Chronophilia

Justin Clemens

Nathan Widder’s new book is impressive in many ways, from its intriguing title on. Indeed, this title, Reflections on Time and Politics, turns out to problematize the very terms it deploys. The etymology of ‘reflection’ is ultimately Latinate: a bending or turning-back. The word at once signifies a throwing-back of light or heat from a surface; an image; the action of bending back; a reference or relation; a thought expressed; the faculty of mind by which mind deals with itself. Think, too, of the genre of ‘Reflections’: a series of famous and influential writings, from Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France, up to the choice of the title for collections by Walter Benjamin and others. ‘Reflections’ then are constitutive re-foldings of energy that produce semblances of identity that they at once transform.

In its very structure, a series of eighteen ‘reflections,’ Widder’s book essays, as I have said, to exemplify its own theme, playing on all these significations in a resolutely post-Deleuzian way, exploring what rebounds affectively from surfaces (and not from depths); the primordiality of simulacra; the vicissitudes of the discontinuous; the differentiators of the heterogeneous; the traumatisms of time. Widder, moreover, engages in these reflections with a handful of proper names: above all, Aristotle, Bergson, Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze, and, in minor supporting roles, Saussure, Bachelard, Freud and Lacan. I will focus critically on several of Widder’s points, in order to bring out something I think he gestures towards without ever expressly affirming; the first is a general remark on the relation between time and space in Widder’s project; the second bears on his interpretation of Jacques Lacan; the third on the topic of politics in its relation to ethics.

Widder opens by declaring: ‘Time’s dynamics, embedding the past and memory in the present in such a way as to propel time into an always open and indeterminate future, are being deployed against spatial models of representation to develop further non-representational concepts of difference, which had often been elaborated primarily in spatial terms’ (1). You get the point as a general mission statement — it’s just a program that’s already been underway for two centuries or so. What else was German Idealist philosophy, à la Schelling and Hegel? Didn’t Heidegger write a book called Being and Time? As Michel Foucault expresses the situation, in an explicitly politico-institutional frame:
At the moment when a considered politics of spaces was starting to develop, at the end of the eighteenth century, the new achievements in theoretical and experimental physics dislodged philosophy from its ancient right to speak of the world, the cosmos, finite or infinite space. This double investment of space by political technology and scientific practice reduced philosophy to the field of a problematic of time. Since Kant, what is to be thought by the philosopher is time. Hegel, Bergson, Heidegger. Along with this goes a correlative devaluation of space, which stands on the side of understanding, the analytical, the conceptual, the dead, the fixed, the inert.1

One might therefore respond to Widder that, if his project remains in a generally Romantic philosophical lineage, it at once suggests and evades an antithetical shadow project, viz., one which would ask as to the spacing of time and difference, and attempt to construct a concept of time that doesn’t succumb to residual sociological pressures, on the one hand, or to the priority of dynamics, on the other. Foucault’s remark certainly doesn’t compromise the validity of Widder’s project to reflect upon the contemporary question of philosophy’s relationship to politics and time, not at all. But it does suggest that the time of philosophy, its preposterous anachrony, is itself often a disavowed element of its own space-of-placement or sp ace (to invoke a term of Alain Badiou’s):2 Philosophy’s anachrony is often due to its re-collection of a speculative genealogy for itself, one which scrambles elements of the past and present in ways that remain inaccessible to its own thinking of chronology qua disavowed self-placing.

I present this as a too-general, unsatisfactorily specified remark in order to proceed to a much more specific differend: the non-relation between Deleuze and Lacan. Widder himself is among the best I have read at characterising this non-relation, which he does with real insight, sensitivity, and a surprising lack of partisan blindness. Against Widder, however, I will present my own account of the non-relation in detail, in order to conclude with a kind of evaluation of his insights. I maintain that: 1) Deleuze is more Lacanian than most Lacanians; 2) his supposed critique of Lacan doesn’t cut where he, Deleuze, seems to think it does (e.g., in his repudiating of ‘lack,’ ‘repression,’ ‘law’ or in his change of vocabulary to ‘affirmation,’ ‘determinitization,’ ‘plane of consistency,’ etc.); 3) nonetheless, precisely because of this mistaken self-reflection, Deleuze does push Lacan further at a particular point, by finally enabling the full and absolute separation of ethics from politics; 4) what Deleuze then constructs is a philosophy of a pure ethics without politics; 5) the ‘cost’ of this brilliant development is the possible reintroduction of a covert presupposition of totality (albeit completely transformed) into the thought of immanence itself.

