers do require more constant attention. In the order of material causality, they are indispensable to
all life and so the moral demands of respect for physical integrity of the person are most urgent and the strictest of all. Moral and legal codes usually forbid lethal violence more strictly even than lies. Also, social justice and opportunity to self empower socially in a just and peaceful state take precedence in this sense over the life of the higher self/mind as its causal necessary condition for the same reason, and despite their being less distinctive. Thus, given this ‘inversion’ in moral urgency of the order of inherent choiceworthiness by that of material causal dependency, two features of this ethics are particularly notable: (i) the master need for empowerment through intellectual and moral virtues entails an urgent ethico-practical need for equal opportunity and supportive institutions of justice; and (ii) the need for a healthy physical environment with respect to air, water, etc. and security from violence, require strict anti-violence provisions and natural environmental controls. They will appear in two propositions of the promised ethico-political frame presented below. On social transmission of culture across generations see Janna Thompson’s *Discourse and Knowledge: A Defence of a Collectivist Ethics*, Routledge, London (1998).

4 For a suggestion along parallel lines regarding the self/organisation similarity see Seabright, M and Kurke, L (1997). ‘Organisational Ontology and the Moral Status of the Corporation’. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 7 (4) pp:91-108. These authors are intent on breaking down the assumption that organisations are radically different from individuals. They use Quine’s notion of the relativity of ontology to show most alleged differentiating properties like concreteness and complexity do not suffice. A view close to some of the conclusions of this section on moral responsibility but which denies the agency, accountability and moral status of the corporation as such is that of S. Miller (1997).

5 The maintenance of a strict one to one or isomorphic fit between State structures and human powers and needs is not, as Plato thought, necessary and his requirement of a fixed elite can be dropped. As Rawls has suggested, roles can be open to talents as necessary i.e. hierarchy is not ruled out provided offices are open to all and incumbents can be rotated.

6 I have described the informal non-deductive process of casuistic ‘determination’ or specification elsewhere in *Professional Ethics* (1999) Vol. 7, (3 and 4).
\textbf{Nicomachean and Neo-Aristotelian Ethics in Shakespeare’s Tragedies} examines two of Shakespeare’s most compelling tragedies—Othello and King Lear—through the lens of contemporary virtue ethics theory, thereby offering new conceptions of how morality operates in these plays. Although neo-Aristotelian moral philosophers locate the roots of their theories in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, their arguments reach far beyond Aristotle’s original theoretical conception, offering innovative ways for us to understand virtue in our analysis of morality. The dissertation Introduction provides an overview Ethics, Empowerment, and Education: A Neo-Aristotelian Case for the Public Duty to Educate and Train. David Ardagh. Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 2 (2) (2000). Malpractice Liability for the Failure to Adequately Educate Patients: The Australian Law of Informed Consent and Its Implications for American Ethics Committees. Don Chalmers & Robert Schwartz - 1993 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2 (3):371. Public, Ecological and Normative Goods: The Case of Deepwater Horizon. Adam Konopka - 2013 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 16 (2):188-207. Criminal Parental Responsibility: Blaming Parents on the Basis of Their Duty to Control Versus Their Duty to Morally Educate Their Children. Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics. Agent-Based Virtue Ethics. Objections Against Virtue Ethics. A life cannot be very fulfilling if everyone who performs his or her duty very rarely actually wants to. Moral schizophrenia means that, in most situations, individuals will end up discontent from following the reasoning of the moral theory. Modern moral theories do not allow for personal pursuits such as love, friendship, and community, which are valuable sources of pleasure. Both care ethics and neo-Aristotelian ethics were not concerned with the ‘inner life’ of the agent that Slote speaks of. All that matters is that people perform the action the virtuous agent would. But Slote says people need to look into the ‘inner life’ of the agents to see if they have the correct motivations for performing right action. Start studying Neo-Aristotelian Criticism. Learn vocabulary, terms and more with flashcards, games and other study tools. Location and creation of ideas and materials for the speech (examines the main ideas, lines of argument, content. Two forms of proof internal/artistic, external/inartistic. Internal/Artistic (part of invention). Within the framework of the project. The cultural model of Kazakhstan in thirty developed countries: problems of integration and intercultural communication in a changing world. On the basis of reasonable activity of a man as his natural properties Al-Farabi made a number of conclusions about the humanistic equality of all people as a result of the overall reasonable nature of the autonomy of the human being, the creative activity of the person, freedom of the human will, independent of the value of human life. This issue Al-Farabi considered in his Treatise on the views of the residents o