Crucially, when you’re dealing with Jacques Lacan, you’re not dealing with just any philosopher. Actually, you’re not dealing with a philosopher at all, and for a number of reasons. Above all, Lacan insists throughout his life that psychoanalysis is a clinical practice. It is certainly not philosophy. He even later formalises his difference from philosophy by insisting on his lineage with a post-dadaist ‘antiphilosophy.’3 This immediately has several consequences. One has to take into account that psychoanalysis is a singular practice, and not a doctrine nor a set of propositions. Psychoanalysis certainly does not think in the same way, nor about the same things as philosophy. If psychoanalysis can sometimes seem to draw on philosophical concepts and arguments, this is, variously, as a kind of resource; a resource of auto-differentiation, a resource of stimulation, and, finally, as a simulated simulation. Psychoanalysis is an ethical practice of ‘well-speaking’ (not of ‘well-being’ or of whole-thinking). It is in fact localised as a practice by its attentiveness to the singular utterances of analysands, and in its deployment of two other ‘disciplines,’ modern science and literature. None of these are philosophical. Modern (‘Galilean’) science in fact constitutes a rupture with philosophical conceptuality, above all in its drive to formalise the universe in mathematical script and in the construction of experimental spaces. Literature, too, constitutes a rupture with philosophical conceptuality, and has been immemorially (as is testified by Plato’s famous expulsion of the poets). Psychoanalysis is genuinely an antiphilosophy in that it injects literature into science (see Freud’s own remarks in Studies in Hysteria) in its attempt to capture something otherwise irretrievable and incomprehensible about the utterances of its patients. There is therefore something a priori suspicious about any attempt to treat psychoanalysis and its writings as if they could be submitted to philosophical investigation.
Yet Lacan’s own work, from the 1930s to the 1970s, clearly functioned as a kind of honey-trap for the very greatest philosophers of his time. From Alexandre Kojève (with whom he had planned to write an article in the mid-1930s on the differences between Hegelian and Freudian theories of desire), through Jean Wahl, Jean Hyppolite, Paul Ricoeur, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and of course Gilles Deleuze (etc. etc.), French thought of the twentieth century is irremediably marked by psychoanalysis, and Lacanian psychoanalysis at that. You’d perhaps be surprised by just how many of the above-named luminaries dropped by Lacan’s Seminar at one point or another. To pick up on a phrase of Derrida’s, however, this attraction has also been a kind of ‘organizing allergy’ — every one of the aforementioned philosophers (rightly) recognised that psychoanalysis offers the most extreme challenges to thought. It’s even tempting to suggest that, just like Claude Lévi-Strauss and Merleau-Ponty — who’d spend Sunday afternoons at Lacan’s talking about art — they just don’t get it. On Lévi-Strauss’ own admission, the reason they spoke about art was because Clod and Moz just didn’t get what Lacan was on about whenever he veered off topic.

But bad-faith, miscomprehension and allergy have hardly stopped the plunder. A number of contemporary bien pensant philosophical issues are still directly indebted to Lacan. For our purposes here, let’s take just four issues that Lacan introduces, on the basis of his own idiosyncratic encounters with post-Saussurean linguistics, and which he remorselessly re-interrogates throughout his work:

1. the signifier as constitutive lack
2. the inconsistency of any thought of the whole
3. the subject as empty, split, unreflective support
4. the rift between statement and utterance

1. If Lacan relies heavily on post-Saussurean linguistic science — and let’s not dismiss the claims of ‘science’ here too rapidly — he immediately remarks something about structural linguistics that is at once very simple, yet has extraordinary consequences. For Lacan, the Saussurean conception of the sign has a peculiarity that Saussure himself falsifies with his weird little diagrams. It is this: one never encounters a signified anywhere. Ever. One only ever encounters signifiers. A simple, stupid point. If each language, as an ensemble of diacritically-defined signs, must cut up the world differently, then one cannot think of the signifieds of that language as having any direct lock onto the real. On the contrary, human language is distinguished from other sign-systems by precisely being, in Hegel’s terms, ‘the murder of the thing.’ Not only is there no possible grounding referent outside of language, nor any transcendental signified, but language itself creates the things of the world for a language-user. Yet no signified can ever be met with directly, anywhere; one has to go through signifiers. Yet there is no such thing as a pure signifier in itself, without at least the presumption of a signified. That ‘signified’ can only be encountered as lacking from the signifier that nominally conveys it; moreover, every signifier leads only and always to others. At one stage, Lacan will even translate this double-differentiation in terms drawn from classical rhetoric: metaphor (the signified does not exist except in tropes) and metonymy (the signifier does not exist except by referring to others). Language is constituted by inflections, deflections, defections, misdirections — and reflections.

Language can only function because it is internally ‘barred,’ lacking from itself, yet always and everywhere presuming what it misses. The sense of a signified insists. This bar — to which we will give another sense in a moment — is a cut within the word. For Lacan, this gives a precise sense to the ‘castration complex’ of Freud: any language user is literally castrated by words that are themselves cut cuts. What, for psychoanalysis, can be the signifier of this irreparable lack? Nothing other than the ‘phallus.’ The phallus is the signifier of the constitutive lack that founds signifying, signification. The phallus is the signifier of lack that is itself lacking from its place — i.e., there is no sign in language that exemplifies it. It is thus a simulacrum, in the strict sense, undoing any relation between original and copy. It is also always only ‘veiled,’ because no signifier in language can be that phallus. If you want to say something to render your average Deleuzian antsy about this: the phallus is the differenciator.
This is a crucial point that Widder makes: ‘Deleuzean repetition here converges with Lacanian repetition’ (87). His exegesis proceeds:

The Oedipal story…refers not to a trauma occurring in time but to the traumatic organization of time itself. In this revised story, the Oedipal trauma may or may not be established by a real childhood event. Its effect, in defining sexual difference in heterosexual and genital terms and introducing the castration threat, is at once to separate and join together two orders, one infantile and pregenital and the other adult and genital, each having divergent body images and both real and imaginary objects of desire, memories of the past, and expectations of the future. The expression of this event is the phallus, the signifier of the mysterious paternal Law, which seems to give sense and cohesion to the psyche but is never entirely incomprehensible. Because it constitutes the separate series through a radical break, it cannot be localized within either series, appearing at the margins at each. But the phallus does not establish an identity between the series, because it has no identity itself (94).

This cannot be bettered as a description. One could add that: where Deleuze seems to dismiss or correct psychanalysis, he often simply rephrases and/or renominates what Lacan has already said. There is thus unquestionably what Harold Bloom would call ‘an anxiety of influence’ at work, legible in the surface distortions of Deleuze’s claims on this and related points. Even the ideal of the affirmation of events in a non-resentimental sense brings us very close to Lacan’s theory of the psychoanalytical ‘act,’ which effects a radical operation of depersonalisation (cf. Lacan’s interpretation of Antigone and the concomitant injunction ‘don’t give way on your desire’).

This dangerous proximity is presumably one reason why Deleuze is also shifty about his relation to structuralism. Widder is correct to note, against Deleuze, that Saussure doesn’t only define the sign negatively, but also as a positivity: ‘An unlikely source of elucidation here is Saussure’s linguistic theory — unlikely because Saussure is often thought to hold that language contains only negative differences. Deleuze too holds this reading. But Saussure’s thinking is more subtle’ (111). At the same time, what ‘is missing from Saussure’s analysis is the sort of nonhistorical becoming found in Hegel and Deleuze…’ (113). You can see the excellence of Widder’s procedures in these little extracts: a serious encounter with and attempt to elucidate concepts beyond the received images of partisanship, all the while sustaining the focus on the problematics of time throughout.

2. Yet Widder is probably incorrect to blame Lacan for undue Platonizing; or, rather, Widder doesn’t quite get the peculiar ways in which Lacan sets Plato against Plato himself. Widder writes ‘In its structural function, Lacan’s unconscious desire parallels Plato’s on almost every major point’ (56). This is broadly accurate: indeed, Freud himself in Group Psychology emphasizes that the love of analysis and love as conceived by ‘the divine Plato,’ are the same in their ‘origin, function, and relation.’ Yet it sort of isn’t too: for Widder to remark that ‘the rather obvious residues of transcendence in Bergson and Lacan lie in the former’s appeals to mysticism and the latter’s use of language of negative theology with respect to the phallus and the feminine’ (61) is a misreading of Lacan’s own peculiar form of immanence (in this, Lacan is followed by Badiou, who has dedicated a number of important essays to variants of this issue in Lacan, notably in Conditions). When Widder remarks that Lacan never really explains this recourse to transcendence, my objections are: i) Lacan doesn’t have to explain this because he is not a philosopher; and, to the extent that such an explanation is demanded, it misses part of the point of his program; ii) such a thought is nonetheless already there, but it has to be reconstructed because Lacan’s not doing philosophy.

What is the single biggest problem with the attempt to think ‘pure immanence’? It is the difficulty — the impossibility? — of thinking pure immanence without simultaneously reintroducing totality. This is why, despite his very strong identification with Spinoza, Lacan cannot ultimately affirm ‘Deus sive Natura.’ In the end, God and Nature are themselves struck by inconsistency; the whole is an imaginary phenomenon; what we confront when we try to think language is its constitutive ‘not-all.’ Language introduces an irreparable failure
into ‘the totality of things,’ no matter how one tries to conceptualise the latter. Language, to be ‘language’ at all, has to split from the world it allegedly signifies, as well as to split internally from itself in order to function. Language ‘represses,’ sure, but it ‘represses’ literally nothing. The signifier for this operation, which cannot itself, strictly speaking, be said to exist, is the phallus. Rather, with Lacan, the simulacrum rises to the surface, becomes depthless mirror, affirmative transformation…but also reterritorialization ‘at the same time’ (though this ‘at the same time’ is precisely what’s put into question by Lacan, as it is by Deleuze and the army of contemporaneous French philosophers).

This non-existence drives as it divides. The phallus is the name Lacan gives to that which operates a disjunctive synthesis within and between the orders. It is necessarily extra-ontological, and only revealed in slips, faults, inconsistencies, etc. — i.e., in nonsense and paradox: ‘What are the characteristics of this paradoxical entity? It circulates without end in both series and, for this reason, assures their communication. It is a two-sided entity, equally present in the signifying and the signified series. It is the mirror. Thus, it is at once word and thing, name and object, sense and denotatum, expression and designation, etc.’5 Ought this sound familiar to Deleuzians? Deleuze certainly alters the terms and mode and references of Lacan, but all this is done on a strictly Lacanian basis. Where Deleuze fails from a Lacanian point of view (and, more recently, from a Badiouan point of view, which explicitly picks up the Lacanian critique), is that, in his drive to think pure immanence, he covertly reintroduces a totality of being. Let’s put this another way: ‘equivocity’ (Lacan) versus ‘univocity’ (Deleuze). Equivocity is the cost of trying to think immanence without totality; univocity is the cost of trying to think immanence without negativity.6 In any case, it is not transcendence that is the problem with Lacan; rather Lacan offers a new way of thinking about how a sense of transcendence is irreducible for humankind, as he points towards the real problems that therefore have to be confronted when attempting to construct a viable theory of immanence. It is my contention that Deleuze himself knew this, and that’s exactly what he then undertook to provide — albeit with unavoidable distortions.

3. Let’s pick up on Lacan’s sustenance of the subject. The subject for Lacan can only be the subject of the signifier. What does this mean? Lacan’s revised version of the Saussurean diagram is: S/s. What’s the subject? Nothing but this /, an empty, cleft support that has to be there for any utterance to function as an utterance. The / cannot seize itself, cannot think itself, except by being there where it does not think, and not being there where it does. The ‘subject,’ in other words, has no need to be biologically human; it is merely whatever supports a signifying chain. For something to leap the bar, it must be at once the repetition of the phallic inexistence and the creation of a new signifier. Metaphor, poetic creation, must be the repetition of what does not exist (the phallus) and the invention of a difference (new signifiers).7 Whether Stoic or Cynic, Cyrenaic or Carollian, you don’t leap into ‘affirmation’ just like that. Repetition as difference, difference as repetition, ‘repression’ and ‘return,’ ‘law’ and ‘desire,’ ‘lack’ and ‘creation’…change the names if you prefer, perhaps to give yourself a nice warm feeling of being productive and affirmative (because you don’t like the sense of the words ‘negation’ or ‘lack’?), but, as Lacan might say, just because your friend’s shoved his head in the sand doesn’t mean you’re invisible too. The desperate attempt to desexualize desire patent in these renominations — and which is only exacerbated by later Deleuzo-Guattarian developments — is itself an attempt to re-veil (and revile) one of the great antiphilosophical critiques. Under this description, metaphysics really is a ludicrous attempt at an apotropaic seduction of the Other.

4. More on the /. Despite Lacan’s long-standing interest in Hegel’s thought, he is not and cannot be a dialectician in the strictly Hegelian sense. There is no developmental immanence, nor contradiction, nor sublation possible in regards to language, and the logic of the signifier is not subject to the science of logic. What Lacan accordingly emphasizes in his own doctrine are various forms of non-dialectical differences: the differential definition of signs, the difference within each, the gap in any instance of language-use between what it says and that it is said, etc. Lacan is not really susceptible to Widder’s critiques at this point, except at the cost of serious misrepresentation.8
If we take the evidence of this ‘non-relation’ between Deleuze and Lacan seriously, it is possible not only to see how thoroughly the youngish Deleuze (particularly the one of *Difference and Repetition* and *Logic of Sense*) remains Lacanian, but how he also uses Lacan to try to push philosophy past its capture by the linguistic turn. In a specifically psychoanalytic sense, it is even possible to assert that Deleuze is truly in love with Lacan. What does this mean? I am claiming that Deleuze draws from Lacan a series of topics, methods and propositions whose provenance he then assigns elsewhere (to the Stoics, the Scholastics, to Spinoza, etc.), dissimulating the traces of his own operations. Yet love qua transference is nothing other than the violent, recurrent misassignation of predicates, which at once knows and does not know what it is doing. Along similar lines, Deleuzians themselves are usually unbelievably unfaithful to their own professed master, inssofar as they utterly refuse to examine the singularity of this non-relation. To track Deleuze’s own labyrinthine references — for example, ‘Deleuze and esotericism,’ ‘Deleuze and Maimon’ — is a necessary and desirable task. But it remains purblind unless one also tries to discern the adversarial, nameless force that gives Deleuze the most powerful kick up the arse, the one that forces Deleuze to re-think philosophy and, in doing so, to become ‘Deleuze.’ This nameless force bears, as I am arguing here, the hunter’s mask of a disavowed proper name: Lacan.

My point is not simply corrective, in the sense of rectifying misapprehensions about influence, and supplying a more adequate account of personal and conceptual issues. Rather, the fundamental reason that I have been harping on this non-relation is that it enables us to bring out Deleuze’s real and radical originality vis-à-vis the philosophical tradition. It’s time to say it bluntly: Deleuze not only has no theory of ‘the political’ or of ‘politics,’ but the entire animus of his work is directed against the possibility of any viable conception of politics in the name of an unprecedented, even absolute ethics. The massive dissension about the signifier ‘politics’ in the Deleuzian literature is a symptom of the commentaries’ giving way on the extremity of Deleuze’s desire. To my mind, Deleuze is perhaps one of the first thinkers of a truly pure and truly contemporary ethics.

If Widder’s book is one of the strongest commentaries I have read on these issues — and, indeed, on several other issues, notably the location of cracks in the thought of Aristotle and Bergson — he still doesn’t quite go far enough. Again, the symptom here is the retaining of the word ‘politics.’ Why call it politics at all? — it’s not true etymologically, pragmatically or conceptually. ‘The polis’ — Deleuze not only has nothing like a city of men in his thinking, but his thought remains one of the greatest contemporary assaults on philosophical anthropology. Moreover, the term ‘micropolitics’ is essentially a misnomer if one accepts the full import of the Deleuzian intervention. There are becomings and PoC constructions, rather than human revolutions or utopian projections.

So when Widder writes of ‘politics and ethics’ in a single line, one has to say that only someone already entirely on the side of ‘ethics’ would be able to write this so easily, with so little sense of stress. (This is not a criticism of Widder’s position, but an acknowledgement of the strong decision he has clearly made; if a criticism at all, it is regarding Widder’s reluctance to assert his position as clearly as he might.) Yet, in speaking of the necessity of the overcoming of identities, Widder is more accurate: ‘This overcoming is an ethical and political task. Or, perhaps better, it is an ethical task that flows into politics. It is a crucial task insofar as political and social life continues to privilege fixed markers and identities that are no more than surface projections’ (11). Again, Deleuze offers us a new ethics, one that has nothing to do with ‘ethics committees’ or any existing values, that is extra- and trans-political, and whose absolute incompatibility with ‘politics’ must be declared as such. Widder’s book is one of the few that can help us proceed along this great if treacherous line. It suggests, despite itself, that to keep saying ‘politics’ is already to be so far downstream the Deleuzian source as to miss Deleuze’s import and implications almost entirely (of course, sometimes Deleuze himself misses his own import).
My concluding theses are these:

1) there is no possible Deleuzian politics;
2) there is a Deleuzian ethics;
3) any possible Deleuzian ethics must be an ethics of (self) problematizations;
4) such problematizations must be as much ‘situational’ as they are ‘aionic.’

To date, we have barely approached the borderlands of such a milieu.

Justin Clemens is a Lecturer in English at the University of Melbourne, and has published extensively on psychoanalysis, contemporary European philosophy, and Australian art and literature. Recent books include Villain (Hunter Publishing 2009) and Black River (re.press 2007), illustrated by Helen Johnson. He is also a co-editor of The Work of Giorgio Agamben with Alex Murray and Nick Heron, and of the forthcoming Alain Badiou: Key Concepts (Acumen 2010) with A.J. Bartlett.
NOTES

6. In his response to an early draft of this piece, Jon Rolfe wrote: ‘One thought on an interesting turn of phrase: that equivocity and univocity are “costs.” To my mind, the cost of thinking univocity is, for Deleuze, the regrettable theme of pure immanence, and this latter is the figure of totality, rather than univocity in itself. In Lacan, what I am struck by from my very peripheral position, is that it’s a very peculiar equivocity, since the division in being locates “being” on one side (as the signifier-effect of language) and literally nothing on the other. This is admirable and striking. Deleuze is, dare I say it, the more conservative, because the covert totality reintroduced by the theme of pure immanence—from my point of view at least—does indeed draw close to a crude vitalism in the way that Badiou argues he does.’ I believe Rolfe is correct in this, but I have been unable myself to respond adequately to his remark in the present article.
8. Moreover, it’s necessary to underline that Lacan himself constantly shifted his own doctrines under both internal and external pressures, and the account that I am giving here is a still-too-general ‘average version of Lacan’ that avoids especially his later work.
9. For more on this point, see my ‘Love as Ontology,’ op cit.
10. See for example, the various incommensurable positions proposed by Claire Colebrook, Understanding Deleuze (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2002); Reidar Due, Deleuze (Cambridge: Polity, 2007); Todd May, “The Politics of Life in the Thought of Gilles Deleuze,” SubStance, 29.3 (1991); 24/33, Philippe Menue, Deleuze et la question de la démocratie (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2003), Paul Patton, Deleuze and the Political: Thinking the Political (London: Routledge, 2004), etc. To some extent, I just don’t understand why, when, in What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari speak of philosophy, science and art — and flagrantly ignore politics/the political as a possible plane of consistency — this extraordinary ‘omission’ doesn’t seem to be taken seriously.
11. Perhaps partially a function of his occupation as a Lecturer in Political Theory in a Department of Politics and International Relations, perhaps partially a function of philosophical nostalgia?
On these bronze coins of the Byzantine Empire the emperor’s name and portrait are not part of the design, hence they are anonymous. Instead of the earthly king, these coins depict Jesus Christ, King of Kings. Constantine, whose earlier coinage played homage to various pagan gods, including the sun god Sol (favored by many Romans) placed the Chi-Rho on some of his coins in the years after his conversion. Enter Anonymous. The hacktivist collective known for operations such as Project Chanology, the Westboro Baptist Church hack, OpISIS, anti-pedophile ops and Occupy Wallstreet announced, over the weekend, a declaration of war on QAnon: A sample of the reactions to the announcement are: The full announcement states: The war against QAnon is declared. You are not Anonymous. Hello boys and girls, it’s time to learn your A B C’s. “L.” “M.” “N.” “O.” “P.” “Q.” Op Q, Op Q Anon. Abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.

Schizophrenics Anonymous is a peer support group to help people who are affected by schizophrenia and related disorders including bipolar disorder, schizoaffective disorder, psychotic depression and psychosis. The program was established in Detroit, [[Detroit]] in 1985. The founder was Joanne Verbanic, who was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1970. Shortly before forming SA, Verbanic publicly disclosed her diagnosis and discussed her illness on national television in an effort to challenge the stigma. This is the audio version of the Fourth Edition of the Big Book, the basic text for Alcoholics Anonymous. ...read more. show less. Part I “Pioneers of A.A. Doctor Bob’s Nightmare. (1) Alcoholics Anonymous Number Three. (2) Gratitude in Action. (3) Women Suffer Too.